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Racial Profiling
ROAD WORK: RACIAL PROFILING AND DRUG
INTERDICTION
ON THE HIGHWAY
Colombia-based traffickers continued to control wholesale level cocaine
distribution throughout the heavily populated northeastern United
States... often employing Dominican criminals as subordinates.... In
major U.S. cities, organized criminal groups of Cuban, Jamaican, and
Mexican nationals, as well as African-American and ethnic Dominican
gangs, dominated the retail market. - United States National Narcotics
Intelligence Consumers Committee, November, 1998'
There should be no loopholes or safe harbors for racial profiling. Official
discrimination of this sort is wrong and unconstitutional no matter what
the context. - John Ashcroft, Attorney General of the United States,
January, 20012
We have emphatically rejected ethnic profiling. What we have looked to
are characteristics like country of issuance of passport.... - Michael
Chertoff, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, November,
2001'
I. INTRODUCTION
Hypocrisy about race is hardly new in America, but the content
changes. Recently the spotlight has been on racial profiling. The story
of Colonel Carl Williams of the New Jersey State Police is a well-
known example. On Sunday, February 28, 1999, the Newark Star
Ledger published a lengthy interview with Williams in which he talked
about race and drugs: "Today... the drug problem is cocaine or
marijuana. It is most likely a minority group that's involved with
that."4 Williams condemned racial profiling - "As far as racial pro-
filing is concerned, that is absolutely not right. It never has been con-
1. NAT'L NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMM. ("NNICC"), THE NNICC
REPORT 1997: THE SUPPLY OF ILLICIT DRUGS TO THE UNITED STATES 11-12 (1998) [here-
inafter NNICC REPORT].
2. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John Ashcroft to Be Attorney General of
the United States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 492 (2001)
(answer of Senator Ashcroft to questions submitted by Senator Feingold).
3. Preserving Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Panel I of a Hearing of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., Fed. News Serv., Nov. 28,2001, at 20.
4. Kathy Barrett Carter & Ron Marsico, Whitman Fires Chief of State Police, STAR
LEDGER (New Jersey), Mar. 1, 1999, at 1A.
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doned in the State Police and it never will be condoned in the State
Police" - but he said that the illegal drug trade is ethnically balkan-
ized: "If you're looking at the methamphetamine market, that seems
to be controlled by motorcycle gangs, which are basically predomi-
nantly white. If you're looking at heroin and stuff like that, your
involvement there is more or less Jamaicans."' Hours later, still on
Sunday, Governor Christine Todd Whitman fired Williams from his
job as superintendent of the New Jersey State Police because "his
comments... are inconsistent with our efforts to enhance public con-
fidence in the State Police." 6 Six months later Colonel Williams sued
the state for damages, arguing (among other claims) that his state-
ments about race and drugs reflected well-known facts, and pointing
out that the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy
website told visitors that in Trenton, New Jersey, "crack dealers are
predominantly African-American males," powder cocaine dealers are
"predominantly Latino," heroin traffickers are "mostly Latinos," and
the marijuana market is "controlled by Jamaicans."7
It is not news that American police officers devote a dispropor-
tionate amount of their attention to racial and ethnic minorities. The
phrase "racial profiling," however, has only recently appeared and has
no set meaning.' As we use the term, "racial profiling" occurs when
a law enforcement officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or
otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that
members of that person's racial or ethnic group are more likely than
the population at large to commit the sort of crime the officer is
investigating.' The essence of racial profiling is a judgment that the
targeted group - before September 11, 2001, usually African
Americans or Hispanics; now often Arab Americans or visitors from
5. Id. at 6A.
6. Id. at 1A, 6A.
7. C.J. Chivers, Ex-Police Leader's Claim of Bias Attacked, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at
B4.
8. Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson described the practice in an excellent and prescient
article in 1983, when it still had no name. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to
Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983). Jerome Skolnick and Abigail Caplovitz report, on
the basis of a LEXIS search, that the first use of the term in the American press was in 1987,
followed by a handful of uses through 1993, 31 in 1994 and 1995,63 in 1996 and 1997, 187 in
1998, over 1000 in 1999, and over 1000 again from January through September of 2000. See
Jerome H. Skolnick & Abigail Caplovitz, Guns, Drug and Profiling: Ways to Target Guns
and Minimize Racial Profiling, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 413,419 n.36 (2001). Our own search of the
LEXIS "mega" file of all court opinions in its database reveals that the term was first used in
a court opinion on any aspect of law enforcement in 1996, followed by 15 references in 1999,
38 in 2000, and 75 in 2001, as of November 28,2001.
9. See Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1413, 1415 (2002),
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Middle Eastern countries - is more prone to crime 'in general, or to a
particular type of crime, than other racial or ethnic groups."0
Racial profiling depends on police discretion in choosing suspects.
At one end of the continuum, racial profiling is impossible once the
police are looking for a particular person - the victim's partner, the
woman in the surveillance video, Osama bin Laden - although it may
be a factor at an earlier stage, in determining who to look for. At the
other extreme, racial profiling can flourish in proactive investigations
in which the police scan large numbers of people in search of culprits
in crimes that have not been reported or have not yet occurred. Re-
cently it has been a controversial topic in debates over the conduct of
anti-terror investigations following the September 11, 2001 attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon." Before that, racial pro-
filing was primarily an issue in investigations of crimes of possession,
usually of guns or drugs. It has received particular attention in the con-
text of highway drug interdiction, which is the subject of this study.
Did Colonel Williams's comments amount to an admission of ra-
cial profiling? At first blush, he seems to have done no more than re-
state the common law enforcement position that minority groups
dominate major drug trafficking in the United States. 2 Supporters
have described him as an honest cop who was fired for telling the un-
pleasant, politically incorrect truth.13 In their view, he was saying: "We
don't target by race, we arrest those who should be arrested; it's unfor-
tunate that most of them are black and Hispanic, but it's not our
fault."
But Colonel Williams's comments could also be interpreted in a
somewhat different manner, as a defense of racial profiling: "Of
course we stop and search motorists based on their race - because it
10. It does not matter if the officer uses other criteria as well. As long as race or ethnic-
ity is an essential element, targeting young black males is racial profiling even if other blacks
are not directly affected. On the other hand, it is not racial profiling for an officer to stop,
question, search, or arrest a person because his race matches the description of the perpetra-
tor of a specific crime that has been reported. See Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329
(2d Cir. 2000); see also Brown v. City of Oneonta, 235 F.3d 769, 771, 779, 789 (2d Cir. 1999)
(opinions concurring in and dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); R. Richard Banks,
Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1075 (2001). Likewise, a deliberate practice of discriminating between
known suspects of different races - stopping all speeders but giving tickets to black drivers
only, and warnings to whites - is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996), but it is not
racial profiling. For a similar definition, see DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS 3
(2000). See infra Section V.B.2, notes 277-303 and accompanying text, for a discussion of
alternative definitions of racial profiling.
11. See infra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
12. See NNICC REPORT, supra note 1.
13. Heather MacDonald, The Myth of Racial Profiling, 11 CITY J. 14, 26 (2001), avail-
able at http://www.city-journal.org/html/11..2_the_myth.html.
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works. So cut us some slack." Seen in that light, his firing may not
have been entirely unprincipled. Of course he didn't say that racial
profiling is justified, but didn't he imply it? In the political climate of
1999, a police commander could hardly defend racial profiling directly.
The most he could do is say that blacks and Hispanics do in fact
commit most of the drug crimes that matter, and wink. Line officers
are sometimes a bit more explicit. In June 1999, for example, Sergeant
Mike Lewis of the Maryland State Police told a reporter for the New
York Times:
Ninety-five percent of my drug arrests [used to be] dirt-ball-type whites
- marijuana, heroin, possession-weight. Then I moved to the highway, I
start taking off two, three kilograms of coke, instead of two or three
grams. Black guys. Suddenly I'm not the greatest trooper in the world.
I'm a racist. I'm locking up blacks, but I can't help it.
14
So far, most disputes about racial profiling have been battles over
police records. Racial profiling is impossible to detect or prove
without detailed information on police conduct: whom they stop, ques-
tion, and search, by race; why they take these actions; and what they
discover in the process. Historically, most police departments did not
systematically keep this type of information. In general, they only
maintained records of arrests, and of those searches that resulted in
seizures or that were conducted pursuant to court warrants. Police
departments may be reluctant to allow outsiders to see the records
they do keep, but they can be compelled to do so by courts in discov-
ery in civil or criminal litigation, or by legislatures under freedom of
information acts. The essential step is to require that the information
be recorded and kept in the first place. For several years, police de-
partments and police unions managed to defeat most efforts to require
the sort of record keeping that would make it possible to detect racial
profiling, but in the last few years, as racial profiling has become an
increasingly powerful political issue, the tide has turned.'5 As of this
writing, at least twelve states and hundreds of cities have passed laws
14. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, § 6
(Magazine), at 50.
15. In September 1999, for example, Governor Gray Davis of California vetoed a bill
that would have required all California police agencies to collect information on the race and
ethnicity of every driver they stop. The Los Angeles Police Chief, among others, opposed
the bill and argued that it would do a "disservice to the community, circumvent the depart-
ment's disciplinary system," and lead to a rise in civil liability by government agencies. Carl
Ingram, Davis Vetoes Racial Data Legislation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, at A3. By the time
of Governor Davis's veto, however, more than thirty California police forces had record-
keeping programs that were much like the vetoed bill. Armando Acuna, More Police
Agencies Keeping Racial Data, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at A3. Los Angeles is now re-
quired to keep such records under a consent decree with the United States Department of
Justice. See infra note 218.
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requiring racial record keeping,'" and several additional jurisdictions
must keep such records under consent decrees entered into after being
sued by the United States Department of Justice. 7
It's easy to understand police antipathy to the early record-keeping
regimes. They had every reason to believe that the records would be
used against them, and some reason to fear that they would be unfairly
singled out for doing what they had been told to do. The controversy
that led to the dismissal of Colonel Williams illustrates this problem.
In 1996 Colonel Williams emphatically rejected a suggestion from his
own subordinates that he authorize an internal "racial monitoring
program" to address glaring racial disparities in the stops and searches
by some state troopers. 8 Two months later, confronted with an inves-
tigation by the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department
of Justice, the New Jersey State Police (apparently in consultation
with the New Jersey State Attorney General) decided to "consistently
attempt[ ] to limit what we will be giving to the Department of
Justice," because they saw the federal investigation as a "witch hunt"
that was "obviously intended to make us look bad."' 9 There is no justi-
fication for this sort of cover-up, especially since Colonel Williams
continued to insist publicly that his department abhorred racial pro-
filing, but the anger and frustration behind it are understandable. The
very same practices that the Civil Rights Division condemned in 1996
as racial profiling had been taught to New Jersey State troopers ten
years earlier by the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), a
unit of the Department of Justice, as part of a national program of
drug interdiction.'
16. The Institute on Race & Poverty at the University of Minnesota Law School reports
that there were eleven such statutes as of March 1, 2001. See THE INSTITUTE ON RACE &
POVERTY, COMPONENTS OF RACIAL PROFILING LEGISLATION (2001), available at
http://www.instituteonraceandpoverty.orgpublications/racialprofiling.html. Since then at
least two additional racial profiling laws went into effect, in Maryland. See MD. CODE ANN.,
TRANSP. 11 § 25-113 (2002); infra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
18. David Barstow & David Kocieniewski, Records Show New Jersey Police Withheld
Data on Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,2000, at Al.
19. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
20. David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues That the U.S. Wrote the Book on Race
Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2000, at Al; see also United States v. Wilson, 853 F.2d 869,
875 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting that DEA and Georgia State Patrol taught officers that "drug
couriers are frequently Hispanics"); United States v. Valenzuela, No. 00-CR-510-B, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7679, at *19-20 (D. Colo. June 1, 2001) ("Officer Cox testified that in de-
ciding whether he has a reasonable suspicion that a car may be carrying drugs, the race or
ethnicity of the driver may be one factor... because the Drug Enforcement Administration
has informed officers that the majority of drug smugglers in his part of the state are
Hispanic."); United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332,334, 337 (D. Colo. 1990) (noting that
officers were trained by the DEA to use drug courier profiles, and that "being Black or His-
panic was and is a factor in their drug courier profile on which they decide who to stop and
search").
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Whatever its causes, this conflict over record keeping has had a
predictable casualty: empirical research. Researchers who study gov-
ernment conduct depend on government records. In this context, that
means that until recently they have had to be content with very little.
So far, most studies of racial profiling, in all settings, have been limited
to rough comparisons based on sketchy information."'
There is only one American jurisdiction for which detailed data on
racial profiling in highway searches are available for a considerable
period. Since January 1995, Maryland State Police ("MSP") troopers
have been under court order to file a report on every incident in which
they stop and search a motor vehicle, including information on the
race of the driver, the basis for the search, and the type and quantity
of the drugs recovered, if any.2 Similar data have been collected in
other jurisdictions' but for shorter periods of time, and the raw data
are not always available to researchers. More important, the evidence
at the hearing that led to the 1995 court order also included a traffic
survey that recorded the race of the drivers on Interstate Highway 95
("1-95"), the main North/South highway that the Maryland State
Police patrol. Traffic surveys by race have been done elsewhere, but
never in a jurisdiction in which official records of police stops are
available for the same time period. The net result is that the Maryland
State Police are uniquely suitable for a study of racial profiling: their
conduct may be indistinguishable from that of other agencies that
police interstate highways, but our ability to study that conduct is
unparalleled. Limited analyses of these data have been reported else-
where," but this is the first comprehensive study of racial profiling by
the Maryland State Police.
In this Article we examine the data that accumulated under the
1995 Maryland court order from January 1995 through June 2000 - a
total of 8027 searches. We focus in particular on the subset of 2146
searches that occurred on the northern portion of 1-95, from Baltimore
to the Delaware border. This part of 1-95 (the "1-95 corridor") is
21. The main exception is a major study of the New York City Police Department by
the New York State Attorney General's Office: CIVIL RIGHTS BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE
ATT'Y GEN. OF N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK"
PRACTICES (1999) [hereinafter OAG REPORT].
22. This record-keeping program is part of a court-supervised settlement in Wilkins v.
Maryland State Police, a federal civil rights class action filed by the Maryland ACLU,
charging the Maryland State Police ("MSP") with racial profiling. Settlement Agreement,
Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. CCB-93-468 (D. Md. 1993) (settlement agreement
approved Jan. 5, 1995) (copy on file with authors) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement,
Wilkins]. The MSP has consistently denied that it engages in racial profiling.
23. See, e.g., supra note 15.
24. For a discussion of a similar traffic survey in New Jersey, see infra note 53.
25. See John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and
Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 143-145).
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reputed to be a drug distribution pipeline. It is also the area in which
racial profiling by the MSP is most strongly suspected, and it has been
the main focus of civil litigation charging the MSP with racial profil-
ing.' As a result, we have data for the 1-95 corridor that do not exist
for the rest of the state: on the racial makeup of the population of
drivers, and on the characteristics of all stops by the MSP, whether or
not there was a search.
Unfortunately, while the data on the Maryland State Police are the
best available, they cannot be taken as a complete and unbiased
reflection of reality. This Article is only partly about highway searches
for drugs; it is also about the difficulty of using official police informa-
tion as a basis for studying police behavior. Like most archival
databases, this one is intrinsically limited. Some of the most interesting
aspects of the encounters between officers and drivers are simply not
recorded. In addition, the data are limited by the selection process that
produced them. We can only guess what the state troopers would have
found if they had searched a representative sample of 1-95 drivers,
instead of those they in fact chose, who were mostly minorities.
Worse, the data are not only limited but probably distorted as well.
The Maryland State Police did not volunteer to keep these records;
that requirement was forced upon them. They knew that the informa-
tion they collected would be used to judge and to criticize them, and
they had every incentive to improve the picture. In other states, offi-
cers in similar circumstances have been caught falsifying information.27
We don't know if that happened in Maryland, but even if it did, that
sort of fabrication is not the main problem. The easy, safe way to bias
records is simply to skip some cases altogether. Underreporting is in-
evitable in any effort of this sort; usually it's caused by ordinary lazi-
ness or forgetfulness. But cops, like everyone else, are least likely to
omit the cases that make themselves look good, and they may be
tempted to overlook the ones that make them look bad. There is sub-
stantial evidence that this has happened with the MSP data set,28 but
we do not know to what extent.
None of this means that factual conclusions are impossible. Spe-
cifically, we reach two basic conclusions that are not vulnerable to the
distortions that we have described:
26. This is true both of Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. CCB-93-468 (D. Md. 1993),
and Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland State Police, No. CCB-98-
1098 (D. Md. filed 1998), a second class action suit brought by the ACLU on behalf of al-
leged victims of racial profiling by the MSP, which is still pending. See Maryland State
Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 1999)
(denying defendants' motion to dismiss, and denying in part and granting in part defendants'
motion for summary judgment).
27. See infra notes 87-88, 92-93 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
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1. The Maryland State Police did engage in racial profiling
on 1-95. They stopped and searched cars with black and
Hispanic drivers much more often than cars with white
drivers; it is hard to see how they could have produced
these results without taking race into account in decid-
ing who to stop and who to search.
2. There is a clear explanation for this practice: racial pro-
filing seems to increase the probability of finding large
hauls of drugs. These large hauls, however, are rare.
Nearly two-thirds of all drivers searched were not car-
rying any illegal drugs, but drug-free Hispanic and
African American drivers were far more likely to be
stopped and searched than drug-free white drivers.
Moreover, for each racial group, the majority of those
who had any drugs were found with trace amounts or
amounts consistent with personal use rather than sale.
Among black and Hispanic drivers, however, a larger
minority of the searches uncovered substantial quanti-
ties of illegal drugs. If this is the explanation for the ra-
cial disparities in searches by the MSP, it is noteworthy
that the Maryland State Police have never said so them-
selves. Their position on racial profiling is that they
don't do it.
On other issues, firm conclusions are impossible. In particular, we
cannot say whether (and to what extent) minority drivers really do
account for the bulk of the wholesale drug traffic on 1-95. Our major
conclusions, however, seem secure. As we will see, the data on the
quantities of drugs seized are, no doubt, substantially accurate, and the
evidence of racial profiling is, if anything, an understatement of actual
practice.
The Article proceeds as follows:
In Part II we discuss basic data on drug interdiction by the
Maryland State Police in the 1-95 corridor: stops, searches, and "hits"
(successful searches), by race and ethnicity. We then describe the pro-
cess that produced those stops and searches - the legal bases and the
operational context for these investigative actions - and the limita-
tions and distortions in the data. We show how two major patterns in
the data - the surprisingly high overall hit rates reported by the MSP,
and the similarity in hit rates for white and black drivers - can be ex-
plained by aspects of the process that are hidden from our view: selec-
tive reporting of stops and searches, aggressive use of investigative
procedures that do not count as "searches," and racial discrimination
[Vol. 101:651
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in the use of these subsearch investigations. We conclude that both the
stops and the searches by the MSP seem to have been based at least in
part on the motorists' race or ethnicity.
In Part III we re-examine the data on stops and searches on 1-95
and introduce two new variables: the types and quantities of drugs
found (if any) and the car's direction of travel. We find that most of
the drugs seized on 1-95 were found in cars with black or Hispanic
drivers, and were heading south. These findings suggest that the
Maryland State Police targeted drug dealers rather than users on 1-95,
but they reinforce the conclusion that they relied on race in the proc-
ess.
In Part IV we consider changes over time in Maryland State Police
practices, from 1995 through 2000. In the 1-95 corridor we find a sharp
break between 1996 and 1997, possibly in response to the anti-racial-
profiling litigation focusing on that section of highway. Racial profiling
did not stop after 1996, but it became considerably less pronounced; at
the same time, the total quantities of drugs seized in the 1-95 corridor
decreased markedly. There were no parallel changes in MSP searches
in the rest of Maryland.
Finally, in Part V we discuss the legal and social implications of
these findings. First, we conclude that despite the high standard the
Supreme Court has set for proof of racial discrimination in other
criminal justice settings, the type of evidence we present here is likely
to be persuasive on this issue, especially since the relevant fora are as
likely to be political as judicial. Second, we argue that while the Fourth
Amendment might permit limited use of race by police officers as a
basis for individualized suspicion (even in the absence of racially spe-
cific identifying information), the Equal Protection Clause does not.
However, the range of available remedies for an equal protection vio-
lation of this sort is unclear. Last, we consider the costs and the bene-
fits of racial profiling. The costs depend primarily on the number of
innocent people the police target because of their race, and on the
treatment they receive after they are selected; the benefits are a func-
tion of the magnitude of the danger to which the practice is directed,
and the effectiveness of the racial-profiling program in combating that
danger. In a context in which the danger is extreme and the profiling
program uniquely effective, such calculations might possibly provide a
substantial argument for racial profiling - especially if the racially
identified suspects are treated with respect. Highway drug interdiction
fails this test on all counts. Illegal drug use is certainly a serious prob-
lem, but not a critical emergency; innocent suspects are routinely
humiliated; and, most important, such programs are essentially
useless. Roadside drug searches are easy to accommodate in the rou-
tine of patrolling interstate highways - that is probably why they are
common - but, judging from the Maryland State Police data, they
have no effect whatsoever on the supply of illegal drugs.
December 2002]
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II. STOPS, SEARCHES, AND HITS
A. The Maryland State Police Data
1. Searches and Stops
Across Maryland, 40% of the motorists searched by the State
Police from January 1995 through June 2000 were African American
and 4.4% were Hispanic. According to the 2000 census, 28% of
residents of Maryland described themselves as African American,
and 4.3% as Hispanic.29 The racial makeup of drivers on Maryland
highways may be quite different. We have data on that point, but only
for the northern section of 1-95, the major north-south interstate
highway that passes through Maryland on its way from Maine to
Florida.
As we have mentioned, the section of 1-95 that passes through
Maryland is important for drug interdiction because, in the words of
the Maryland State Police Superintendent, it is "a well-documented
portion of the East Coast drug pipeline."3 The flow through that
pipeline is said to be from north to south, from New York, which is
believed to be the national center for importing heroin and a regional
center for distributing cocaine, to Baltimore and Washington, D.C.,
where these drugs are consumed." Therefore, the logical place to try
to stop the flow of drugs on 1-95 is north of Baltimore, before the
drugs reach their destination. That 48.5 mile stretch highway -
"Interstate Highway 95 in Baltimore, Harford, and Cecil Counties be-
tween the City of Baltimore and the Delaware state line (the '1-95 cor-
ridor')"32 - was singled out for special attention in Wilkins v.
Maryland State Police3 and in Maryland State Conference of NAACP
Branches v. Maryland State Police,4 two major cases charging the
Maryland State Police with racial profiling. About a quarter of the
searches in our data (2,146/8,027) were in the 1-95 corridor, and their
29. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS, at http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/24000.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2002).
30. David B. Mitchell, Letter to the Editor, Racism Isn't in the Profile of the Maryland
State Police, BALT. SUN, Jul. 29,2000, at 9A.
31. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, The High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Area Program: 2000,2001 NAT'L DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: THE HIGH INTENSITY DRUG
TRAFFICKING AREA PROGRAM ANN. REP. 164-65 (2001) [hereinafter High Intensity Drug
Trafficking]; NNICC REPORT, supra note 1, 10-12.
32. Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. CCB-468 (D. Md. filed Apr. 22, 1997) (order
enforcing settlement agreement) (copy on file with authors).
33. Id.
34. No. CCB-98-1098 (D. Md. filed 1998).
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racial makeup is different from those elsewhere in the state: a majority
of those searched were black - 60% - and 6% were Hispanic. See
Table 1.
Table 1: Race of Motorists Searched by
the Maryland State Police, by Location35
1-95 Corridor Elsewhere Entire State
(2,146) (5,881) (8,027)
White 33.3% 62.6% 54.7%
Black 59.7% 32.2% 39.6%
Hispanic 5.9% 3.8% 4.4%
Other 1.1% 1.4% 1.3%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
p < .000136
35. In this table, and in the other tables in this Article, we omit cases with missing data
on the variables that are reported in the table. In general, there are very few missing data in
any of the analyses we have conducted, with one exception: about 18% of the searches in the
1-95 corridor lack data on the direction of travel of the car that was searched. See infra note
56. These missing data could effect some of the findings reported in Tables 15, 16, 20, and 22,
infra.
36. The notation at the bottom of Table 1, "p < .0001," is a measure of statistical signifi-
cance. We report such measures for most of the tables in this Article; on some tables we
report separate measures of statistical significance for various comparisons that may be
made. Unless otherwise noted, they are based on X2 ("chi-square") tests for independence,
and state the probability of the occurrence of a distribution of outcomes as skewed as the
one reflected in the table, or more skewed, if there were in fact no systematic relationship
between the variables reported in the table. For Table 1, for example, "p < .0001" means
that this distribution of searches by race, or any distribution with a greater difference be-
tween 1-95 and the rest of the state in the rates of searches by race, would occur by chance
less often than one time in 10,000 if there were in fact no systematic racial differences in
search patterns between 1-95 and the rest of the state. The true figure is actually far smaller
than .0001, but even at p < .05 (the conventional level of "statistical significance"), it is rea-
sonably safe to reject the hypothesis that any observed differences were caused by chance,
since if chance were the operating force such patterns would occur only one time in twenty.
If a finding or pattern does not meet the .05 level of statistical significance - that is if p > .05
- it is conventionally described as "non-significant," which is sometimes indicated by "n.s."
The fact that a finding is non-significant does not necessarily mean that there is no system-
atic relationship between the variables. This is particularly true if the data include only a
small number of cases, because with few observations almost any pattern is a plausible prod-
uct of chance. Most of the comparisons we make are based on samples that are large enough
that sample size is not an important issue for this purpose; for those based on small subsam-
pies, however, sample size must be kept in mind in evaluating findings are statistically non-
significant.
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In June and July of 1996, as part of the continuing process of moni-
toring the settlement in Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, Professor
John Lamberth of Temple University's Psychology Department su-
pervised a survey of drivers in the 1-95 corridor. 7 The observers who
conducted the survey recorded the race of each driver, and whether
they were speeding (as almost all were) or appeared to violate any of
four other basic traffic rules: changing lanes without signaling, unsafe
lane changing, weaving, and tailgating.3 In twenty-one separate peri-
ods from July 24 to July 31, totaling about forty-two hours, they
observed 5,741 cars, as reflected in Table 2. Unfortunately, Dr.
Lamberth's observers were not able reliably to record Hispanic ances-
try as a separate category, so his data cannot be used to estimate the
likelihood of stops or searches for Hispanic drivers.
Table 2: Drivers and Traffic-Law Violators on
1-95 North of Baltimore, by Race or Ethnicity.
June -July, 1996
All Drivers Violators
(5,741) (5,354)
White 75.6% 74.7%
Black 16.9% 17.5%
Other 4.3% 4.4%
Race 3.2% 3.4%
Unknown
TOTAL 100% 100%
The main MSP database that we use does not include information
on those motorists who were stopped but not searched. This is a sig-
nificant limitation that makes it difficult to draw inferences about the
factors that led state troopers to search some cars but not others.
However, on April 22, 1997, United States District Court Judge
Catherine C. Blake of the District of Maryland, the judge supervising
the settlement in Wilkins, ordered the MSP to keep records of all stops
on 1-95, from the Baltimore City limit to the Delaware border,
37. Aff. of Dr. John Lamberth, Wilkins, No. CCB-93-468 (D. Md. 1993) (filed Nov. 14,
1996) (copy on file with authors) [hereinafter Aff. of Dr. John Lamberth, Wilkins]; Mem. in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Enforcement of Settlement Agreement and for Further
Relief, Wilkins, Exhibit 11 (filed Nov. 14, 1996) (copy on file with authors).
38. Aff. of Dr. John Lamberth, Wilkins, supra note 37.
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whether or not the stop resulted in a search.39 As a result, we have
limited data on stops in the 1-95 corridor starting in May 1997. We do
not know which of these stops resulted in searches, but we do know
the race or ethnicity of the drivers. In Table 3 we display those data,
together with data on searches for that sectionof 1-95 in the same time
period.
Table 3: Stops and Searches on 1-95
North of Baltimore. by Race or Ethnicity,
May 1997- April 200040
Stops Searches
(82,410) (1,227)
White 65.9% 41.9%
Black 27.8% 51.3%'v
Hispanic 1.3% 6.0%v
Other 5.0% 0.7%
TOTAL 100% 100%
IV p < .0001 for difference between search
rate for row and white search rate
Given the overall levels of traffic on 1-95, the 82,410 stops recorded
in the three-year period covered by Table 2 translate into roughly one
stop for every 1250 cars that traveled the length of the 1-95 corridor
(or any equivalent distance in that portion of 1-95).4' These data can
also be used to calculate the relative probabilities of stops and
searches for black and white motorists if we assume that the racial
39. Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. CCB-468 (D. Md. filed Apr. 22, 1997) (order
enforcing settlement agreement) (copy on file with authors).
40. The MSP search data that we have for May and June 2000, appear to be incomplete,
probably because the data that we are using were reported soon after June 2000, and many
of the reports for the last two months had not yet been properly filed. Therefore, to insure
that the search data are comparable to the stop data, we restricted both data sets to the pe-
riod ending in April 2000.
41. According to the Maryland Transportation Department's 1-95 Master Plan, the traf-
fic in the 1-95 corridor averaged 1682 million vehicle miles traveled per year for 1997
through 1999, which is equivalent to about 34.7 million trips per year, the length of the 48.45
mile corridor. See MARYLAND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, 1-95 MASTER PLAN STUDY,
available at http://www.mdta.state.md.usli95mps/i95mps-pn-table-a2.html (last visited Nov.
30, 2002). At an average of 27,470 stops per year from May 1997 through April 2000, that
translates into slightly less than one search for every 1250 full-length trips up or down the
corridor, or their equivalent.
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proportions of drivers on 1-95 that Lamberth found in 1996 held from
May 1997 through April 2000.42 This assumption seems reasonable. As
we will see, the racial breakdown of MSP searches on 1-95 has varied
greatly over time, 3 but the racial composition of all traffic stops by the
MSP remained essentially unchanged from 1997 through 2000," and it
is likely that the racial composition of the far larger set of all drivers
on that highway has also been comparatively stable. Given that as-
sumption, among motorists who violated traffic laws, black drivers in
the 1-95 corridor were almost twice as likely to be stopped as white
drivers; and more than five times as likely to be searched. See Table 4.
Table 4: Race of Driver and Relative Risk of a Stop and
a Search by the MSP on 1-95, May 1997- April 200041
Traffic Law Relative Relative
Violators Risk of a Risk of a
(11/96) Stops Searches Stop Search
White 74.7% 65.9% 41.9% 1 1
Black 17.5% 27.8% 51.3% 1.81 5.2"
p < .05 for black-white difference in relative risk
p < .01 for black-white difference in relative risk
Since almost all drivers of all races violated the traffic laws, these ra-
tios remain essentially unchanged if we consider all drivers rather than
traffic-law violators.
The data on stops and searches can also be used to calculate the
probability of a search for a car that was stopped by the MSP in the
1-95 corridor. The results of these calculations are displayed in
Table 5.
42. Setting the probability of a search (or a stop) of a white driver at 1, the relative
probability of a search of a black driver is:
% black searches I % black traffic violators
% white searches/ % white traffic violators
43. See infra Table 23, subchart (3).
44. See infra text following note 187.
45. See supra note 40.
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Table 5: Probability and Relative Risk of a Search for a Motorist
Stopped on 1-95. by Race or Ethnicity, May 1997- April 2000
Probability of a Search Relative Risk of a Search
White I in 105 1
Black I in 36 2.91v
Hispanic I in 15 7.1I v
All 1in 67 1.6
IV p < .0001 for difference between relative risk for row
and white relative risk
As Table 5 shows, black drivers who were stopped on 1-95 north of
Baltimore were almost three times more likely to be searched than
white drivers, and Hispanic drivers were more than seven times as
likely to be searched as whites.
2. Hits
Two-thirds of the cars searched by the Maryland State Police car-
ried no illegal drugs, or at least none were found. The "hit rate" - the
proportion of searches that produced contraband - is in the same
range for white and black drivers, but somewhat higher for whites. On
1-95, the rate is about 3% greater for white drivers than for blacks;
elsewhere, that difference grows to 11%. The hit rate for Hispanic
drivers, however, is far lower than for the other two groups, about a
third the hit rate for whites in the state as a whole. See Table 6.
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Table 6: Proportions of MSP Searches that Found Drugs,
by Race or Ethnicity and Location
1-95 Corridor"v Elsewhere v Entire State
White 40.3% 36.8% 37.4%
Black 37.8% 25.8% 30.6%
Hispanic 15.8% 9.7% 11.9%
Other 39.1% 19.0% 23.4%
All
Searches
tvp < .0001 for column
37.3% 32.0% 33.4%
When drugs were found, it was usually marijuana. Hard drugs
(anything other than marijuana) were found in 9% of the searches
statewide, slightly more than a quarter of those in which any drugs
were recovered. On 1-95 north of Baltimore hard drugs were found in
about 13% of the searches, or slightly more than a third of the time
when any drugs were seized. See Table 7.
Table 7: Percentages of MSP Searches in
Which Particular Drugs Were Found 46
1-95 Corridor Elsewhere Entire State
Marijuana t  28.4% 26.6% 22.1%
Cocaine=" 7.4% 3.7% 4.7%
Crack" 3.7% 1.8% 2.3%
Heroin" 2.5% 1.4% 1.7%
Othert 1.3% 1.2% 1.2%
37.3% 31.9% 33.3%All Drugs
t p n.s. for row
I p < .01 for row
V p < .0001 for row
46. The percentages of individual drugs found total more than those for "All Drugs"
because in some searches more than one drug was recovered. For the same reason, the per-
centages for all "hard drugs," which are reported in the text preceding the table, are smaller
than the totals of the individual percentages of "hard drugs."
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Overall, black drivers on 1-95 were more likely to be found with hard
drugs than white drivers (16% to 10%), and Hispanic drivers were
slightly less likely, at 9%. The most common hard drugs seized were
cocaine and crack,47 followed by heroin. A small number of those
searched, about 1.2%, were found with one or more of a long list of
miscellaneous illegal drugs that we have grouped together in the cate-
gory "other." The most common drugs in this category were am-
phetamines, PCP, and LSD.48 Cocaine and crack were found most of-
ten in cars with black drivers; heroin and "other" drugs in cars driven
by whites. See Table 8.
Table 8: Percentages of MSP Searches in 1-95 Corridor
in Which Particular Drugs Were Found by Race49
White Black Hispanic
Marijuana"v  33.3% 27.7% 7.9%
Cocaine v  3.9% 9.4% 5.5%
Crack' 0.6% 5.7% 0.8%
Heroin"' 3.8% 1.8% 2.4%
Other 2.2% 0.8% 0.0%
All Drugs 40.3% 37.8% 15.8%
p < .1 for row
p < .001 for row
IV p < .0001 for row
47. Crack is a form of cocaine that has been processed for ingestion by smoking rather
than sniffing or injection. Under federal law, the penalties for possession of crack are much
more severe than for possession of the same quantity of powder cocaine or "cocaine base,"
compare 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000), and 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2000), with
§§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2000), and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2000), despite the fact that powder cocaine
is readily convertible to crack at about the same weight. We list crack separately because it is
reported separately from cocaine in the MSP database. It is possible, however, that some
seizures of crack were reported as "cocaine."
48. See infra note 152, for a more complete description of the distribution of drugs in
the "other" category.
49. The percentages of individual drugs found total more than those for "All Drugs"
because in some searches more than one drug was recovered. For the same reason, the per-
centages for all "hard drugs," which are reported in the text preceding the table, are smaller
than the totals of the individual percentages of "hard drugs." The racial category "other" is
omitted from this table because there are too few cases - 30 in all - or meaningful esti-
mates of the frequencies of particular drugs.
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In sum, the available data show that black motorists who violated
traffic laws on 1-95 north of Baltimore were almost twice as likely as
white motorists who violated traffic laws to be stopped by the MSP,
and once stopped they were almost three times as likely to be
searched. Black motorists who were searched, however, were some-
what less likely than whites to be found with drugs. As a result, among
motorists who were not carrying illegal drugs, African Americans
were eight times more likely to be stopped and searched than whites."
We cannot estimate the relative probability of a stop for an Hispanic
driver because we have no data on the proportions of Hispanic drivers
on Maryland highways. But we can estimate the probability of a
search after a stop of an Hispanic driver, and it was seven times that
for a white driver - despite the fact that Hispanic motorists who were
searched were much less likely to be carrying illegal drugs than either
blacks or whites. Assuming that Hispanic drivers were stopped on 1-95
in proportion to their numbers, drug-free Hispanic drivers were about
ten times more likely to be searched by the Maryland State Police on
1-95 than drug-free white drivers.
B. The Process
1. Pretext Stops and Operation Pipeline
One of the truisms of American life is that the police may, if they
want, stop just about any car that is driving down the highway. The
laws regulating driving are so elaborate, so detailed, and so unrealistic
that virtually every driver violates one or another almost all the time
- or at least there is probable cause to believe she might be, which is
all that's required to justify a stop." The data that John Lamberth
collected in Maryland,52 and similar data that he collected in New
Jersey,5 3 confirm what everybody knows: almost all cars on interstate
highways speed. But even the rare driver who doesn't speed may be
stopped if an officer has probable cause to believe that he has a
burned-out license-plate light, an obscured tag or rear-view mirror, a
cracked windshield, misaligned headlights, or is not wearing a seat
50. This figure is based on the proportions of black and white traffic-law violators on
1-95 found by Dr. Lamberth - 17.5 % and 74.7%, respectively - and on the numbers of
searches in which no illegal drugs were found for black drivers (798) and for white drivers
(426). We also assume that the vast majority of travelers of both races do not carry drugs, or,
alternatively, that the proportion of white drivers who carry drugs is not substantially higher
than the proportion of black drivers who do so.
51. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,818-19 (1996).
52. See supra notes 37-38 and Table 2.
53. State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 752-53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1996) (describing a
study by Dr. Lamberth on the New Jersey Turnpike).
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belt. As one California Highway Patrol Officer put it: "The vehicle
code gives me fifteen hundred reasons to pull you over."54
Most traffic law violations, of course, are ignored even if the police
happen to detect them. Some drivers are pulled over, however, not
because their driving is especially dangerous, nor even because of or-
dinary bad luck, but as part of a program of drug interdiction. Starting
in the early 1980s, police departments around the country have been
systematically using their virtually unrestricted power to stop cars as a
tool to hunt for illegal drugs.5 This technique picked up steam in 1984,
when the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration initiated a pro-
gram named Operation Pipeline, "a nationwide highway interdiction
program that focuses on private motor vehicles," as part of which,
"[ejach year, state and local highway officers conduct dozens of train-
ing schools across the country, attended by other highway officers."56
The Maryland State Police have participated in Operation Pipeline
since its inception. In a 1999 report by the Joint Legislative Task
Force of the Democratic Caucus of the California State Legislature,
the California Highway Patrol described Operation Pipeline as an
"intensified enforcement" program to find illegal drugs by generating
"a very high volume of legal traffic enforcement stops to screen for
criminal activity, which may include drug trafficking."57
By blanketing motorists on certain routes with traffic tickets or warnings,
Pipeline teams are able to pull over a great many cars to find drivers who
fit established "profiles" of what drug couriers reportedly look like and
act like. If the motorist "fits" the profile, then the officer's goal becomes
to conduct a warrantless search of the car and its occupant , in the hope
of finding drugs, cash and/or guns.58
This practice - using traffic stops as a pretext for drug investiga-
tions - is perfectly constitutional. In Whren v. United States,59 the
Supreme Court held that a police officer may stop a car for a broken
taillight even if his real purpose is to look for drugs, but he has no
legal basis to stop the car for that purpose. As long as the officer has
probable cause to believe that a violation occurred, his motivation is
immaterial under the Fourth Amendment. But this does not mean that
racial profiling is legal. As the Court explained:
54. Gary Webb, DWB*, ESQUIRE, Apr. 1999, at 118, 123.
55. Id. at 120.
56. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OPERATIONS PIPELINE
AND CONvOY, at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/pipecon.htm (last visited June 4,2001).
57. CAL. STATE ASSEMBLY DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS TASK FORCE ON GOv'T
OVERSIGHT, OPERATION PIPELINE: CALIFORNIA JOINT LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE
REPORT (Sept. 29, 1999), available at http://www.aclunc.org/discrimination/webb-report.html
[hereinafter OPERATION PIPELINE].
58. Id.
59. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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[Tihe Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.60
In other words, under Whren the practices taught by Operation
Pipeline are constitutional as long as the "profile" the police use to
identify likely suspects does not include race or ethnicity as a factor.
The DEA,6' like the Maryland State Police 62 and the California
Highway Patrol,63 denies that it teaches or practices profiling by race.
We don't know how many of the stops by the Maryland State
Police were pretext stops. Most likely the great majority of the 82,000
stops in the 1-95 corridor in the 1997-2000 period were straightforward
traffic stops. For some stops, however, drug interdiction was the
primary purpose from the outset, and those stops are sure to be
overrepresented among the small proportion in which a drug search
was ultimately conducted.
2. Consent and Probable Cause
If a trooper decides to search a car that she has stopped, she needs
one of two possible legal justifications: consents" or probable cause.65
In theory, under the settlement in Wilkins' and the MSP General
Order implementing it,67 a trooper is required to file a report
whenever she asks for consent to search a car, whether or not consent
is granted, and whether or not a search is conducted. The data the
MSP compiled show that when consent was requested consent was
given, 96% of the time statewide and 97% of the time on 1-95. This
could mean that drivers virtually always do consent when asked -
there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence to that effect,' and similar
patterns have been reported in other cases69 - or it could mean the
60. Id. at 813.
61. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., supra note 56.
62. Mitchell, supra note 30.
63. OPERATION PIPELINE, supra note 57.
64. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see also 3 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 8.1, 8.1(a)
(3d ed. 1996).
65. See infra notes 71-72.
66. Settlement Agreement, Wilkins, supra note 22.
67. Maryland State Police, General Order 01-9501, Jan. 1, 1995 (on file with authors)
[hereinafter MSP General Order 01-9501].
68. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 622 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that
consent is given over 98% of the time); Lopez v. State, 360 S.E.2d 722, 723 (Ga. Ct. App.
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troopers did not, in fact, report requests for consent unless the vehicle
was actually searched. In any event, if there were any considerable
number of cases in which consent was requested and denied, they are
not included in these data.
If a record indicates that consent was not given, we assume that a
search was conducted based on probable cause. In the context of
highway stops, probable cause can be the basis for a search under two
distinct legal theories: (1) If there is probable cause to believe that the
driver has violated a sufficiently serious law (for example, driving
while intoxicated), then she may be taken into custody, and the
arresting officer may conduct a search "incident to the arrest" of her
person and personal effects, and of the passenger compartment of the
car. 1 (2) If an officer has probable cause to believe that a car contains
contraband, he may, without a search warrant, search any part of the
car in which that contraband could be hidden.72 Typical bases for
probable cause to search on 1-95 include: drugs in plain view; the odor
of burnt marijuana; and occasionally a "K-9 alert" by a police dog
trained to detect illegal drugs.73
About half of the MSP searches in these data were based on con-
sent - 50% in the 1-95 corridor, 56% statewide - but drugs were
found more than twice as often in probable-cause searches, as shown
in Table 9.
1987) (recounting testimony of trooper that all of "around forty" drivers who were asked
consented to be searched).
70. In 23% of the cases in which the reports indicate that consent was denied, they also
indicate that illegal drugs were recovered. This rate is almost identical to the hit rate for
searches when consent was granted, see infra Table 9, which suggests that in all (or virtually
all) of the refusal cases in the database, searches were in fact conducted.
71. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 7.1. at
432-57.
72. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42,47-48 (1970); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 7.2, at 458-508.
73. The dogs were usually wrong. In the 1-95 corridor drugs were found in two of the
seven cases in which they "alerted," or 29%; for the state as a whole the dogs were wrong
75% of the time (27/36).
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Table 9: Percentage of Searches in Which Drugs Were Found,
by Leaal Basis for Search and Location
1-95 Corridor ' Elsewhere v  Entire State
Probable 52.5% 46.7% 48.4%
Cause
Consent 22.2% 21.0% 21.3%
All Searches 37.3% 31.9% 33.3%
IV p < .0001 for column
It's not surprising that probable-cause searches were more likely to
uncover illegal drugs than consent searches. Many probable-cause
searches were conducted because the troopers had already seen or
smelled some of the drugs that were later found; others may have been
conducted in response to drivers who behaved in a reckless or intoxi-
cated manner as a result of drug use.
There is no constitutional requirement that a police officer justify a
request for consent to conduct a search. Nonetheless, because of the
allegations of discrimination in consent searches, the MSP data in-
clude information on the reason for each such request. These data, un-
fortunately, are difficult to code and analyze. The most common
ground given is "nervousness" or "extreme nervousness." Other rea-
sons range from the presence of "air fresheners" (supposedly used to
cover the smell of drugs) to driving from a "source city." Twenty-four
drivers were asked for consent and searched because their cars dis-
played a suspicious number of Grateful Dead posters or stickers. Eight
of them (33%) were found with small amounts of marijuana; the rest
were clean.74
Searches of black drivers were somewhat more likely to be based
on consent than searches of white drivers, and searches of Hispanic
drivers much more so. In both cases, these differences were greater on
1-95 than elsewhere, as shown in Table 10.
74. The only clear pattern we have detected in justifications for seeking consent is that
when a consent search caught a big drug dealer, see infra Table 11, the explanation usually
mentioned "nervousness" or "excessive" or "extreme nervousness" of the driver, It's hard to
know what to make of this pattern. "Nervousness" is a subjective description; in these cases
it was applied after the fact, by the arresting officer, to a drug dealer who had just been
caught in an unusually successful drug search.
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Table 10: Percentaae of MSP Searches Based on Consent,
by Race and Location75
1-95 Corridorv Elsewherev Entire State
White 41.9% 55.4% 53.2%
Black 52.9% 59.8% 57.0%
Hispanic 67.7% 74.3% 72.0%
All Searches 50.0% 57.6% 55.6%
IV p < .0001 for column
Probable-cause searches are sometimes dictated by circumstances (a
traffic arrest, inadvertent discovery of contraband), while consent
searches are always discretionary. As a result, consent searches have
been a special focus of complaints about racial profiling in Maryland
and elsewhere.7' This distinction, however, does not nearly capture the
full range of police discretion in highway stops. On the one hand, po-
lice officers are not required to arrest suspects or to conduct searches
when they have probable cause to do so, and frequently they don't.
On the other hand, as we will see, even in the absence of probable
cause, police officers have complete discretion to take many intrusive
nonconsensual actions short of a full-blown "search." Even so, the
higher proportion of consent searches among black and Hispanic driv-
ers probably means that Maryland State troopers pay greater attention
to minority drivers when they have discretion to choose their targets,
as reflected in the higher probability of a search for a black or
Hispanic driver than for a white driver after a stop by the MSP. See
Table 5.
One of the curiosities of consent searches, in Maryland and across
the United States, is that almost everybody does agree to be searched,
including people who are carrying drugs or other contraband. The
usual explanations offered for this behavior fall into two categories:
(1) The suspects think they will do better by consenting because that's
the honest-sounding thing to do, so it may divert suspicion and lead
75. Searches of motorists whose race or ethnicity was listed as "other" are not listed
separately in this table.
76. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement, Wilkins, supra note 22; N.J. Arr'Y GEN.'S OFFICE,
INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF
RACIAL PROFILING 30-31, 100-02 (1999) (describing disproportionate use of consent
searches for minority drivers in New Jersey, and proposing new policies to regulate them);
Daniel J. Chacon, CHP Halts Consent Searches Amid Racial-Bias Claims, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TIMES, June 10, 2001, at A3 (reporting that faced with racial profiling lawsuit, C.H.P.
bans consent searches for six months).
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the cops to search lightly, or not at all; or perhaps they merely think
they will do no worse by consenting because the game's up anyway
and they might as well make the cops happy.77 (2) The suspects don't
realize that they have a choice. There's no equivalent to Miranda for
searches - the police are not required to tell suspects that they have
the right to refuse to be searched78 - and the circumstances usually
suggest the opposite. People generally assume that when a policeman
asks them to do something they are supposed to obey, especially if the
officer uses what is sometimes called the "command voice,' 79 and they
may be afraid of displeasing an armed officer by refusing to do what is
asked. At a minimum, a refusal to consent is likely to trigger further
detention and investigation.'
There is also a third explanation for the near unanimity of consent:
it's exaggerated. Police officers sometimes ask drivers to sign written
consent forms, but that is not constitutionally required. Oral consent is
easy to misinterpret or misrepresent; the officer just has to write down
(or check a box) that the driver consented. Unless the case is litigated,
that's all the information we'll ever have. And even if it does go to
court, most judges routinely accept the word of the police officer over
that of the criminal defendant.8' Only rarely is there third-party evi-
77. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Howard, 462 F.2d 992, 996-97 (1st Cir. 1972); Gorman v. United
States, 380 F.2d 158, 165 (1st Cir. 1967) ("Bowing to events, even if one is not happy about
them is not the same as being coerced." (citation omitted)); Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay
on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 177-80 (1991).
7X See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,231 (1973); see also Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (noting that police officer was not required to inform motorist that
he was free to leave before asking for consent to search car).
79. Rotenberg, supra note 77, at 188-89. As Professor William Stuntz put in the context
of street searches, in practice the test for consent "resolves into a kind of 'jeopardy' rule: If
the officer approaches the suspect and puts the command to empty his pockets in the form of
a question, the resulting search is consensual." William J. Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1795, 1823 (1998). In United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332 (D. Colo.
1990), one of the few published opinions that analyzes the actual practice of obtaining con-
sent, the court concluded that the arresting officer conducted stops "in a manner creating a
coercive and intimidating atmosphere that most people, especially young minority citizens,
would find coercive and impossible to resist." Id. at 341.
80. See infra note Ill and accompanying text for a description of how exactly this se-
quence of events happened to the family of Mr. Robert Wilkins in an incident that led to the
initial racial profiling law suit against the MSP, Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. CCB-
93-468 (D. Md. 1993).
81. United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), presents an extraordinary
example of the pressures that can emerge when a judge accepts a defendant's description of
a police investigation. In Bayless, New York City police officers found thirty-four kilograms
of cocaine and two kilograms of heroin in the defendant's car. Id. at 234. The district court
judge, Harold Baer, Jr., found the defendant's version of the events leading up to the seizure
more credible than that of the police officer who testified at a suppression hearing, and said
so in a published opinion. Id. He also wrote that the fact that several participants in the
events leading up to the search ran from the police should not be considered suspicious
because in the minority-dominated neighborhood where the search took place the residents
"tended to view police officers as corrupt, abusive and violent," id. at 242, a statement that
no doubt reflected Judge Baer's experience on a commission investigating police corruption
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dence to confirm a civilian's claim that he did not consent when the
officer says that he did. For example, in Chavez v. Illinois State Police2
the trooper who stopped Mr. Chavez called for a canine unit to sniff
his car, and then "asked Chavez if he would consent to a canine walk-
around. [The canine officer] testified that Chavez did not consent,
though [the original trooper's] report said he did."83
3. Intelligence
In some cases, the decision to stop and search a car is not based on
anything the officer sees on the road, but on prior intelligence. A 1999
legislative report on Operation Pipeline in California discusses
"whisper stops" -' "cases in which the California Highway Patrol
("CHP") receives a tip from another law enforcement agency that a
suspected drug courier is on the road, and a CHP officer follows the
suspect and looks for a traffic violation in order to pull him over and
search the vehicle."' According to a California Highway Patrol man-
ual:
Whisper enforcement stops shall be conducted as though involved offi-
cers had not received information regarding drug trafficking. Officers are
not to disclose the information provided by the allied agency requesting
the whisper stop to vehicle occupants .... [If probable cause is devel-
oped and an arrest is made, in-custody reports shall not contain informa-
tion regarding the whisper stop details provided by allied agencies. This
information is confidential and should not be disclosed in the report. Of-
ficers should begin their report at the point of establishing independent
probable cause. 5
In California, the practice of concealing the intelligence on which
some highway stops were based seems to have led some CHP officers
to commit perjury in court.86
in New York. The decision set off a firestorm. Congressional leaders demanded that Judge
Baer be impeached; the President said that if he didn't reverse himself he should resign. See,
e.g., Ian Fisher, Gingrich Asks Judge's Ouster for Ruling Out Drug Evidence, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1996, at B4; Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22,
1996, at Al. After six weeks, the judge granted a rehearing, heard new testimony covering
the same ground as the first hearing, and reversed himself, finding that the officers who testi-
fied the second time around were more credible than the defendant. See United States v.
Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). This, of course, was an unusual case, both be-
cause of the extraordinary political response to Judge Baer's initial order, and because that
response plainly caused him to reverse himself, despite the fact that (unlike the great major-
ity of state court judges) he is not elected.
82. 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001).
83. Id. at 624.
84. OPERATION PIPELINE, supra note 57, at 24.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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For obvious reasons, we don't know how many of the stops and
searches by the Maryland State Police were based on confidential in-
telligence. Quite possibly, some of the most successful searches were
not the clever hunches or lucky breaks they look to be. If so, the num-
ber of searches involved is probably too small to have much of an
impact on the data that we have considered so far. However, if these
searches included some of the largest seizures by the MSP, they may
be important to our understanding the quantities of drugs seized,
which we discuss in Part III.
C. Do the Data Describe Reality?
Before we attempt to interpret the data on stops and searches by
the Maryland State Police we should consider their limitations. First,
misrepresentation and selective reporting may have distorted the data;
second, even if complete and accurate, the data provide only a frag-
mentary picture of the process that produces these encounters.
1. Misreporting
On April 19, 1999, New Jersey State troopers John Hogan and
James Kenna were indicted for falsifying police reports to conceal ra-
cial profiling.87 In January 2002, they pled guilty.' Hogan and Kenna
are not your average troopers. On April 23, 1998, they shot into a van
they had stopped on 1-95 in New Jersey and wounded three of the four
men inside, three Hispanics and an African American, all unarmed
and all apparently drug-free.89 The two officers were later indicted for
the shooting as well.' But the practice that was the subject of the first
indictment - concealing racial profiling - seems to have been wide-
spread: "Two state police supervisors said it was common practice for
troopers on the turnpike to jot down the license plate number of white
motorists who were not stopped and use them on the reports of blacks
who were pulled over. Officers called the tactic 'ghosting.' "91
87. David Kocieniewski, Trenton Charges 2 Troopers With Falsifying Race of Drivers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at BI.
88. Owen Moritz, N.J. Troopers Plead, Admit Race Profiling, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan.
15, 2002, at 55.
89. David M. Herszenhorn, II Miles of Turnpike Shut to Re-Create a Shooting, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at B5; State Police Shoot 3 After Van Backs Into Trooper and Cars,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1998, at B6.
90. David M. Halbfinger, New Jersey Troopers Again Face Charges in Turnpike Shoot-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,2001, at Al.
91. Kocieniewski, supra note 87. "After reviewing the activity logs of 164 troopers in the
Cranbury and Moorestown barracks in southern and central New Jersey, investigators found
some troopers routinely falsified the race of drivers they stopped. As many as 10 other
troopers could face criminal charges ..." Id.
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A safer and less elaborate trick is to list a Hispanic driver as
"white." For example, in Chavez v. Illinois State Police the court de-
scribes how the Illinois State trooper who stopped and searched the
car driven by the lead plaintiff, "completed a field report... and listed
Chavez's race as 'white,' despite the fact that the report contained a
listing for Hispanic."' If the error is noticed, the officer can describe it
as an honest mistake. Sometimes no doubt it is; Hispanic ethnicity is
not always obvious. That seems unlikely in the case of a driver named
Peso Chavez, from Albuquerque, New Mexico, but the court was
charitable: "There is nothing in the record to indicate that [the
trooper] thought Chavez was Hispanic and simply decided to list his
race as white in an attempt to disguise his motivations."'93
We have no information that Maryland State troopers did anything
similar. But even if MSP troopers did not engage in the active decep-
tion, they very likely did distort the records in these data by simply
failing to report unsuccessful searches, a type of conduct that is also
familiar from reports in New Jersey94 and New York.95
One of the most surprising findings in the MSP database is the
most basic, the hit rate: 33% for the entire state, 37% in the 1-95 corri-
dor. By the standards of the trade this is a record of enviable success.
For example, only about 11% of suspects stopped and frisked by New
York City Police in 1998 and 1999 were arrested,' and only 3% to 5%
of passengers searched by customs agents at airports from 1996
through 1999 were found to carry contraband.97 These are different
contexts from highway drug interdiction, but data from that setting are
similar. Two 1993 reports by the California Highway Patrol describe
the performance of officers assigned to drug interdiction duty. In one
period the officers searched 482 vehicles and made 44 drug arrests and
in the other they conducted 95 searches and made 5 arrests, for an
overall hit rate of 8.5%. 9
How did the MSP manage to bat .330 or better in a league where
.100 is common? Could it be that they disproportionately record hits
92. 251 F.3d 612, 624 (7th Cir. 2001).
93. Id. at 646.
94. William H. Buckman & John Lamberth, Challenging Racial Profiles: Attacking Jim
Crow on the Interstate, THE CHAMPION, Sept./Oct. 1999, available at http://www.criminal
justice.org/public.nsf/championArticles/99sep0l?OpenDocument.
95. William K. Rashbaum, Review Board Staff Faults Police on Stop-and-Frisk Reports,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,2000, at B1.
96. NEW YORK ATTORNEY GENERAL, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S
"STOP AND FRISK" PRAcInCES 111 (1999).
97. PERS. SEARCH REVIEW COMM., U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., REPORT ON PERSONAL
SEARCHES BY THE UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE 6-7 (2000), available at
http://www.customs.ustreas.gov/personal-search/pdfs/main.pdf.
98. OPERATION PIPELINE, supra note 57, at 20.
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and omit strikeouts? A reporting bias in that direction is virtually
inevitable. It's harder to ignore a case in which drugs were seized and
a suspect was arrested than one in which the driver was eventually
sent on her way. Moreover, self-interest makes successful searches
more memorable than failures, an impulse that is likely to get stronger
when the conduct of the officers is challenged. (The statistics from the
California Highway Patrol are valuable in part because they were re-
ported before racial profiling had achieved its present notoriety.)
There was also pressure from the MSP command to record searches
selectively. Documents produced in discovery in Maryland State
Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland State Police reveal that
from January through November of 1998, Major G. H. Hall, the com-
mander of the Northern Region of the Maryland State Police repeat-
edly ordered his troopers to complete overdue reports on dozens of
searches.9 9 These orders confirm that a great deal of the paperwork
required by the Wilkins settlement was missing, and that MSP com-
manders attempted to remedy that problem - but only in some cases:
all the searches that Major Hall listed were those that had come to his
attention because drugs had been seized and/or suspects had been
arrested. There is nothing improper in ordering subordinates to com-
plete missing paperwork, but doing so for hits only while ignoring
unreported misses will inflate the reported hit rate across the board.
Unfortunately, the underreporting to which Major Hall was re-
sponding may not have been evenhanded in the first place. The troop-
ers' incentive to "improve" their racial statistics (as well as hit rates)
was at least as strong in Maryland as in New Jersey, since the racial
proportions of stops and searches by individual state troopers were
reported by the MSP and examined in court."° And there is specific
evidence of racially selective underreporting by the MSP. The second
amended complaint in Maryland State Conference of NAACP
Branches v. Maryland State Police,' the federal class-action lawsuit
following up on Wilkins v. Maryland State Police,"°2 describes nine
searches of black and Hispanic plaintiffs by MSP troopers, conducted
after January 1, 1995, that do not appear in the MSP database as re-
quired by the Wilkins settlement 03 In each case, it is alleged that no
99. Memoranda from Major G.H. Hall, Commander, Northern Region, Maryland State
Police, to various subordinates (dating from Jan. 14 through Nov. 2, 1998) (on file with
authors).
100. Aff. of Dr. John Lamberth, Wilkins, supra note 37; Second Am. Compl. and Jury
Demand 45, NAACP v. Maryland State Police, No. CCB-93-468 (D. Md. 1993), available
at http://www.aclu.org/court/msp-2nLcomp.html (on file with authors).
101. No. CCB-98-1098 (D. Md. filed 1998).
102. No. CCB-93-468 (D. Md. 1993).
103. Second Am. Compl. and Jury Demand 1] 71, 73, 78, 82,83,86,89, 92, 95, NAACP
v. Maryland State Police, No. CCB-93-468 (D. Md. 1993).
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drugs were found and no arrests were made. (So far, Wilkins has not
come to trial, so these allegations have not been proven - or
disproven - in court.)
To estimate the extent of underreporting, we need a bench mark: a
survey of drivers that asks whether they were stopped, whether they
were searched, and .if so, whether any drugs were found. There is no
such survey for drivers on 1-95, or on Maryland highways generally,
but there is one for the country as a whole, the Police-Public Contact
Survey which was administered in 1999 by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics of the Department of Justice to a national sample of over
80,000 respondents.'" Over half of all reported contacts with police
were traffic stops," and in 6.6% of those stops the police searched the
driver, or the vehicle, or both.'" Black drivers were somewhat more
likely to be stopped than white drivers, 12.3% to 10.4%, and Hispanic
drivers somewhat less, 8 .8 %,1 7 but both black and Hispanic drivers
who were stopped reported that they were twice as likely as whites to
be searched.'" Among those who said they were searched, drugs or
other incriminating evidence were found much more often when the
driver was white (17%) than black (8%) or Hispanic (10%).11
The data from the Police-Public Contact Survey are not directly
comparable to those in the MSP database. They include traffic stops
by all police forces, on and off major highways, whether or not drug
interdiction was a motivating force. The searches described by the re-
spondents inevitably include many investigations that are not covered
by the court order in Wilkins, and do not have to be reported by the
Maryland State Police.'t 0 Nonetheless, this survey indicates that for
the nation as a whole, drug searches of minority motorists are substan-
tially less likely to be successful than searches of white motorists.
Taken together with other evidence, that suggests that the compara-
tively high hit rate for searches of black motorists by the MSP may
well be due in part to selective reporting.
In short, there is no doubt that some searches that should have
been reported are missing from the MSP database. The real question
is how many searches were omitted and how they were distributed. To
the extent that they are concentrated among unsuccessful searches of
104. PATRICK A. LANGAN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, FINDINGS FROM THE 1999
NATIONAL SURVEY (2001).
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id. at 18.
107. Id. at 15.
108. Id. at 18.
109. ld. at 24.
110. See infra notes 111-129 and accompanying text.
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cars driven by minority drivers, the consequences are predictable: the
proportions of blacks and Hispanics among those searched are
understated, and the hit rates for searches of the cars they drive are
exaggerated.
2. Preselecting
Our data record two types of events: "stops" and "searches." The
underlying reality is more complex. There may be several steps be-
tween these two points, including conduct that is clearly a search as
that term is generally used, but not under the narrower definition of
the type of "search" regulated by the Fourth Amendment. Consider
the encounter that led to the lawsuit in Wilkins v. Maryland State
Police. The lead plaintiff was Robert Wilkins, at the time an assistant
public defender at the District of Columbia Public Defender Service.
On May 8, 1992, Mr. Wilkins was driving from Chicago to Washington,
D.C. with his aunt, uncle and cousin. They had attended the funeral of
Mr. Wilkins' grandfather, Rev. G. R. Wilkins, Sr. The family was driving
a Cadillac they had rented for the trip. They had decided to drive all
night so that Mr. Wilkins could arrive on time for a client's 9:30 a.m.
court appearance.
At about 5:55 a.m., Maryland state police officer V. W. Hughes stopped
the car on 1-68 in Cumberland, Maryland. Mr. Wilkins' cousin, Scott El-
Amin, was driving at the time. Officer Hughes stated that Mr. EI-Amin
had been driving sixty miles per hour in a forty mile per hour zone. Be-
fore issuing either a ticket or a warning, Hughes produced a form re-
questing consent to search the car. The family declined consent and re-
fused to sign the form. Hughes stated that the searches were routine and
further stated "if you have nothing to hide, then what is the problem?"
Mr. Wilkins' uncle stated that he would not consent to the officer
searching through all of their belongings on the highway in the rain. Mr.
Wilkins asked Hughes why he wanted to search the car. Hughes refused
to provide an explanation and merely repeated his request. He then
mumbled something about "problems with rental cars coming up and
down the highway with drugs." Mr. Wilkins then informed Hughes that
they were returning from his grandfather's funeral in Chicago and of-
fered to show him a copy of the obituary. Hughes declined the offer and
informed the family that if they did not consent to the search, they would
have to wait while he called for a narcotics dog to come and sniff the
car....
At approximately 6:25, Sergeant Brown arrived with a narcotics dog and
ordered them out of the car. The family asked if they could remain in the
car during the dog sniff so they could stay out of the rain and away from
the dog. The police officers refused their request and insisted that they
stand in the rain. The german shepherd sniffed slowly and thoroughly
around the car while curious motorists passed on the highway. The dog
detected nothing. Hughes issued a $105 speeding ticket and at about 6:35,
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the Wilkins family continued on their way. Mr. Wilkins was late for his
court appearance. 1
Obviously the Wilkins family was seriously inconvenienced and
embarrassed. Very few drivers on interstate highways are subjected to
this sort of humiliation. Nonetheless, what happened to them does not
count as a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. A request for
consent is considered a voluntary, noncoercive interaction; 12 ordering
occupants out of a car is routinely permitted in a traffic stop;" 3 and a
dog sniff of the outside of a car does not violate any "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" that courts are prepared to protect."' This is not
to say that trooper Hughes in fact had the legal authority to do what
he did; as Mr. Wilkins pointed out at the time, his conduct amounted
to an illegal detention because he held the Wilkins family for a longer
period than was justified by the traffic stop." 5
The Wilkins settlement was crafted in part to address the problems
presented by the search in that case. As a result, two acts by trooper
Hughes - asking for consent to search, and calling for a K-9 unit -
are now subject to a reporting requirement." 6 But what was done to
the Wilkins family - asking for consent, waiting for a drug-sniffing
dog, ordering them out into the rain while the dog sniffed the car - by
no means exhausts the list of available subsearch investigative tech-
niques. Under current case law, trooper Hughes could also have or-
dered the entire family to get out of their car at the outset; he could
have separated them and questioned them individually, with backup if
necessary; and, he could have examined the interior of the car at
length through the windows (and used a flashlight to do so).
In addition, if the officer developed a "reasonable suspicion" that
any of the occupants was armed, he could have frisked them and
searched the passenger compartment of the car for weapons, including
any space in which a weapon could be concealed."7 A check for weap-
ons is viewed as a protective measure, rather than as the sort of evi-
dence-gathering activity that constitutes a "search" under the Fourth
111. Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 439-40
(1997).
112. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); 4 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 9.3(a), at
86-112.
113. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,410 (1992) (passengers); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106,111 (1977) (driver).
114. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696,707 (1983); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 2.2(f), at 449-64.
115. Davis, supra note 111, at 439.
116. See Settlement Agreement, Wilkins, supra note 22; MSP General Order 01-9501,
supra note 67. As we have noted, supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text, there's some
ambiguity as to whether requests for consent that are denied are in fact reported on a regu-
lar basis.
117. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S 1032, 1035 (1983).
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Amendment. The Court of Appeals of Maryland describes such a
weapons search in Derricott v. State:.18
Upon Corporal Thomas' orders, Derricott exited his vehicle, and, as di-
rected, stood between his vehicle and the police cruiser. Corporal
Thomas then conducted a pat-down search of Derricott's outer clothing
and concluded that he was not armed....
After searching Derricott, Corporal Thomas approached the driver's side
door of Derricott's vehicle, which had remained open. Corporal Thomas
leaned inside the car and looked around, ostensibly to search for weap-
ons. Between the driver's seat and the center console, Corporal Thomas
saw a cellophane bag containing smaller glassine bags of what appeared
to be cocaine. He seized the bag, and Derricott was placed under arrest
for possession of a controlled dangerous substance."9
None of this, from the initial stop through the search for weapons,
would have tripped the wire that requires including the incident in the
MSP database - unless, of course, contraband was discovered in the
process.
Only about one driver in seventy that the MSP stopped in the 1-95
corridor was subjected to a search that was reported under the proce-
dure instituted in the wake of the Wilkins case. On the other hand,
recall that of respondents on the national Police-Public Contact
Survey who had been subject to traffic stops, about one in fifteen -
more than four times the MSP search rate - said that they had been
"searched."' 2 That finding, of course, does not necessarily reflect MSP
practices, but the two rates are easily reconciled. The survey respon-
dents probably interpreted the word search as it is ordinarily used, and
included many searches of the sort that the Maryland State Police
might have conducted but would not have had to record. MSP troop-
ers might, for example, have questioned the driver in one stop in five;
ordered the occupants to step out of the car, questioned them sepa-
rately, examined the car carefully through the windows, and possibly
frisked the occupants and searched the passenger compartment for
weapons, in one stop out of fifteen; and done a full-dress search in the
one case in seventy that looked most promising after all that prelimi-
nary checking. The MSP's impressive hit rate is easier to explain if the
denominator - "searches" - is seen as the last stage of a complex
sorting process that narrows down the vast number of cars that are
stopped to a much smaller group that are considerably more suspi-
cious than average.
Do police officers do that sort of winnowing? We have no direct
evidence in Maryland, but similar tactics are described in a report on
118. 611 A.2d 592 (Md. 1992).
119. Id. at 594-95.
120. See LANGAN ET AL., supra note 104.
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drug-interdiction training in California. "Once a stop has been made,
motorists are compared against a well-established set of 'indicators' to
see if they fit the profile of a drug courier.' 21 If so, the officer pro-
ceeds to the next step: "the interrogation of the motorist and the pas-
sengers, if any":
The officer is trained to subtly ask questions about their registration pa-
pers, their destination, their itinerary, the purpose of their visit, the
names and addresses of whomever they are going to see, etc. Officers are
trained to make this conversation appear as natural and routine part of
the collection of information incident to a citation or warning. They are
advised to interrogate the passengers separately, so their stories can be
compared. The officer will apply more "indicators" at this point, includ-
ing how long it took them to answer the questions, how they acted, how
consistent their stories were and what kind of eye contact they made....
[In] approximately 30 hours of [actual] videotaped stops .... [t]he ques-
tioning that was done was intense, very invasive and extremely pro-
tracted. It was not uncommon to see travelers spending 30 minutes or
more standing on the side of the road, fielding repeated questions about
their family members, their occupations, their marital status, their immi-
gration status, their criminal histories and their recreational use of drugs
and alcohol....
During the training session ... officers were advised to take the motor-
ist's pulse during the interrogation, to see if the motorist's heart is beat-
ing rapidly. During the videotaped... stops, the officer was repeatedly
seen taking motorists' pulses, pronouncing them "way up there," and
then demanding to know why the motorist was so nervous. Pulse-taking
was also used in conjunction with questions regarding the motorist's pos-
sible use of intoxicating drugs, particularly methamphetamines, and a
high pulse rate was cited on several occasions as the officer's reasons for
requiring a field sobriety test.122
Consider the program that was at issue in City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond."2 From August through November of 1998 Indianapolis
Police officers set up drug inspection road blocks and stopped 1,161
cars at random, exercising no discretion in the choice of cars or the
conduct of the initial investigation that followed. When a car was
stopped,
Pursuant to written directives issued by the chief of police, at least one
officer approaches the vehicle, advises the driver that he or she is being
stopped briefly at a drug checkpoint, and asks the driver to produce a li-
cense and registration. The officer also looks for signs of impairment and
conducts an open-view examination of the vehicle from the outside. A
121. OPERATION PIPELINE, supra note 57, at 13.
122. Id. at 13-15.
123. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
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narcotics-detection dog walks around the outside of each stopped vehi-
cle.
The directives instruct the officers that they may conduct a search only
by consent or based on the appropriate quantum of particularized suspi-
cion. The officers must conduct each stop in the same manner until par-
ticularized suspicion develops .... 124
This inflexible procedure was obviously designed to skirt the edges
of the constitutional definition of a search, and it succeeded. The
program was held unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit"z and the
Supreme Court, but solely on the ground that it is unconstitutional to
stop motorists for this purpose without individualized suspicion.
Indeed the Supreme Court specifically held that what happened after
the initial stop was not a search that would require separate justifica-
tion.'26 The information gathered by the Indianapolis police on all of
the cars they stopped no doubt greatly improved their hit rate for
those comparatively few cars that were actually "searched"; if they
had had a constitutionally sufficient justification for the initial stops, it
would have provided a legal basis for those searches as well. Ulti-
mately, the Indianapolis police made fifty-five drug arrests during the
life of this program, 4.7% of the total number of cars stopped.27
Unfortunately, we don't know how many cars were "searched," so we
can't calculate a hit rate that is comparable to that reported by the
MSP.128 Instead, the 4.7% rate of drug arrests is a proxy for the
underlying rate of drug possession by drivers in those areas of
Indianapolis where the road blocks were conducted, to the extent that
it is detectable by this sort of aggressive screening followed by full
blown searches in the most suspicious cases.
One last point: The distinction between distortion and preselection
is slippery. Everybody, lawyers and judges included, has a hard time
with some Fourth Amendment distinctions.'29 Was the search of a
small paper bag on the front seat permissible on the basis of a "rea-
sonable suspicion" that there were weapons in the car, or did it go too
far? Did the officer cross the line between "plain view" and "search"
124. Id. at 35.
125. Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659,661 (7th Cir. 1999).
126. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,40 (2000).
127. Id. at 34-35. They also made forty-nine arrests for non-drug related crimes. Id.
128. See supra Table 6.
129. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388,417 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Policemen do not have the time, inclination,
or training to read and grasp the nuances of the appellate opinions that ultimately define the
standards of conduct they are to follow [in conducting searches]. The issues that these deci-
sions resolve often admit of neither easy nor obvious answers, as sharply divided courts on
what is or is not 'reasonable' amply demonstrate. Nor can judges, in all candor, forget that
opinions sometimes lack helpful clarity." (citation omitted)).
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when she stuck her head part-ways inside the open window of the car?
Given this sort of uncertainty, it's only natural for troopers to give
themselves the benefit of the doubt and fail to report some investiga-
tions that probably should have been classified as "searches." In the
process, they can also improve their racial statistics by applying an es-
pecially conservative definition of "search" when the driver is black or
Hispanic. Even with a great deal of information on such stops (and we
have next to none), there might be no way to tell when an officer omit-
ted a search that should have been reported, and when he merely took
full advantage of information-gathering options that did not require a
report.
D. Is This Racial Profiling?
The central question we address is whether these stops and
searches were made because of the race or ethnicity of the drivers. A
full answer requires us to consider data on the quantities of drugs
seized, which we do in Part III. However, since most of the debate on
racial profiling has focused on the type of data we have presented so
far - racial comparisons of stop, search, and hit rates - it is useful to
consider the question initially at this point. Based on the data we have
examined, we conclude that the disproportionate stopping of black
drivers seems to have been based on their race, and that the dispro-
portionate searching of black and Hispanic drivers was not a byprod-
uct of a race-neutral effort by the Maryland State Police to maximize
their hit rate.
1. Stops
Black drivers on 1-95 were nearly twice as likely as white drivers to
be stopped by the MSP.1' We know that black drivers were hardly
more likely than white drivers to exceed the speed limit, to change
lanes unsafely or without signaling, to weave, or to tailgate,' but
could this preference for stopping blacks reflect something else about
their driving? Speeders, for example, are not all equal. Could it be that
more black drivers than white drivers go way over the speed limit?
Blacks are underrepresented among the few law-abiding drivers on
1-95: 3.6% of black drivers are in this category, and 7.9% of whites. Is
it possible that blacks are overrepresented by a similar amount among
those who are stopped because their driving is not merely over the
130. See supra Table 4. We have no data on this issue for Hispanics.
131. See supra note 38 and Table 2.
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official speed limit but noticeably faster than the actual norm, or
because their weaving or tailgating is particularly egregious?'32
The data on stops in Maryland are too limited to answer this ques-
tion with confidence. In New Jersey, however, the question of racial
profiling on 1-95 was the subject of a full-blown court hearing in the
case of State v. Soto.'33 Dr. John Lamberth, who conducted the high-
way survey on 1-95 in Maryland, supervised a similar set of surveys on
the New Jersey Turnpike. On the basis of those surveys he and other
experts found that in New Jersey, as in Maryland, black motorists
were about as likely as whites to exceed the speed limit, but several
times more likely to be stopped by the New Jersey State Police. In ad-
dition, the record in Soto includes two other types of evidence that
bear on this issue: (1) The former Radar Unit of the New Jersey State
Police, which exercised little or no discretion in deciding who to stop,
pulled over black drivers only slightly in excess of their proportion
among all speeders, 18% versus 15%, while the Patrol Unit, which po-
liced the same population of drivers but with much greater operational
discretion, stopped black drivers at about twice that rate134 (2) On the
section of 1-95 in New Jersey that was the focus of the Soto litigation,
blacks were even more heavily overrepresented among drivers who
were stopped but not ticketed (63%) than among all those stopped
(46%). 111 In addition, several New Jersey State Police officers and su-
pervisors and an expert on police procedure all testified in Soto that
blacks and whites drive indistinguishably.'36 Given this record, the
court concluded that black drivers on 1-95 in New Jersey were stopped
disproportionately often for reasons unrelated to their driving. That
seems the likely conclusion here too, but we can't say for sure.
Perhaps black drivers were stopped twice as often as whites not
because of their driving, but because Maryland State troopers sus-
pected that they were transporting drugs. But on a highway, at a dis-
tance, from outside a car that is driving ahead of him or passing by,
what nonracial information could a state trooper learn that might raise
132. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HON. JAMES E.
CLYBURN, CHAIRMAN, CONG. BLACK CAUCUS, RACIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA
AVAILABLE ON MOTORIST STOPS 8-9 (2000), available at http://gao.gov/new.items
gg00041.pdf [hereinafter GAO, CLYBURN REPORT].
133, 734 A.2d 350 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
134. Soto, 734 A.2d at 354.
135. Id. at 353, 355.
136. id. at 354-55. On the other hand, reports in the press suggest that a new and so far
unreleased state study of driving on the New Jersey Turnpike will show that black drivers
on the southern part of the Turnpike (but not in the northern section) are considerably more
likely than white drivers to exceed the speed limit by fifteen miles per hour or more.
See David Kocieniewski, Study Suggests Racial Gap in Speeding in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2002, at B1. Even so, racial profiling by the New Jersey State Police is both well-
documented and officially admitted. See, e.g., id., and infra note 221 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 101:651
Racial Profiling
a reasonable suspicion of a drug-law violation? To be specific: What
nonracial information could an officer have that would make innocent
black drivers look more like drug dealers than innocent white drivers?
And if they did have such nonracial information, the level of suspicion
it generated must have been very low: of the black drivers who were
stopped, thirty-five out of thirty-six were sent on their way without
being searched.'37 There's a simpler explanation for the dispropor-
tionate stopping of black motorists: the troopers took race into
account in deciding who to stop.38
2. Searches and Hits
Once stopped in the 1-95 corridor, black and Hispanic drivers were
much more likely to be searched than white drivers, but no more likely
to be found with drugs. For Hispanic drivers the hit rate was much
lower than for whites; for black drivers it was comparable but slightly
lower. Critics of the Maryland State Police argue that the roughly
equal hit rates for blacks and whites demonstrate that the troopers
discriminate against black drivers. David Cole, a law professor, and
John Lamberth, the psychologist who conducted the traffic surveys in
Maryland and New Jersey, made this point in a recent New York
Times column:
It is no longer news that racial profiling occurs; study after study over the
past five years has confirmed that police disproportionately stop and
search minorities.... Those who defend the police argue that racial and
ethnic disparities reflect not discrimination but higher rates of offenses
among minorities.... But the racial profiling studies uniformly show that
this widely shared assumption is false. Police stops yield no significant
difference in so-called hit rates - percentages of searches that find evi-
dence of lawbreaking - for minorities and whites. If blacks are carrying
drugs more often than whites, police should find drugs on the blacks they
stop more often than on the whites they stop. But they don't. 39
137. See supra Table 5.
138. Heather MacDonald, a conservative commentator who approves of the use of race
as a predictor of criminality in other contexts, agrees that "highways are relatively cueless
places":
In assessing the potential criminality of a driver speeding along with the pack on an eight-
lane highway, an officer['s] .... ability to observe the behavior of a suspect over time is lim-
ited by the speed of travel. In such an environment, blacks traveling 78 mph should not face
a greater chance of getting pulled over than white speeders ....
MacDonald, supra note 13, at 20. MacDonald goes on to assert, with no data, that the use of
race at that stage is probably not widespread. Id.
139. David Cole & John Lamberth, The Fallacy of Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 2001, § 4, at 13. Cole and Lamberth specifically cite Maryland statistics: "In Maryland,
for example, 73 percent of those stopped and searched on a section of Interstate 95 were
black, yet state police reported that equal percentages of the whites and blacks who were
searched, statewide, had drugs or other contraband." Id. Although it is not specified in the
compressed context of a newspaper column, the authors are apparently referring to data
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The argument (which other scholars have also made"4 ) is appealing,
but incomplete.
If the police searched representative samples of black and white
drivers and found drugs in equivalent numbers of cases, that would be
evidence that blacks are no more likely to carry drugs than whites. But
whatever else they do, the Maryland State Police do not search repre-
sentative samples of drivers. They choose those cars that they think
are most likely to be carrying drugs. Given that selection process, and
in the absence of other information, hit rates alone are insufficient to
distinguish discrimination from evenhanded treatment of groups with
different behavior patterns.
Imagine an expensive medical screening procedure for a patho-
logical condition that is difficult to detect. And imagine also that the
condition - diabetes, for example - is more common among African
Americans than among Caucasians. What if doctors at a particular
hospital administered this test to 10% of their black patients and only
4% of their white patients, and in each group found that the condition
exists 25% of the time: Would that mean that the condition was
equally prevalent among their white and black patients, and that the
doctors were discriminating by race in testing mostly blacks? Obvi-
ously not. The likely interpretation would be that the doctors were re-
serving the procedure for those patients, black and white, who seemed
most likely to have the pathology. The fact that they found similar lev-
els among blacks and whites who were tested would suggest that they
were treating the two groups equally, and making equally good predic-
tions based on all the information available to them - the patients'
symptoms, family history, demographic traits, and other medical tests.
In theory, that could be what's going on here. Maryland State
troopers might have made judgments on all available nonracial infor-
mation - the driver's and passengers' behavior, their criminal history,
the appearance of the car, any suspicious objects in view, etc. Using all
of those sources they might have reasonably concluded that some cars
were more likely than most to be carrying drugs, and decided to search
those cars. If so, the fact that they found drugs in similar percentages
of cars driven by black and white drivers suggests that in aggregate
they had equally strong grounds for suspicion against the blacks and
the whites who were searched; it is evidence that the troopers were
evenhanded rather than discriminatory. Under this scenario, the fact
that they got similar hit rates after searching blacks at a higher rate
from some portion the first few years after the Wilkins settlement, when the percentage of
blacks among drivers searched on 1-95 was in the 70s. See supra Table 3 and infra Table 23.
140. See David. A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 295 (1999); see also RAMIREZ ET AL., supra note 10,
at 10. Harris notes that there is a counterargument, but he rejects it. See Harris, supra, at 295
n.128.
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than whites is evidence that blacks are more likely than whites to carry
drugs, just as if doctors found similar rates of diabetes after testing
proportionately more blacks than whites that would indicate that the
disease is more common among blacks.
Conversely, equivalent hit rates are also consistent with discrimi-
nation. Consider another disease, for example tuberculosis, and as-
sume that it is equally common among all groups in the population. If
a school district with 20% foreign-born students gave TB screening
tests to a randomly selected 10% of its American-born students, and
to all of those born abroad, the proportion of positive tests would be
the same for each group, and more than two-thirds of those who test
positive would be foreign. Under those assumptions, the high propor-
tion of foreign-born students who test positive is a product of dis-
crimination - singling them out for the screening test because of their
national origin - and the pattern of equal hit rates is perfectly com-
patible with that discrimination.
Which of these models describes the MSP searches in the 1-95 cor-
ridor? With hit rates alone, there is no way to distinguish between
them. But we can do so to the extent that we are able to obtain infor-
mation on the other assumption that is built into these illustrations:
the frequency of the pathology (drug offenses) by race in the popula-
tion that is the object of those choices.
We know that Maryland State troopers searched blacks at five
times the rate that they searched whites. If they intended to search
those drivers who were most likely to be carrying drugs, that means
that blacks were five times as likely as whites to be in that group; since
they found drugs on the blacks they searched about as often as on the
whites, that also implies that blacks were in fact several times more
likely than whites to carry drugs on 1-95 - which is almost certainly
false. According to the 1999 National Household Survey on Drug
Abuse, 6.6% of white Americans 12 years of age or older report that
they have used an illicit drug in the previous month, compared to
7.7% of blacks and 6.8% of Hispanics.' There are no comparable
data on drug dealers, but customers swamp sellers in any consumer
market, including the market for illegal drugs. As a result, the great
majority of the drug offenders arrested by the MSP were users rather
than dealers, as we will see.'42 Drug use, of course, is not synonymous
with drug possession in a car, but the rates are not likely to diverge by
141. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES., SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE
1999 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE, at http://www.samhsa.gov/oasl
NHSDA1999/Chapter2.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2002). The overall national rate is 6.9%;
the District of Columbia is somewhat higher (7.6%), and Maryland.and Virginia somewhat
lower (5.3% and 4.7%, respectively). Id at 23-24. Unfortunately, this study does not report
racial and ethnic drug-use data by state, but there is no reason to believe that the rough
equivalence in drug-use rates does not apply in the Baltimore/Washington area.
142. See infra Table 12.
December 2002]
Michigan Law Review
much: Is it plausible that black drug users in Maryland are five times
more likely than white drug users to carry drugs in their cars, or five
times easier to spot when they do so? Unless one of these improbable
assumptions is true, the vast overrepresentation of blacks among those
searched cannot be explained as a by-product of an MSP plan to
maximize their hit rate.
Economists John Knowles, Nicola Perisco, and Petra Todd ana-
lyzed some of the same MSP data that we use, and concluded that the
observed outcomes are consistent with the assumption that the troop-
ers were acting to maximize the number of searches that turned up
drugs.'43 They distinguish between two types of police behavior:
"prejudice" or "bias," which they define as a preference for searching
one racial group rather than another even though those searches are
no more likely to be successful; and "statistical discrimination," which
occurs when unbiased police officers search one group more often
than another because the chances of success differ by group.'" They
acknowledge that "statistical discrimination" - the type of selection
they believe is operating here - might be the result of explicit, if
"unprejudiced," use of race as a factor in decisions to search.45 We
will discuss the legal implications of this distinction in Part V.'" As a
factual matter, however, their initial assumption is unrealistic, and
equally so whether we suppose that the MSP tried to maximize its hit
rate by taking race into account or did so by race-neutral means.
Either way it implies that blacks possess drugs on the highway far
more often than whites, which is hard to square with what we know
about drug use by race. The assumption is also inherently implausible.
Why would the MSP want to maximize the number of drug busts,
however small, rather than the number of dealers they arrest or the
quantities of drugs they seize? And if they did want that, why wouldn't
they shift more heavily from consent searches (with a 22% hit rate) to
probable-cause searches (with a 53% hit rate)? 47
How then did the MSP achieve equal hit rates for black and white
motorists, if blacks were searched far more often but were not sub-
stantially more likely to carry drugs? In part, the black hit rate may
143. Knowles et al., supra note 25, at 209-10. Knowles, Perisco, and Todd analyzed MSP
data from January 1995 through January 1999. The economic model that they develop also
depends on a second debatable assumption: that motorists who might carry drugs are de-
terred by the race-specific probability of being searched. Id. at 209.
144. Id. at 205, 210.
145. Id. at 212.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 285-288.
147. As we will see in Part IV, the MSP did just that after 1996: they reduced the
proportion of consent searches in the 1-95 corridor, increased the proportion of probable-
cause searches, and the hit rate went up. See infra Table 23. Knowles, Perisco, and Todd also
considered the possibility that the MSP attempted to maximize the number of sizeable drug
seizures, rather than all drug seizures. We discuss that analysis in Part V.
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have been inflated by selective omissions. In part, it may reflect a
practice of devoting more attention to black drivers than to white
drivers at every stage of the process, including those that were not re-
corded: more were stopped, more were questioned, more were
checked out as candidates for searches, and more were ultimately
searched. This means that if the MSP had devoted as much effort to
white drivers as they did to blacks they could have searched one white
driver in thirty-six instead of one in 105 and found drugs on about the
same proportion as they did for the black drivers they searched in-
stead. There would have been plenty of room to move in that direc-
tion. If the real rate of drug possession on 1-95 is anywhere near the
4.7% found at roadblocks in Indianapolis,"4 thousands of white, black,
and Hispanic motorists who were stopped by the Maryland State
Police were carrying drugs that were not detected.149
The debate over the meaning of the similar hit rates for those
white and black drivers who were searched can obscure the larger pic-
ture. There is also strong evidence of racial profiling in the initial deci-
sion to stop, as we have seen, and we have reason to believe that the
search data, however lopsided, understate the true proportion of
blacks searched, and overstate the hit rate for black motorists. We also
know that Hispanic drivers (like black drivers) were much more likely
than whites to be searched after a stop, and yet they were found to
carry illegal drugs far less often than either whites or blacks. This indi-
cates discrimination against Hispanics by any accoant, a point that is
sometimes overlooked."5 The fact that Maryland State troopers took
ethnicity into account in deciding to search Hispanic drivers is evi-
dence that they also took race into account in deciding to search black
drivers, on the same highway, in the same period - if further evidence
on that point is needed.
148. See GAO, CLYBURN REPORT, supra note 132.
149. As we will see in Part IV, this happened to some extent after 1996: the MSP began
to search a higher proportion of white drivers on 1-95, and both the white hit rate and the
overall hit rate increased. See infra Table 23.
150. Knowles, Persico, and Todd recognize that the data indicate discrimination against
Hispanics even when discrimination is defined as they do to mean "bias" - singling out
Hispanics despite the fact that doing so does not improve the odds of success - but they are
cautious about drawing conclusions: "Our finding of lower probabilities of guilt for
Hispanics suggests that police may be biased against Hispanics, but the sample size for this
group is small and further investigation is warranted." Knowles et al., supra note 25, at 228.
This caution seems excessive, at least given our larger sample size. The differences between
Hispanics and whites in the search rates for cars stopped, and the hit rates for cars searched,
in the 1-95 corridor are large and highly statistically significant (both p's < .00001); in our
state-wide sample the difference in hit rates is slightly larger and equally unlikely to be due
to chance (p < .00001). See supra Tables 3, 5, and 6.
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E. Summary
The data we have examined are the best available for an empirical
analysis of racial profiling on the highway anywhere in the nation.
Nonetheless, they are limited, incomplete, and probably biased. There
is credible evidence that cases that should have been reported were
omitted. To the extent that these omissions reflect the self-interest of
the reporting officers, they will have systematically biased the
database by understating the numbers of minorities who were stopped
and searched, exaggerating the success rates for searches of minority
drivers, and inflating the overall success rate. Moreover, these data in-
clude only Fourth Amendment "searches" (and perhaps a scattering
of nonsearch cases in which a dog sniff was used, or consent to search
was requested but denied). They are merely a snapshot of the last and
least-common stage of a complex process. Discrimination by race in
investigative steps between the stop and the decision to "search"
would be invisible to us.
Taking these data at face value, they show that black motorists
who violated traffic laws were stopped by the Maryland State Police
on 1-95 almost twice as often as white motorists who did the same. The
most likely explanation for this disparity is the obvious one: Maryland
State troopers took race into account in deciding who to stop. We
can't make a similar comparison for Hispanic drivers because we don't
know their proportion among drivers on 1-95.
Among drivers who were stopped, blacks and Hispanics were
much more likely than whites to be searched. Searches of Hispanics
were far less likely to find drugs than searches of whites, which
strongly suggests that ethnicity played a role in the decisions to search
Hispanic motorists. Blacks were slightly less likely to be found with
drugs than whites, but the rates were close. The similarity in success
rates for searches of blacks and whites could be interpreted as evi-
dence that the decisions to search were the product of an attempt to
efficiently detect drug possession. That interpretation, however, im-
plies that blacks who travel on 1-95 are several times more likely to
possess drugs than whites, which is highly unlikely given that blacks
and whites use illegal drugs at approximately equal rates. A more
plausible explanation is that more black drivers than white drivers
were subjected to extensive "pre-search" investigations that allowed
the state troopers to limit their searches, in all racial categories, to cars
that were comparatively likely to contain illegal drugs. That sort of
pre-search screening would explain both the high number of black mo-
torists found with drugs (given comparable rates of drug use for blacks
and whites) and the high hit rate for all searches.
Why would Maryland State troopers discriminate in this manner if
whites and minorities are in fact about equally likely to carry drugs?
That question is best answered in the context of a more detailed dis-
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cussion of the purposes and the outcomes of these searches, which
follows.
III. DRUGS BY WEIGHT
A. Users and Dealers
As we have seen, most of those motorists searched by the
Maryland State Police,'66% on 1-95 and 68% elsewhere, were not car-
rying any illegal drugs (or at least, no drugs were found on them).
Among those who were carrying drugs, the quantities varied enor-
mously, from trace amounts of marijuana or crack to dozens of pounds
of cocaine. We divided the drug seizures into four categories based on
quantity by drug: Trace Amount, a category taken directly from the
MSP reports, means a drug residue or other amount too small to
weigh. Personal Use means that the quantity of the drug(s) seized was
no greater than a user might possess for her own consumption. Small
Dealer refers to seizures that are large enough to suggest that at least
some of the drugs seized were intended for delivery to another person.
Medium or Large Dealer means that the seizure was large enough to
indicate that the drugs were intended primarily or exclusively for de-
livery to others; this is an open-ended category covering everything
from a small retail stock of 15 grams of heroin to a large wholesale in-
ventory of 20 kilograms of cocaine. The cutoff weights for these cate-
gories are described in Table 11; all quantities are expressed in grams
("g"), except for the miscellaneous category of "other" drugs which
are measured either in grams or in "dosage units" ("du"), depending
on the drug."'
Table 11: Drug Seizure Classification
Marijuana Cocaine Crack Heroin Other
Trace Amount Up to 0.lg Up to 0.05g Up to 0.059 Up to 0.05g Up to 0.05g
or 0.05 du
Personal Use 0.1 to 56g 0.05 to lOg 0.05 to lOg 0.05 to 2g 0.05 to 1Og or
0.05 to 25 du
Small Dealer 56 to 455g 10 to 50g il to 50g 2 to log 10 to 50 g or
25 to 150 du
Medium/ More than More than More than More than More than
Large Dealer 455g 50g 50g log 50g or 150 du
151. For marijuana, the cutoff amounts, while calibrated in grams, are keyed to the units
in which that drug is usually traded: 56g = 2oz; 455g = 1lb.
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These categories, of course, are to some extent arbitrary."2 This is
particularly true for the miscellaneous group of "other" drugs - many
of which were found in only a single search - but those few seizures
have little impact on 'the overall pattern. Fortunately, the exact choice
of cutoff points does not seem to matter much; we have tried others,
and none of the important patterns change. The comparative robust-
ness of this classification scheme probably reflects a relatively clear
distinction between users and traffickers, especially in the 1-95 corri-
dor, where most seizures fell in the "trace" and "personal" use catego-
ries, or in the "medium and large dealer" category, with relatively few
cases in the intermediate "small dealer" category. See Table 12.
152. The cutoff points are based on government estimates of the average prices and the
amounts spent by users of various contraband drugs in 1998. Specifically, our scheme reflects
the following estimates from WILLIAM RHODES ET AL., OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL
POLICY, WHAT AMERICA'S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS 1988-1998, at 12, 16, 22-23
(2000). Marijuana. Estimated price, $320/oz; estimated average cost per user: $81/month.
Cutoff point for "small dealer" category: 56g = $640 or 8 months supply; cutoff point for
"medium or large dealer" category: 455g = $5120 or 5 years supply. Cocaine. Estimated
price: $149/g; estimated average cost per user: $191/week. Cutoff point for "small dealer"
category: 10g = $1490 or about 8 weeks supply; cutoff point for "medium or large dealer"
category: 50g = $7450 or about 9 months' supply. (Crack - a form of cocaine - is not
treated separately in the study from which we took these estimates, so we use the same cate-
gories for it as for powder cocaine.) Heroin. Estimated price: $1029/g; estimated average cost
per user: $214/week. Cutoff point for "small dealer" category: 2g = $2068 or about 9 weeks
supply; cutoff point for "medium or large dealer" category: 10g = $10,290 or about 11
months supply. Other. This is an extremely assorted collection of drugs that were infre-
quently found. The two largest categories - amphetamines (n=15) and PCP (n=14) - are
usually reported in grams, as are psilocybin (n=6) and hashish (n=5), the fourth and fifth
most common. The third ranking miscellaneous drug - LSD (n=12) is usually reported in
"hits" or "tabs." About 25 other types of contraband pills were found in one to four searches
each, ranging from Valium (n=4) to MDMA (n=l). Obviously no single scheme can mean-
ingfully categorize all these varied drugs. We have sorted the seizures of those miscellaneous
drugs that were measured in grams using the same categories we used for cocaine and crack.
For those that were measured in pills, tabs, or hits, we divided the seizures into categories
based on very rough estimates of the significance of different quantities measured in "dosage
units" or "du's:" cutoff point for "small dealer" category: 25 du's; cutoff point for "medium
or large dealer" category: 150 du's. The classification scheme for "other" drugs is particu-
larly rough; fortunately, it is relatively unimportant because so few seizures include drugs in
that group.
The lines we drew are intended to balance price and use. Thus, we assume that a mere
consumer of marijuana might possess as much as eight months estimated supply for the "av-
erage" user because that represents an investment of only $640, but that anyone who pos-
sesses more than 10 grams of cocaine is likely to be at least a "small" dealer, despite the fact
that the average user consumes that quantity in eight weeks, because 10 grams is estimated
to cost almost $1,500.
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Table 12: MSP Drua Searches
by Location and Quantity Seized
1-95 Corridor Elsewhere Total
No Illegal 62.7% 68.1% 66.7%
Drugs
Trace 6.1% 7.0% 6.7%
Amounts
Personal 20.0% 21.5% 21.1%
Use
Small 2.6% 1.9% 2.1%
Dealer
Mediuml 8.6% 1.5% 3.4%
Large Dealer
p < .0001
Most drug seizures by the Maryland State Police were small. State-
wide, 84% of those found with drugs were carrying only trace or
personal-use amounts, and 68% were found with trace or personal-use
quantities of marijuana only. The minority of drivers carrying larger
quantities of drugs were concentrated on 1-95 north of Baltimore.
Elsewhere, 11% of those with some illegal drugs, or 3.4% of the mo-
torists searched, were "dealers" of some type. On 1-95, 30% of those
with illegal drugs, or 11% of all motorists searched, were dealers.
Overall, searches in the 1-95 corridor accounted for about one-quarter
of the statewide total, but they included over half of all dealers
arrested and two-thirds of the medium and large dealers.
The significance of the 1-95 corridor becomes even more apparent
when we examine the total quantities of drugs seized. By weight, the
dominant drugs seized by the MSP were marijuana (535kg) and co-
caine (about 198kg), with crack (41kg) and heroin (6.7kg) far behind.
Cocaine is believed to account for most of the money spent on illegal
drugs in the United States, about 60% for crack and powdered cocaine
combined.'53 This is even more true for drugs seized by the Maryland
State Police. At the government's estimated retail prices for 2000, the
cocaine seized in this five-and-a-half year period was worth about $30
million, the crack about $6.1 million, the heroin $6.8 million, and the
marijuana about $5.5 million.54 Searches on 1-95 accounted for the
153. RHODES ET AL., supra note 152, at 27. Crack is not treated separately in this report,
but as a form of cocaine.
154. See id. at 16, 22 (estimated drug prices).
December 2002]
Michigan Law Review
vast majority of the marijuana and cocaine seized - 93% and 79%,
respectively - and most of the crack (61%), heroin (67%), and other
drugs (73%) as well. Interstate 95 north of Baltimore really does seem
to be a "drug smuggling pipeline," or at least more of a drug pipeline
than any other area patrolled by the MSP.
Most of the drugs seized came from a few large hauls. For cocaine,
over half the total amount seized in the 1-95 corridor was found in the
five largest seizures, out of 159; two-thirds in the ten largest; and
nearly three-quarters in the top fifteen. For marijuana and heroin the
concentration at the top was even more extreme. Ninety percent of
the marijuana came from the top ten seizures, out of 610; and 82% of
the heroin came from the top ten seizures out of 54. See Table 13.
Table 13: Percentaaes of Total Amounts of Druas Seized that
Were Found in the Largest MSP Seizures in the 1-95 Corridor
Fifteen
Five Largest Ten Largest Largest
Seizures Seizures Seizures
Marijuana (610) 78% 90% 93%
Cocaine (159) 53% 66% 74%
Heroin (54) 60% 82% 95%
Needless to say, as targets for law enforcement, drug users and
drug dealers are very different animals. The arrest and punishment of
a mere user may deter drug use, generally or by the person arrested.
The arrest and punishment of a large dealer, and the seizure of a large
haul of drugs, has greater implications: it might deter drug dealing
generally, or by that person, and it may incapacitate him for a substan-
tial period of time. In addition, the seizure will take a large quantity of
illegal drugs off the market, and the arrest may disrupt a drug distribu-
tion network. What's more, a drug dealer who's arrested may be in-
duced to cooperate with the authorities and provide intelligence that
could help bust other dealers, seize additional hauls, generate intelli-
gence from future defendants, and so forth. The extent to which drug
busts actually reduce the supply of illegal drugs is debatable,'55 but that
is the main purpose of many drug interdiction programs - including
drug interdiction by the Maryland State Police on 1-95. For that
purpose, the searches that matter are those that find big dealers and
large caches of drugs.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 338-341.
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B. The Legal Bases for the Searches
As we saw in Table 9, the MSP were more likely to find some
drugs when their searches were based on probable cause rather than
consent. But those successes were concentrated at the low end of the
scale, in the Trace and Personal Use categories; among big dealers, the
pattern reverses. See Table 14. Probable-cause searches accounted for
80% of the drivers arrested in the 1-95 corridor with trace or personal-
use quantities of drugs, but only 35% of the medium and large dealers
arrested. Half of the searches on 1-95 were based on probable cause,
but they yielded only 27% of the cocaine seized, 14% of the mari-
juana, and 15% of the heroin. This makes sense: a driver who is car-
rying five kilograms of cocaine is likely to be more careful than one
who is carrying half a gram not to smoke marijuana, have a gun in
plain view, or otherwise attract the attention of the police (and inci-
dentally provide them with probable cause to conduct a search). On
the other side, the police are interested primarily in large drug busts.
They'll seize small amounts when they happen to run across them
(e.g., when plain view or odor give them probable cause) but are more
likely to embark on an open-ended search (e.g., by asking for consent
to search) if they think they may have a dealer. Searches based on in-
telligence are particularly likely to fit this mold: if successful, they
yield substantial quantities, but the traffickers who carry those quanti-
ties are not likely to make it easy by giving the police probable
cause. 
1 56
156. The question remains: Why would drug traffickers, with large quantities of illegal
drugs in their possession, consent to searches? But whatever the reason, they do consent, or
at least the police say so. Judging from these MSP reports, they almost never refuse to con-
sent. We have discussed some of the possible reasons above: they may not realize that they
have a choice (especially if the police don't want them to think so), they may think that con-
senting is the best of two bad alternatives, they may be too nervous or afraid to resist, or the
police may misinterpret ambiguous responses or misreport clear ones. See supra text accom-
panying notes 77-80.
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Table 14: Basis for Search by Quantity of
Drugs Found for MSP Searches on 1-95
Probable Cause Consent All Searches(1073) (1073) (2146)
No Drugs 47.5% 77.8% 62.7%
Trace Amount 8.7% 3.4% 6.1%
Personal Use 34.0% 6.1% 20.0%
Small Dealer 3.7% 1.5% 2.6%
Medium/ 6.1% 11.2% 8.6%
Large Dealer
TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
p < .0001
C. Direction of Travel
According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, drug
shipments in the Baltimore/Washington area mostly flow south, from
the regional distribution center in the New York/New Jersey metro-
politan area.'57 Drug interdiction by the MSP on 1-95 reflects this
southbound bias. The direction of travel is noted for 82% of the 1-95
corridor searches," 8 and for those searches about two-thirds of the
cars were traveling south, despite the fact that over time the volume of
travel on an arterial highway must be virtually identical in both direc-
tions. The hit rate for southbound cars was higher than for those going
north, 41% versus 33%, but the differences in the quantities of drugs
found in those hits is much more striking, as reflected in Table 15.
157. High Intensity Drug Trafficking, supra note 31, at 163-65.
158. The remaining 18% - 381 searches in total - were in aggregate extraordinarily
successful, yielding total quantities of drugs comparable to those found in the much larger
set of southbound seizures: 167.3kg of marijuana; 55.8kg of cocaine; 8.9kg of crack; 1.7kg of
heroin. Obviously, MSP troopers were less likely than usual to record the direction of travel
for those searches that produced large seizures. It seems plausible that this common record-
keeping failure is connected, in some manner, to the unusual nature of these searches. How
it is connected, however, we can only guess. Is it because such seizures are frequently the
result of unusual investigations involving more preparation and coordination than routine
stops, and that in such an investigation the direction of travel is not as salient as it is for an
officer on routine patrol? Or does the excitement of a major bust cause some officers to for-
get to record information on the events leading up to it?
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Table 15: Hit Rate for MSP Searches in 1-95 Corridor, by
Drugs Found, Quantity, and Direction of Travel
Northbound
(624)
Southbound
(1141)
All Drugs 32.7% 41.5%
User t  30.0% 27.7%
Dealer"' 2.7% 13.8%
Big Dealer"' 1.6% 9.7%
Marijuana 27.4% 31.6%
User t  26.4% 27.4%
Dealer 1.0% 4.2%
Big Dealer' 0.5% 1.8%
Cocaine 3.9% 8.6%
2.9%
1.0%
0.6%
2.5%
6.1%
5.0%
tp n.s. for row
p < .05 for row
p < .001 for row
Going north, only 8% of the cars with drugs had quantities beyond
those consistent with personal use. Going south, 33% of those with
drugs were dealers (by our definition), and almost 70% of them were
medium or large ("big") dealers. The difference by direction of travel
is particularly conspicuous for cocaine. Going north, cocaine users
outnumbered cocaine dealers by almost three to one; going south,
dealers outnumber users by two-and-a-half to one, and over 80% of
them were big dealers.
The first rule of duck hunting is to go where the ducks are. Of the
twenty largest marijuana seizures in the 1-95 corridor for which direc-
tion of travel is reported, eighteen were found in southbound cars; so
were nineteen of the twenty largest cocaine and heroin seizures for
which direction is known, and all of the twenty largest crack seizures.
Clearly, in this hunt most of the big trophies were bagged flying south.
Usert
Dealer"'
Big Dealer"'
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The pattern for the total quantities of drugs seized is similar, with
one exception. One of the two major hauls taken from a northbound
car consisted of nearly 200 kilograms of marijuana, the single largest
marijuana seizure by the MSP in our data. It accounts for nearly 37%
of all the marijuana seized in this five-and-a-half-year period, and 99%
of the marijuana seized from northbound cars in the 1-95 corridor. As
a result, the total marijuana seized from northbound cars exceeds that
seized from southbound cars. For other drugs, however, the pattern is
the opposite and extremely lopsided. Southbound cars were found
with 23 times as much cocaine as northbound cars, 29 times as much
heroin, and 80 times as much crack. See Table 16.
Table 16: Total Quantities of Drugs Seized
in 1-95 Corridor, by Direction of Travel
Northbound Southbound
Marijuanat 199.2 kg 114.8 kg
Cocaine" 3.0 kg 65.2 kg
Crack' 0.2 kg 16.1 kg
Heroin' 0.1 kg 2.2 kg
tp n.s. for row
p <.05 for row
"p < .01 for row
The same preference for southbound cars shows up in the stop
data, but it is diluted. Southbound searches were 75% more common
than northbound, but southbound stops were only 11% more com-
mon. The 11% advantage for southbound traffic translates into 5448
more southbound stops than northbound stops, compared to 587 more
searches. Since overall the MSP stopped about 67 cars for every one
they searched, the relative disproportion for southbound cars suggests
that the great majority of traffic stops on 1-95 were probably routine
traffic stops that had little to do with drug interdiction. For the minor-
ity of searches that are exclusively or primarily pretext stops to look
for drugs, Maryland State troopers prefer the southbound lanes; that
produced an excess of nearly 5500 southbound stops, of which about
one in nine matured into a search.
[Vol. 101:651
Racial Profiling
D. Race
1. Quantities Seized, by Race
The quantities of drugs seized by the MSP were unevenly distrib-
uted by race. Table 17 shows the breakdown of searches on 1-95 by
race and by the quantities of drugs seized:
Table 17: Searches in 1-95 Corridor by Race
or Ethnicity and Quantity of Drugs Found
All
White Black Hispanic Searches
Trace Amounts 9.0% 4.9% 2.4% 6.1%
Personal Use 27.2% 17.5% 6.3% 20.0%
Small Dealer 1.8% 3.2% 0 2.6%
Medium/Large 2.4% 12.2% 7.1% 8.6%
Dealer
Any Illegal 40.3% 37.8% 15.7% 37.3%
Drugs
p < .0001
Overall, whites who were searched were slightly more likely to be
carrying some drugs than blacks, and three times as likely as
Hispanics. But that's because most of those with drugs were users; for
dealers, the picture is very different. Black motorists who were
searched on 1-95 north of Baltimore were more than three-and-a-half
times as likely as whites to be dealers, and five times as likely to be
medium or large dealers. Hispanics who were searched on 1-95 were
about 1.8 times as likely as whites to be dealers, and three times as
likely to be medium or large dealers. Of the whites who were found
with any drugs on 1-95, 10% were dealers and 6% were medium or
large dealers; of the blacks with drugs, 40% were dealers and 32%
were medium and large dealers; of the Hispanics with drugs, 45%
were medium or large dealers.
The net result of these differences is that 84% of the big dealers
arrested on 1-95 north of Baltimore were black. See Table 18. For co-
caine and heroin, the number of big Hispanic dealers was roughly
proportional to the number of Hispanics searched; for marijuana
and "other" drugs there were no Hispanic dealers. Whites were
underrepresented among medium and large dealers for every type of
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drug except the small category of "other" drugs (where two of four
were white), but especially underrepresented for cocaine and crack.
Table 18: Proportions of Medium and Large Dealers Found
and of all Drivers Searched, on 1-95 by Race or Ethnicity
Larae and Medium Dealers
All Dealers t' Marijuana"' Cocaine Iv CrackV HeroinI Other' All
(185)159 (68) (94) (58) (26) (4) Searches
1 _(2146)
White 9.2% 7.4% 5.3% 5.2% 25.9% 50.0% 33.3%
Black 84.3% 89.7% 87.2% 91.4% 65.2% 50.0% 59.7%
Hispanic 4.9% 0 5.3% 1.7% 5.7% 0 5.9%
t p n.s. for column
p < .001 for column
p < .0001 for column
Table 19 shows the distribution of the total amounts of drugs
seized on 1-95 by race. The pattern is basically the same as in Table 18.
The biggest shift is for Hispanic cocaine traffickers. They represented
5.3% of the big cocaine dealers, but were found with 16% of the co-
caine that was seized. This difference is entirely attributable to a single
seizure of nearly 20 kilograms of cocaine from a car with a Hispanic
driver, over 12% of the total cocaine seized on 1-95 from 1995 through
mid-2000. Overall, black and Hispanic drivers accounted for over 90%
of the marijuana, cocaine, and crack found by the MSP on 1-95, and
72% of the heroin.
159. Some of the dealers were found with medium or large quantities of more than one
drug.
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Table 19: Proportions of the Total Amounts of Drugs
Seized in 1-95 Corridor, by Race or Ethnicity 6'
Marijuana Cocaine Crack Heroin
White 0.9% 7.1% 1.8% 25.2%
Black 96.2% 75.0% 96.7% 57.7%
Hispanic 0 16.2% 0.4% 14.2%
2. Do the Quantities of Drugs Seized Explain the Racial Patterns of
Stops and Searches?
Heather MacDonald, a conservative journalist, recently wrote in
an article entitled The Myth of Racial Profiling: "The fact that hit rates
for contraband tend to be equal across racial groups, even though
blacks and Hispanics are searched at higher rates, suggests that the
police are successfully targeting dealers, not minorities."'' 1
As we have seen, equivalent "hit rates for contraband" are not
persuasive evidence for this argument,' 62 not to mention that in
Maryland the hit rate for Hispanics does not "tend to be equal" to
those for whites and blacks but is much lower."6' Nonetheless, the data
we have presented do illustrate one of MacDonald's points: the
Maryland State Police target dealers. How successfully the troopers do
so is another matter. But do they use race in choosing those they think
are likely to be dealers? MacDonald is agnostic on that point: "Race
may play a role in that targeting, or it may not."'" We think race
clearly does.
The main objectives of all drug interdiction programs are the arrest
of drug traffickers and the seizure of large quantities of drugs. Police
agencies, from the Drug Enforcement Administration'65 through the
160. As we have noted, supra Table 13, most of the total quantities of drugs seized in the
1-95 corridor were concentrated in a few large seizures. This means that it is hard to elimi-
nate chance as an explanation for the distribution of the total quantities seized, by race, be-
cause the impact of one or a few seizures could be great. (We saw this effect with respect to
the distribution of quantities seized by direction of travel. See supra Table 16.) As a result,
tests of statistical significance are not useful in this context, and we have not calculated them.
The racial differences in the numbers of large or medium size dealers arrested, by contrast,
do not depend on the amounts seized in a few "outlier" seizures and are statistically signifi-
cant. See supra Table 18.
161. MacDonald, supra note 13, at 24.
162. See supra notes 139-150 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Table 6; note 150 and accompanying text.
164. See MacDonald, supra note 13, at 24.
165. See http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/stats/ (DEA website on total drug seizures) (last vis-
ited Sept. 24, 2002); http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/major/seizures.htm (DEA website on major
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Maryland State Police,1" hold press conferences to publicize big drug
busts and boast about the total quantities of drugs they seize. The per-
ceived wisdom, supported by substantial evidence, is that most drug
shipments on 1-95 in Maryland travel south. Accordingly, MSP troop-
ers search mostly southbound cars, and they seize far more drugs and
arrest many more dealers among those heading that way. Could these
same troopers be oblivious to the fact that among the searches they
conduct, race is an even better predicator of drug seizures than direc-
tion of travel - that minorities account for 90% or more of the co-
caine, marijuana, and crack they seize?
Table 20 displays the racial patterns of searches in the 1-95 corridor
separately for northbound and southbound cars:
Table 20: MSP Searches in the 1-95 Corridor, Hit Rate and
Relative Risk of a Search. by Race and Direction of Travel
Northbound Southbound
Number of Relative Number of Relative
Cars Risk of a Cars Risk of a
Searched Hit Rate Search 167 Searched Hit Rate Search 1"
White 273 39.6% 1 334 45.8% 1
Black 302 29.8% 4.7 749 40.5% 9.6
Hispanic 44 13.6% 48 20.8%
All 6911' 624 32.7% 1141 41.5%
p < .001 for difference between overall hit rates northbound and south-
bound
drug seizures) (last visited Sept. 24, 2002); http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/news.
realeases.htm (DEA website press release page, with current press releases and archive of
releases on major drug seizures) (last visited Sept. 24, 2002).
166. See Mitchell, supra note 30.
167. This column reports the relative risk of a search for a driver of a given race on that
section of 1-95, compared to that of a white motorist. See supra Table 5. As in Table 5, we
assume that the proportion of drivers by race in the 1-95 corridor throughout the period of
this study was the same as the proportion reported by Dr. Lamberth for June and July of
1996. We also assume that these proportions were equal northbound and southbound. As
before, we have no data on the proportion of Hispanic motorists on 1-95 and, therefore,
cannot calculate the relative risk of a search for a Hispanic driver.
168. See supra note 167.
169. Searches of motorists whose race or ethnicity was reported as "other" are not listed
separately in this table.
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As we have already seen, whites were slightly more likely to be
found carrying drugs in both directions, but blacks were more often
searched. As we have also seen, nearly twice as many searches were
conducted for southbound cars. But notice where these additional
searches are concentrated: Maryland State troopers conducted 9%
more searches of southbound Hispanic drivers than of those going
north; 22% more searches of southbound white drivers; and 148%
more searches of southbound black drivers than of blacks going the
opposite direction - even though the blacks searched were less likely
to have drugs than the white drivers searched, in both directions. As a
result, the relative risk of a search for a black driver, compared to a
white driver, is about twice as high heading south as heading north: in
the southbound lanes, black drivers were 9.6 times more likely to be
searched than whites; in the northbound lanes, 4.7 times more likely.
Is it a coincidence that for years the DEA told local police agencies
that most of the drugs distributed in the Baltimore/Washington area
were supplied by blacks and Hispanics traveling south from New
York," or that more than 90% of the big dealers who were actually
arrested by the MSP on 1-95 north of Baltimore were blacks driving
south? 1' Is there any plausible, nonracial explanation for this and
similar patterns in the MSP's stops and searches?"72
Racial differences in driving habits are not a likely explanation, as
we have already discussed.173 Nor is it plausible that nonracial informa-
tion about the drivers or the cars led the troopers to suspect drug
possession far more often for blacks and Hispanics than for whites.74
But what about nonracial information that might have led the MSP to
suspect drug trafficking?
To return to an example we used before: consider a clinic that uses
an expensive test to screen high-risk patients for diabetes. If they rely
on nonracial predictors to choose who to test - a family history of
diabetes, or an abnormally high level of insulin in the blood, or both
- they will end up with a disproportionate number of African
Americans among those who are tested and found to have diabetes,
170. See, e.g., THE NNICC REPORT 1995, THE SUPPLY OF ILLICIT DRUGS TO THE
UNITED STATES 2 (1996), available at http://www.usdoj. gov/dea/pubs/nnic-95/nnicc-95.htm;
High Intensity Drug Trafficking, supra note 31, at 163-65.
171. The figure in the text is for arrests in cases in which the direction of travel is re-
corded. See supra note 158.
172. For example, for northbound cars equivalent proportions of the searches were
based on consent for black and for white motorists, 45% and 44% respectively, while among
southbound cars, consent searches - the type that produce fewer hits but more big dealers,
see supra Table 14 - were 56% of the total for blacks and 42% for whites. For Hispanics,
the group with the lowest hit rate and the highest proportion of big dealers, the consent-
search rate was high in both directions, 63% going north, and 68% going south.
173. See supra text at notes 130-136.
174. See supra text at notes 137-138.
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and among those who are tested and are found not to have the
disease. Could it be that something similar is going on here: that
Maryland State troopers are searching those drivers who, without ref-
erence to race, look most like drug dealers, and that African
Americans turn up disproportionately among the hits and the misses
alike?
For that to work there must be one or more nonracial factors that
are correlated both with race and with drug dealing. We have such
nonracial predictors for diabetes. African Americans are more likely
to have elevated levels of insulin, and elevated insulin is associated
with diabetes for both blacks and whites. What nonracial factor fits
that bill for drug trafficking? To be specific, what, other than race,
might make blacks who do not deal drugs five times more likely to
look like drug dealers than whites who do not deal drugs?' Nothing
comes to mind, in part because drug dealing is as fundamentally dif-
ferent from chronic illness as policing the highway is from medicine.
Drug trafficking is a behavioral pattern rather than a physiological
syndrome; its best predictors are likely to be related types of behavior,
past and present, which are invisible to the state trooper, rather than
physical symptoms that a doctor can observe. One reason that the
clinic will screen more nondiabetic blacks than whites is that diabetes,
as we define it, is the end point on a physiological continuum; some of
those who test negative are nonetheless at high risk to develop the
disease, and may do so in the future. There is no equivalent group of
innocent motorists with mild symptoms or early stages of drug dealing.
Hispanic drivers stopped by the MSP were searched seven times as
often as whites. Considering that they were found with drugs about
one-third as often as white drivers, it's hard to believe that most of
these Hispanics were searched because they seemed more likely to be
carrying drugs than whites. And if they weren't carrying drugs, what,
apart from ethnicity, would make them look more like drug traffick-
ers? Of course, the troopers who conducted these searches probably
had at least some general sense of one of the patterns summarized in
Table 21: searches of Hispanics included more major cocaine busts
than searches of whites. The average cocaine seizure from a Hispanic
was nine times larger than the average seizure from a white, and the
average amount seized per search was twelve times greater, even tak-
ing into account the many searches in which no cocaine was found at
175. To qualify, a nonracial factor must be something that not only makes blacks who
have it more likely to be drug dealers than those who don't, but that also is more prevalent
among blacks than whites. Even if (let's assume) most black drug dealers on 1-95 in
Maryland have New York license plates, having a New York license plate won't do the trick
unless it's also true that black drivers on 1-95 are more likely than white drivers to have one.
And, given that blacks were several times more likely to be searched than whites, the
nonracial factor or factors at work would also have to be several times more common among
blacks than whites.
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all. We see similar patterns for each drug listed, for blacks, for
Hispanics, or for both. Surely these numbers provide the simplest and
most credible explanation for the troopers' behavior: they searched
innocent Hispanic drivers seven times as often as whites - and more
than twice as often as blacks - in an attempt to find a few major
Hispanic drug traffickers.
Table 21: Average Quantities of Particular Drugs Seized
in the 1-95 Corridor, for All Searches, and for Searches in
Which that Drugi Was Found, by Race or Ethnicity17
White Black Hispanic
Marijuan a
All Searches 6.1g 371.7g 0.3g
Drug Found 18.3g 1342.3g 3.9g
Cocaine
All Searches 15.6g 91.4g 199.6g
Drug Found 398.5g 968.2g 3621.8g
Crack
All Searches 0.6g 19.2g 0.9g
Drug Found 115.9g 337.2g 113.Og
Heroin
All Searches 1.6g 2.Og 5.Og
Drug Found 42.Og 112.7g 213.1g
Isn't this exactly what the Maryland State Police should be doing:
Concentrating their attention on those groups that are most likely to
include big-time drug dealers? At first blush this seems right - and
yet, over the course of half-a-dozen years of defending their conduct
on 1-95, no representative of the Maryland State Police or the State of
176. Differences in average quantities seized are not subject to meaningful tests of sta-
tistical significance for the same reason that such tests are not useful for differences in total
quantities seized. See supra note 160. In this case, however, the Table summarizes the infor-
mation on past drug seizures on which state police troopers may base their decisions. Unless
the troopers are uncommonly sophisticated about inferential statistics, it probably does not
matter whether the pattern is statistically significant. Most likely, they respond primarily to
the few highly visible big busts, most of which involve minority defendants.
December 2002]
Michigan Law Review
Maryland has ever mentioned this explanation.' Why not? We can
dismiss the possibility that it has gone unnoticed. Big drug seizures are
rare, conspicuous events, the grand slams of drug interdiction. It is
inconceivable that they are not well remembered, or that the troopers
involved, and their colleagues and supervisors, failed to notice that
most of the suspects in these big busts were black and Hispanic.
On the other hand, someone in the Maryland State Police com-
mand, or in the Maryland State Attorney General's office, may well
have recognized that this is not actually a legitimate explanation for
racial disparities. Quite the opposite: to endorse it would be an admis-
sion of racial profiling. The state, in effect, would be saying that its
troopers target black and Hispanic drivers for searches not because
they are more likely than whites to be drug offenders (which they are
not) but because they are members of ethnic or racial groups that in-
clude most of the tiny proportion of drivers who are major drug traf-
fickers. This may or may not be an efficient way to run a drug interdic-
tion program - that depends on other factors that we discuss in Part
V - but it is bad policy and it is unconstitutional.
3. Do the Quantities of Drugs Seized Reflect the Reality of Drug
Trafficking?
We have pointed out that our data are flawed. Might those flaws
have created the false appearance that most of the illegal drugs that
are seized on 1-95 in Maryland, by weight, are transported by blacks
and Hispanics? Ordinary errors or omissions could not produce as
clear and strong a pattern as we see here, but what about deliberate
distortion? As we have said, it is likely that Maryland State troopers
have selectively omitted some cases, and they may also have falsified
other entries, but deceptive record-keeping could hardly produce this
finding. To do that the troopers would have had to fail to report large
seizures of drugs from cars driven by whites. That is not a realistic pos-
sibility. Unless they are bribed to turn a blind eye, or are involved in
the drug trade themselves, police officers cannot neglect to report a
search in which a substantial amount of contraband was found,
because both the contraband itself and any suspects who are present
must be taken into custody and booked. Besides, when a large cache
of drugs has been found, the arresting officer will want to boast about
it, not conceal it, whatever the race of the suspect.""s
177. Telephone Interview with William Mertens, Esq., Counsel for plaintiffs in
Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland State Police, and Samuel R.
Gross (Nov. 16, 2001); E-mail message from William Mertens to Samuel R. Gross (Nov. 20,
2001) (on file with authors).
178. See, e.g., Douglas A. Campbell & Howard Goodman, The Path to Glory for N.J.
Troopers: Arrests, Arrests, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 7, 1999, at Al ("The seizure of 99 kilo-
grams of cocaine was Trooper Raymond Lasso's route to stardom.").
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Could we have put the shoe on the wrong foot? Perhaps the con-
centration of drugs in cars with minority drivers is an effect of the
MSP's search policies, rather than a cause. Only about 17% of the cars
on 1-95 were driven by blacks, but they accounted for about 61% of
the searches; we don't have similar estimates for Hispanics, but let's
assume for the moment that the disproportion is the same. If
Maryland State troopers had searched comparable numbers of cars
driven by white drivers, more white drivers would have been arrested
for drug crimes, and more drugs would have been seized from the cars
they drove. Instead, most of the drugs seized were found in cars driven
by blacks and Hispanics for the simple and inevitable reason that most
of the cars searched were driven by blacks and Hispanics. 79
This is true, but only in part. To achieve the same search rate for
white motorists as for blacks, the MSP would have had to search about
five times as many cars driven by whites as they actually did. Even if
they had done that - and assuming the quantities of drugs they found
in these additional searches were proportional to the amounts found
in the searches of white-driven cars that they in fact conducted - 64%
of the medium and large drug dealers arrested would still have been
black or Hispanic, despite the fact that under these imaginary
circumstances black and Hispanic drivers would constitute only 27%
of all drivers searched. Looking at the three drugs that made up most
of the seizures, 93% of the marijuana, 70% of the cocaine, and 90% of
the crack would still have been found in cars with minority drivers."o
In other words, the disproportionate searching of minority-driven cars
explains some of the overwhelming racial and ethnic disparities in the
quantities of drugs seized, but not all or even most.
In addition, a different aspect of MSP search practices may also
have exaggerated the appearance of minority domination of drug
trafficking. As we have noted, the decisions to conduct some searches
may have been based on prior intelligence rather than race or suspi-
cious behavior, confidential information that a particular car was car-
rying drugs. In general, police officers try not to reveal the undercover
intelligence on which some of their actions are based because doing so
makes it more difficult to use the same sources in the future, or to
guarantee secrecy to future informants. In some cases, officers have
been caught lying to hide their informants,' but that's usually unnec-
179. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 140, at 297; PETER VERNIERO & PAUL H. ZOUBER,
ATTORNEY GEN. OF N.J., INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM
REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 67-68 (1999); Ramirez et al., supra note
10, at 11.
180. The predictions of quantities of drugs seized - unlike those that focus on the num-
ber of dealers - are very rough, because, as we have seen, the total quantities actually
seized were concentrated in a small number of large seizures. See supra Table 13 and note
160.
181. See supra text accompanying note 86.
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essary. If confidential information is a necessary part of the justifica-
tion for a search, and if there is litigation over the legality of that
search, officers may have to reveal the nature of that information in
court, and possibly the identity of the source. 82 If there is an inde-
pendent legal justification for their actions, however, they may never
have to mention the existence of such intelligence, even if the issue is
litigated."3 In any event, most defendants who are caught with drugs
plead guilty without ever challenging the legality of the searches, so
the issue never arises. As a result, what looks to us like a typical search
by the MSP - a discretionary stop to enforce a minor traffic rule,
followed by a search based on consent from the driver - might
actually have been undertaken because of a tip from an undercover
source that the car in question would be carrying cocaine from New
Jersey to Washington, D.C.
We have no direct information on how frequently the Maryland
State Police relied on confidential intelligence on drug trafficking, or
on how successful they were in searches based on such intelligence. It
seems unlikely that such information played a role in more than a
small fraction of the thousands of stops and searches that we have
considered. But it is possible that undercover intelligence led the MSP
to some of their larger drug seizures, and was the basis for a significant
proportion of the total amounts of drugs seized. There are hints in the
data that point in that direction. Consider Table 22, which displays the
outcomes of consent searches on 1-95 north of Baltimore, by direction
of travel.
182. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1967) (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53,65 (1957)); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 3.3(g), at 188-203.
183. McCray, 386 U.S. at 312-14; AMERICAN LAW INST., MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROC. 575 (1975); 2 LAFAVE, supra note 64, §3.3(g), at 188-203.
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Table 22: Consent Searches in 1-95 Corridor, by
Direction of Travel and Quantities of Drugs Found
Northbound Southbound
Trace
Amounts 4.4% .9%
Personal
Use 6.6% 6.4%
Small
Dealer 0 2.7%
Medium/
Large Dealer 1.5% 11.9%
Any illegal
drugs 12.5% 24.8%
p < .0001
Going north, 88% of the drug seizures in consent searches were from
people we classify as users. Going south (the direction in which the
drug pipeline is believed to flow), the MSP arrested users at about the
same rate as going north, and dealers, especially big dealers, at ten
times the northbound rate. Dealers carrying more than a pound of
marijuana or more than 50 grams of cocaine were arrested more often
than users carrying less than a fifth as much. Long-haul drug traffick-
ers may be more common in the southbound than in the northbound
lanes of 1-95 - perhaps even 10 times more common - but, unless
they carry drugs primarily to sell to each other, they could not be
nearly as common as local users traveling in either direction."s If
cigarettes were outlawed there might be a sharp increase in the num-
ber of passenger cars carrying more than ten cartons, but they would
still be vastly outnumbered by those with anything from a burnt butt
to ten or twenty packs. Could it be that Maryland State troopers are
highly skilled at picking out southbound dealers and ignoring most of
the much larger group of users, on the basis of their own observations?
That seems unlikely for these searches, which were conducted without
probable cause and which were unsuccessful more than three times
out of four. If not, perhaps a substantial portion of these southbound
184. It's possible to imagine how that could be otherwise: if users consume their drugs
on the spot when they buy them; if they transport their drugs on foot, or bicycle, or bus, but
in any event don't drive with them; or if users, unlike dealers, avoid interstate highways.
These are improbable scenarios. We know that a fair number of users and nonpipeline deal-
ers drive on 1-95; they get arrested doing so in the northbound lanes. Is it credible that the
southbound driving pipeline dealers from New York and New Jersey swamp their numbers?
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dealers were caught in "whisper stops,"'"5 on the basis of prior intelli-
gence.
The use of informants, however, will only produce racial and eth-
nic disparities in the quantities of drugs seized if the police get more
confidential intelligence on black and Hispanic drug dealers than on
white drug dealers. That in turn could happen if the confidential
information itself is a product of racially disproportionate searches at
earlier times. If so, reliance on intelligence could amplify the impact of
disproportionate attention to minority motorists on the proportions of
drugs seized from minority group members.
Few confidential informants are volunteers. Most are drug dealers
themselves who have had the misfortune to be caught, and who agree
to provide information about their colleagues in order to avoid prose-
cution or reduce their punishment. Since more black and Hispanic
drivers are stopped and searched, more black and Hispanic dealers
are likely to be caught and thus become subject to recruitment as
undercover informants. If they are recruited as informants, the
ex-colleagues they can turn on are also likely to be black and Hispanic,
since segregation is probably as common among drug dealers as
elsewhere in America. The preferred method of using drug-dealer
informants is to go up the criminal hierarchy: get a retailer to turn in a
wholesaler, and then get the wholesaler to set up a major distributor.
If that works (a significant qualification), the seizures associated with
the original informant - and which, let's assume, all involve suspects
of the same race as that informant - metastasize from medium, to
large, to monster, and the racial concentration that is linked to this
race-specific chain grows in proportion.
In short, because almost all the drugs seized by the MSP on 1-95
were found in a small number of conspicuous and highly successful
searches, the reported totals of drugs seized are likely to be substan-
tially accurate. These same reports, however, overstate the propor-
tions of illegal drugs that were transported by blacks and Hispanics
because the MSP disproportionately stopped and searched black and
Hispanic motorists. The data may be further biased if (as seems likely)
a significant number of large drug seizures were based on undercover
intelligence that was derived from this same racially disproportionate
pattern of highway searches. As a result, we cannot say to what extent
blacks and Hispanics dominated the transportation of illegal drugs on1-95.116
185. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
186. It's worth noting that the MSP seem to catch less than 1% of the illegal drugs that
are transported on 1-95, see infra text accompanying notes 338-342, and that the 99% or
more that gets through may not be carried by the same sorts of drivers or in the same man-
ner as the tiny proportion that is stopped.
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IV. CHANGES OVER TIME, 1995-2000
So far we have analyzed the MSP data set as a single temporal unit.
We have tacitly assumed that the object of our study - the investiga-
tory practices of the Maryland State Police - remained fixed from
January, 1995 through June, 2000. That assumption is false - or
rather, a simplification. We know that many of the patterns we have
discussed changed over this period. Here we will briefly discuss the
most conspicuous changes. Again, we are limited by the quality of the
underlying data. The problems of omission and distortion that trouble
us for the data set as a whole only get worse as we slice it into smaller
pieces, and our data on searches and stops cover different (if overlap-
ping) time periods.
Table 23 combines several of the more interesting temporal pat-
terns in the MSP searches on 1-95. It consists of seven subcharts with a
cross-cutting division. The searches described by these data seem to
divide into two distinct periods, those conducted in 1995 and 1996, and
those conducted after 1996.
In subchart (1) we see that the number of searches on 1-95 varied
greatly from year to year. There were 45% fewer searches in 1996 than
in 1995, and 80% fewer in 1997. After that, the search rate recovered,
just as quickly, and by 1999, it was back above the 1995 level. The
likely explanation is that the ongoing litigation and controversy over
MSP's search practices affected its conduct. In particular, the
December 1994 settlement agreement in Wilkins v. Maryland State
Police required the MSP to adopt several new policies and training
programs that bear on highway searches, and to keep records that are
the basis for this study."l Maryland State troopers and their supervi-
sors may well have spent the next few years coming to terms with the
new regime, which could explain why the number of searches they
conducted on 1-95 plummeted and then recovered.
In subchart (2) we see that the racial distribution of these searches
changed over time. The top line shows that the percentage of whites
searched increased from about 21% in 1995-96 to over 40% from 1997
on. The second line shows a corresponding decrease in the percentage
of blacks searched, from more than 70% through 1996 to slightly over
50% from 1997 through 2000. These two lines, and several others in
Table 23, are shaded to indicate that there was a clear break between
1996 and 1997: the measure in question was sharply higher (or lower)
for 1997 and for every year after that than it was for either 1995 or
1996. The lines for proportions of searches for whites and for blacks
both qualify under this standard. The line for Hispanics does not,
probably because those proportions are much more variable, as one
187. See Settlement Agreement, Wilkins, supra note 22.
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would expect for such a small group (8 to 35 searches per year,
approximately one-tenth the number for blacks).
Table 23: Changes over Time In MSP Searches, In the 1-95 Corridor
1995 1996
2000
1997 1998 1999 (Jan-June)
1. Number of Searches 564 309 116 374 607 [352]*
2. Searches White 20.7% 22.0% 39.7% 47.3% 39.0% 39.2%
by
Race Black 74.5% 66.0% 53.5% 45.5% 54.7% 53.4%
Hispanic 3.6% 9.7% 6.9% 6.1% 5.8% 6.3%
3. Percent White 25.6% 16.2% 47.8% 40.1% 52.3% 43.5%
of
Searches Black 35.2% 40.7% 37.1% 37.7% 38.0% 42.6%
that
Found Hispanic 10.0% 13.3% 12.5% 13.0% 17.1% 35.4%
Drugs All 32.5% 32.4% 39.7% 37.2% 42.5% 42.6$
4. Percent of Searches
Based on Consent 74% 64% 41% 30% 38% 41%
5. Percent White 3.4% 2.9% 8.7% 2.3% 1.3% 0%
of
Medium Black 16.9% 24.5% 11.3% 1.8% 5.1% 8.5%
and
Large
Dealers Hispanic 10.0% 13.3% 0% 0% 2.9% 18.2%
All 13.8% 18.8% 9.5% 1.9% 3.5% 5.7%
6. Total MJ 357.8kg 43.9kg 37.7kg 2.5kg 32.7kg [41.3kg]*
Drugs
Seized Cocaine 49.7kg 97.4kg 1.9kg 1.0kg 4.8kg [2.4kg]*
Crack 6.8kg 9.5kg 1.1kg 0.4kg 6.8kg [2.Okg]*
Heroin 1.6kg 2.1kg 0.Okg 0.1kg 0.2kg [0.Bkg]*
7. Average
Seizure
Across
All
Searches
MJ
Cocaine
Crack
Heroin
* Estimated total for year based on data for January through ,June, 2000. Data for May and
June, 2000, may be incomplete; see supra note 40.
Subchart (3) displays the hit rate by race, over time. Overall, it was
comparatively level, although it reached new highs in both 1999 and
2000. There was certainly no clear break between 1996 and 1997.
However, for whites the only shaded line in this subchart, the hit rate
more than doubled in 1997 and never returned to its pre-1997 level. In
other words, the relatively flat global hit rate conceals two counter-
vailing changes: (i) The percentage of whites searched increased
sharply in 1997. That would have lowered the overall hit rate, since the
rate for whites in 1995-1996 was lower than for blacks, except that (ii)
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the hit rate for whites increased simultaneously, moving from about
10% to 20% below that for blacks to an average of about 10% above.
In subchart (4) we see that the proportion of searches based on
consent declined after 1996 from about 70% to less than 40%. This
decline occurred across all three racial categories, although the rate of
consent searches for whites was always lower than for blacks, which in
turn was lower than for Hispanics.
As we have seen, consent searches were less likely than probable-
cause searches to find some drugs, but more likely to find big dealers.
The decrease in the proportion of consent searches after 1996 contrib-
uted to the simultaneous increase in the hit rate we see in subchart (3).
It also no doubt contributed to the sharp decrease in the proportion of
medium and large dealers arrested, as reflected in subchart (5). The
total proportion of big dealers arrested dropped by half from 1996 to
1997, and declined further after that. Since the great majority of all
such dealers were black, this pattern is reproduced among the searches
of black motorists - the other shaded line on subchart (5). The per-
centage of big dealers found in searches of whites may have started to
decline later, in 1998, but that pattern is less clear.
The drop in the proportion of big dealers arrested after 1995 was
paralleled by a similar decrease in the amounts of drugs seized, both
the total quantities (subchart (6)) and the average seizure per search
(subchart (7)). These changes vary greatly by type of drug. There may
be a general decline over time in the quantities of marijuana and crack
seized, but that is far from clear. The totals fluctuate, and are heavily
affected by small numbers of large seizures. For heroin and especially
cocaine, however, the picture is unambiguous. Total and average sei-
zures both dropped sharply after 1996 and. never recovered. For co-
caine the change is stark: over 90% of all the cocaine found by the
MSP was seized in the first two years of this five-and-a-half year
period. This is particularly significant since cocaine is easily the most
important drug of the four, accounting for more than half of the
medium and large dealers arrested, and perhaps 60% of the total retail
value of the drugs seized.
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Table 24: Chanaes over Time in MSP Searches Outside the 1-95 Corridor
2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 (Jan-June)
1. Number of Searches 851 869 909 1205 1525 [1042)*
2. Searches White 62.3% 63.5% 61.2% 63.5% 61.2% 65.8%
by
Race Black 34.1% 30.3% 31.5% 30.5% 34.4% 30.5%
Hispanic 2.8% 5.1% 5.4% 3.9% 3.0% 3.3%
3. Percent White 33.4% 35.9% 35.1% 36.9% 36.7% 46.4%
of
Searches Black 25.2% 22.4% 21.0% 26.4% 28.0% 32.7%
that
Found
Drugs Hispanic 16.7% 11.4% 10.2% 4.3% 6.7% 17.7%
All 30.1% 30.4% 28.9% 32.0% 32.5% 41.1%
4. Percent of Searches
Based on Consent 66.4% 59.8% 59.5% 54.3% 54.8% 51.8%
5. Percent White 0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 0.3% 0.8% 0.9%
of
Medium Black 6.2% 4.6% 0.7% 2.2% 3.4% 1.3%
and
Large
Dealers Hispanic 8.3% 11.4% 2.0% 2.1% 0% 0%
All 2.6% 2.2% 0.8% 1.0% 1.6% 1.0%
6. Total MJ 2.7kg 5.5kg 9.8kg 11.0kg 7.8kg [5.2kg]1
Drugs
Seized Cocaine 9.8kg 10.4kg 2.0kg 5.7kg 14.2kg [0.2kg]
Crack 2.3kg 8.8k9 1.1kg. 0.7kg i.Skg [1.SkgJ* -
Heroin 0.6kg 0.1kg r 0.1kg 0.1kg 1.3kg [0.1kg]*
7. Average
Seizure
Across
All
Searches
MJ
Cocaine
Crack
Heroin
3.29
11.6g
2.79
0.7g
5.4g
12.Og
10.2g
0.1g
10.8g
2.2g
1.2g
0.1g
.Estimated total for year based on data for January through June, 2001).
June. 2000, may be incomplete; see supra note 40.
Data for May and
Table 24 contains the same information as Table 23 for MSP
searches that were not in the 1-95 corridor. Given the major shifts on
that section of highway, it is striking how little changed in the rest of
the state. The number of searches increased every year from 1995
through 1999; in 1998 and 1999 the growth was comparatively rapid,
25% to 30% a year (subchart (1)). On 1-95, in contrast, every yearly
change was much larger, in one direction or the other. Outside the
1-95 corridor, the proportions of whites, blacks, and Hispanics
searched remained basically unchanged across the entire period
(subchart (2)). Off 1-95, the overall hit rate and the separate hit rates
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for whites and for blacks were stable, except that they all increased in
2000; the hit rate for Hispanics dropped from 1995 to 1998 and then
recovered (subchart (3)). The percentage of consent searches
decreased modestly from 1995 to 2000 by 14% (subchart (4)), whereas
on 1-95, it dropped by 30%, with two-thirds of that drop occurring be-
tween 1996 and 1997.
The MSP searches outside the 1-95 corridor do not exhibit the
clear break between 1996 and 1997 that we see for the searches on
1-95, with two exceptions. As in the 1-95 corridor, the percentage of
big dealers caught (already low by 1-95 standards) declined markedly
after 1996, for all searches and for those of blacks and Hispanics
separately (subchart (5)). And, unlike on 1-95, the amount of crack
seized fell sharply at the same time (subcharts (6) and (7)), a drop that
could be due to chance if a few large seizures happened to cluster in
1995 and 1996. In contrast, most of the comparatively small amounts
of marijuana, cocaine and heroin seized off 1-95 were found after 1996.
As we have said, the changes on 1-95 after 1996 probably reflect
the scrutiny that has been focused on MSP practices on that highway.
One consequence of that scrutiny was the court order that required
the MSP to collect and maintain data on stops as well as searches in
the 1-95 corridor."s Unfortunately that data collection began in May
1997, after the 1996/1997 watershed in MSP search practices on 1-95.
The data that are available from that date through the end of 2000 are
remarkably uniform from year to year on every variable of interest.
The number of stops per year goes up or down by a few percentage
points; the proportion of whites stopped ranges from a low of 64.5% in
2000 to a high of 66.2% in 1998; for blacks the range is from 27.6% to
28.3%; and so forth. These flat lines could mean that stops, unlike
searches, do not vary much from year to year, at least not on these di-
mensions. Or they could mean that we missed big changes that took
place before May 1997.
In the absence of stop data from 1995 and 1996 we cannot usefully
plot changes in the relative risks of a search given a stop for different
racial groups."9 We can, however, estimate changes over time in the
relative risks of a search for black and white drivers on 1-95, assuming,
as before, that the racial proportions of drivers that Dr. Lamberth
found in 1996 apply throughout the period covered by our search
data."l In Table 4 we saw that the comparative risk of a search for a
black driver was 5.2 times that for a white driver, from May 1997
through April 2000. In Table 25 we see that, as with other measures
we have examined, this ratio changed drastically after 1996. The MSP
18& See supra note 32.
189. See supra Table 2.
190. See supra text at note 42.
December 20021
Michigan Law Review
continued to search black drivers at several times the rate for white
drivers through 2000, but the magnitude of that disparity decreased by
more than half after 1996. This could mean that the Maryland State
troopers reacted to the litigation and complaints about racial profiling
by searching fewer black drivers and more white drivers, to some
extent. At the same time they also shifted from consent searches, the
low probability/high yield type, to probable-cause searches, the type
that succeed more often but usually in a small way. Predictably, the
overall hit rate went up and the number of big dealers arrested went
down. 9'
Table 25: Risk of Search for a Black Driver, Compared to a
White Driver, in the 1-95 Corridor
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
X15.4 X12.5 X5.7 X4.1 X6.0 X5.8
Another possible interpretation of this shift is that it reflects a
change in record keeping rather than practice. Isn't it possible that as
the issue of racial profiling heated up, MSP personnel became
increasingly conscious of the importance of these records, and in-
creasingly likely to omit searches that could make them look bad?
Might they not also have become increasingly careful to pre-screen
searches in order to minimize the number of unsuccessful ones they
report, especially when those searched are black or Hispanic? Per-
haps, but the question is not whether these omissions occur. It is
whether they became more common to an extent that could explain
the other changes that we have observed, which is improbable. A ma-
jor increase in the proportion of omitted searches would reduce the
total number of recorded searches for the year in question. Needless
to say, any factors that influence the true number of searches -
changes in stop policies, or personnel, for example - would also affect
the reported total. Even so, if these apparent changes in search pat-
terns were primarily the product of selective recording we would ex-
pect them to be more pronounced in years for which fewer searches
are recorded. In fact, the percentages of searches by race, the hit rates,
and the proportions of consent searches were all essentially the same
in 1997, with 116 reported searches, and in 1999, with 607.
While the number and the distribution of searches might be biased
by systematic underreporting, the quantities of drugs seized are likely
to be substantially accurate, as we have explained.'9 2 And yet the total
191. See supra Table 23, subcharts (3) and (5).
192. See supra Section III.D.3.
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amounts of cocaine and heroin seized in the 1-95 corridor changed
more drastically over time than any other quantity we have discussed.
The average amount of heroin seized per year dropped by about 85%
after 1996; the average amount of cocaine seized plunged more than
95%. Some of that steep decline may be due to other changes we have
discussed, but not much. A 20% reduction in the number of blacks
searched and a 30% decrease in the percentage of consent searches
can hardly explain a 95% decline in the amount of cocaine found,
especially when the quantities of marijuana and of crack seized were
comparatively unaffected. Something else is going on: a change in as-
pects of Maryland State Police searches that are not reflected in these
data, or in the information on which the troopers acted, or in their
overall drug interdiction program, or in the behavior of the drug traf-
fickers themselves.
V. COMMENTARY
In this section we consider the implications of the data we have
reviewed, from three points of view: (1) As a factual matter, we con-
clude that while the evidence of racial profiling that we have presented
might not persuade some courts, especially if presented by the defense
in a criminal case, it is strong enough to satisfy the decision makers
who matter most on this issue: police administrators and their superi-
ors, legislatures, and the public. (2) The legal status of racial profiling
turns on two separate constitutional provisions. Some comparatively
old Fourth Amendment cases permit police officers to rely in part on
race in deciding who to stop or search, but courts have increasingly
shied away from those rulings; on the other hand, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly prohibits the
use of race for these purposes, but the remedy for such a violation is
unclear. (3) Finally, we discuss the wisdom and morality of racial pro-
filing as a policy. We conclude that while in theory some racial profil-
ing programs might conceivably be worth the fear, humiliation and
disruption they cause to countless innocent suspects, this one cannot
possibly be justified because the entire drug interdiction program of
which it is a part produces no discernable benefits.
A. Do These Data Prove Racial Profiling?
The data we have presented are complex, but the central question
to which they are addressed is simple: Did Maryland State troopers
stop and search black and Hispanic motorists because of their race or
ethnicity? The answer seems clear: yes. The Maryland State Police did
use race and ethnicity as a basis for choosing motorists to stop and to
search for drugs on 1-95 in Maryland, north of Baltimore, from 1995
into 2000. The drug interdiction program that included this racial pro-
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filing component focused primarily on southbound cars, reflecting the
widely held law-enforcement view that most illegal drugs sold in the
Baltimore/Washington, D.C. area come from a regional distribution
center in New York to the north. There is no evidence the blacks were
more likely than whites to carry drugs, and some evidence that
Hispanics were less likely to do so, so this use of race did not improve
the MSP's hit rate. But blacks and Hispanics were overrepresented
among the small minority of drug traffickers in our data, and they
accounted for the great majority of the total quantities of drugs seized
by the Maryland State Police.
Despite these findings, the issue is contested. The Maryland State
Police continue to deny that they practice racial profiling, and
Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland State
Police,'93 the second class action lawsuit alleging racial profiling by the
MSP, is still pending. In that and other contexts, will the sort of evi-
dence we have presented be convincing?
The persuasive power of any information depends on the audience,
and one important audience has been exceedingly demanding. In
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court considered powerful statisti-
cal evidence of racial discrimination in the administration of the death
penalty in Georgia, and decided that it wasn't strong enough.'94
McCleskey relied primarily on a well-known study by Professor David
Baldus and his colleagues, who collected and analyzed detailed data
on homicide prosecutions in Georgia over a period of several years,
and concluded, after taking into account hundreds of nonracial
variables that might explain sentencing outcomes, that defendants
convicted of killing white victims were several times more likely to be
sentenced to death than those convicted of killing black victims." This
is a remarkable study. It was described in the record in McCleskey as
"far and away the most complete and thorough analysis of sentencing"
ever conducted.' Our conclusions may be persuasive, but no more so
than those by Baldus et al. which the Supreme Court rejected.
Doctrinally, the holding in McCleskey was an application of the
rule in Washington v. Davis that a litigant who claims that he was the
victim of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause must prove
purposeful discrimination.197 The difficulty of proving purposeful dis-
193. See Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland State Police, No.
CCB-98-1098 (D. Md. filed 1998); Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches v.
Maryland State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d 560 (D. Md. 1999).
194. 481 U.S. 279, 293-99 (1987).
195. See DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWARD & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990).
196. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 907 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting and
concurring in part) (quoting Dr. Richard Berk, member of a National Academy of Sciences
panel on research on sentencing in the United States).
197. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976).
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crimination, however, varies from one context to another, and is par-
ticularly great where, as in McCleskey, the challenged conduct consists
largely of discretionary acts by prosecutors, judges and juries. Specifi-
cally, the Court held that because discretion is an essential component
of our system of criminal justice, statistical evidence is inherently
insufficient to prove discriminatory intent."9 To win, McCleskey
would have had to present specific evidence of purposeful discrimina-
tion by the actual decision makers whose actions resulted in his death
sentence.'"
Statistics at most may show only a likelihood that a particular factor en-
tered into some decisions .... McCleskey asks us to accept the likelihood
allegedly shown by the Baldus study as the constitutional measure of an
unacceptable risk of racial prejudice influencing capital sentencing deci-
sions. This we decline to do.2 °
The holding in McCleskey has been widely criticized, and rightly
so. 0" As Justice Brennan points out in dissent, there was no real doubt
that race did influence capital sentencing in Georgia; everybody who
dealt with the issue in practice knew it and acted on that knowledge.202
The Court denies the obvious. It acknowledges, as it must, that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits racial discrimination in state crimi-
nal prosecutions, but it demands evidence that is generally impossible
to obtain. If the same burden of proof applies to claims of racial pro-
filing on the highway, then the evidence we have presented is also
"clearly insufficient."
But does McCleskey's rejection of the Baldus study set the stan-
dard for proving racial profiling? Perhaps not, even in the context of
an equal protection claim in a criminal case. In State v. Soto,'°3 Judge
Robert Francis of the New Jersey Superior Court decided a challenge
to racial profiling on the New Jersey Turnpike based primarily on evi-
dence much like the data on traffic law violations and traffic stops that
we have presented. His interpretation of the value of statistical evi-
198. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297 ("Because discretion is essential to the criminal jus-
tice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the dis-
cretion has been abused.... Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly insuffi-
cient to support an inference that any of the decision makers in McCleskey's case acted with
discriminatory purpose.").
199. Id. at 298.
200. Id. at 308-09.
201. See, e.g., BALDUS ET AL, supra note 195, at 370-93; SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT
MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING
159-227 (1989); Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the
Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1741 (1987); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race,
Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988).
202. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321.
203. 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
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dence seems very different from that of the Supreme Court in
McCleskey:
Statistics may be used to make out a case of targeting minorities for
prosecution of traffic offenses .... While defendants have the burden of
proving "the existence of purposeful discrimination," discriminatory in-
tent may be inferred from statistical proof presenting a stark pattern or
an even less extreme pattern in certain limited contexts.204
He goes on to hold that the defendants did in fact prove racial profil-
ing by the New Jersey State Police.
How did Judge Francis distinguish McCleskey? At first blush it
looks as though he didn't really try. Instead of relying on the bits of
nonstatistical evidence of discrimination in the record - mostly
training materials and testimony by disaffected ex-troopers - he cites
McCleskey itself for the proposition that statistics may prove discrimi-
nation. The McCleskey opinion does say that a sufficiently stark statis-
tical discrepancy may prove discrimination in criminal prosecution,
but the 1886 case it points to, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 5 was so extreme it
has never been duplicated. Yick Wo, who was prosecuted for operat-
ing a laundry without a permit, showed that "all but one of the white
applicants received permits [to operate laundries in wooden build-
ings], but none of the over 200 Chinese applicants were successful."2 6
The evidence in Soto was a far cry from the rejected Baldus study, let
alone the extraordinarily one-sided showing in Yick Wo. The
McCleskey Court, however, also acknowledges that it has accepted
less extreme statistical disparities as proof of intentional discrimina-
tion in other settings - specifically, jury composition and employment
discrimination - where the decisionmaking process is simpler and in-
volves fewer decision makers than capital charging and sentencing: "In
those cases, the statistics relate to fewer entities, and fewer variables
are relevant to the challenged decisions."'2 7 Judge Francis picks up this
theme, citing an earlier New Jersey state court opinion that "implies
that discriminatory intent may be inferred from statistical proof in a
traffic stop context probably because only uniform variables.., are
relevant to the challenged stops ..... 2 0
This enigmatic statement in Soto apparently means that because
traffic stops are supposed to be based on a few relatively simple
variables, the influence of race is comparatively easy to detect. It is a
plausible argument: it may be easier to describe how traffic laws
204. Id. at 360 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
205. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
206. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293 n.12.
207. Id. at 295.
208. Soto, 734 A.2d at 360 (citing State v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991)).
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should be enforced than how homicides should be prosecuted, and
there may be less variation in policy from one jurisdiction to
another.' c Some may disagree, however, and Judge Francis refers
(curtly) to only one of the two considerations the Supreme Court
discusses in McCleskey. The other factor - the number of decision-
makers - does not support his position, since stops on the New Jersey
Turnpike are made by many different officers.
There is a related argument, however, that may be more persua-
sive. McCleskey relies heavily on the claim that we must not constrain
the types of decisions at issue in that case. The Court repeatedly em-
phasizes the importance of wide-ranging prosecutorial discretion in
charging,"' ° and of open-ended jury sentencing in capital cases."1 Our
legal system has no similar commitment to police officer discretion in
traffic law enforcement.12 The New Jersey State Police is a paramili-
tary organization. Troopers can be given specific orders on how, when
and why to conduct traffic stops. For these purposes, a police force
may be less like a prosecutor or a jury, whose independence the
Supreme Court was concerned to protect, and more like the contrast-
ing examples the Court offered in McCleskey: "The decisions of a jury
commission or of an employer over time are fairly attributable to the
commission or the employer,' 213 even if they were made by many
separate individuals within the organization.
Not only is the police discretion that was examined in Soto less
favored than the prosecutorial and jury discretion in McCleskey, but
the government function it serves is less important. McCleskey was
about murder prosecutions. There is an unmistakable sentiment run-
ning through the Court's opinion: This is difficult but essential work;
let's not make it impossible by demanding more consistency than
prosecutors and juries can deliver. Drug interdiction has not achieved
that dignity. We are ambivalent about the enterprise as a whole, and
less willing to tolerate injustices and inequities. Releasing guilty drug
dealers is a cost, but they leave no mutilated bodies or grieving rela-
tives, and we know that most are never caught in the first place.
Releasing convicted murderers is another matter entirely.
Soto is unique. There is only one other reported opinion in any
American jurisdiction (also from New Jersey) in which evidence in a
209. See GROSS & MAURO, supra note 201, at 173-80.
210. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 311-13, 319.
211. Id. at 293-94, 308-11.
212. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1141 (N.D.
Cal. 2000); Carl J. Schifferle, After Whren v. United States: Applying the Equal Protection
Clause to Racially Discriminatory Enforcement of the Law, 2 MiCH. L. & POL'Y REV. 159,
175 (1997); Joseph H. Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971 DUKE
L.J. 717,727 (1971).
213. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 295 n.15.
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criminal case was suppressed because of racial discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause," 4 and none in which a court did so on the
basis of statistical evidence. Soto is also a narrow decision; it concerns
stops only. Even a court that agreed with Soto in that setting might
conclude that because the separate decision to conduct a search after a
stop may be based on more elaborate information, statistical evidence
is inherently insufficient to prove discrimination at that stage. But the
main reason that Soto stands alone may be practical rather than doc-
trinal: it is a specimen of a rare species.
Soto was a systematic challenge to racial profiling in the context of
a criminal prosecution, or rather seventeen criminal prosecutions that
were joined for consideration of that issue. Most criminal cases that
raise similar issues are individual cases, where the issue is the legality
of a particular search under the Fourth Amendment. Systemic chal-
lenges to racial profiling are generally litigated as civil actions, usually
complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the police deprived
the plaintiffs of federal constitutional rights under color of state law.
In theory, McCleskey applies to civil and criminal cases alike; it
addresses the requirements for proof of an equal protection violation,
not the remedy. In practice, equal protection claims follow very differ-
ent paths in civil and criminal cases even when the underlying issues
are identical.
Civil cases have several interrelated advantages over criminal cases
as vehicles for challenging racial discrimination in the criminal justice
system. Because the challenging parties are plaintiffs rather than
defendants, they and their lawyers can take the initiative, structure the
cases, and assemble resources beyond the reach of all but the rarest
criminal defendant. The named plaintiffs are generally innocent vic-
tims of police misconduct, not criminals who were caught as a result of
that misconduct. They are more credible as witnesses, and they
personify the costs of discrimination rather than its occasional bene-
fits. Liberal civil discovery rules make it possible for civil plaintiffs to
conduct depositions, subpoena documents and obtain the sort of evi-
dence that defendants in run-of-the-mill criminal cases can only dream
of; as a result, they are more likely than criminal defendants to find
214. The case is State v. Maryland, 771 A.2d 1220 (N.J. 2001), in which the New Jersey
Supreme Court ordered suppression on both Fourth Amendment and equal protection
grounds. New Jersey is the only American jurisdiction in which it is settled that suppression
is an appropriate remedy for an equal protection violation, a position first articulated by the
Appellate Division in State v. Kennedy, 588 A.2d 834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), then
followed in Soto, and finally endorsed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Maryland. See
infra notes 291-292 and accompanying text. In United States v. Pollard, 209 F. Supp. 2d 525
(D.V.l. 2002) the court suppressed evidence on the ground that 8 C.F.R. § 235.5(a), which
requires an immigration inspection before United States citizens may travel from the Virgin
Islands to other parts of the United States, lacks a rational relationship to a permissible
governmental goal and therefore violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Fifth
Amendment.
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and present nonstatistical evidence of discrimination to accompany
any statistics. For systemic civil challenges, the relief sought is primar-
ily prospective, new rules for future conduct rather than the dismissal
of pending prosecutions. This makes it easier to agree on terms for
settlements, especially since settlements usually include a ritual
disclaimer that by settling the defendant police department is not ad-
mitting to any past misconduct. The focus on reform rather than indi-
vidual misconduct also makes the value of aggregate statistical evi-
dence more apparent: How else can one describe how an entire
agency is behaving? And if the case does not settle, the risk to the
state is usually greater in a civil discrimination trial than at a hearing in
a criminal case, both because the civil case is likely to be better pre-
pared and litigated, and because the dismissal of a drug prosecution is
a small cost compared to an injunction or a sizeable award of damages
against a police force.
In the end, most defense motions based on claims of racial dis-
crimination in criminal cases are denied, and most civil cases raising
similar claims settle."5 Wilkins v. Maryland State Police"1 6 is an
example. The settlement in Wilkins required the defendants to pay
modest damages to the named plaintiffs, and fees to their lawyers, but
the main provisions were forward looking: the Maryland State Police
reiterated its official opposition to racial profiling, and agreed to
formulate an official policy embodying that position, to conduct vari-
ous training programs, and to undertake the record-keeping program
that produced the database that we have relied on in this Article.1 7
The major obstacle to success in civil actions against police
departments is the complexity and expense of litigation. A major
advantage is that some of the most important civil law suits alleging
racial profiling have been brought by the United States Department of
Justice rather than by private plaintiffs. Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the
Department of Justice has the authority to investigate and, if
warranted, to sue a police department in order to eliminate a pattern
and practice of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity or na-
215. See Laura L. Scarry, Racial Profiling Litigation, The Defense Perspective 6,
(unpublished paper presented at Nat'l Symp. on Racial Profiling & Traffic Stops,
Northwestern University Center for Public Safety, Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 2001) (on file with
authors) ("[O]nly a small percentage of these [civil racial profiling] cases, for whatever rea-
son, actually proceed to trial. The majority of the cases settled ...."); see also David Rudov-
sky, Law Enforcement by Stereotype and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches
Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 352 n.349, 358 n.388, 360-63 (2001) (discussing
several settlements in civil law suits over racial profiling); Julia C. Martinez, Settlement
Reached in Tinicum Suit, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 6, 1994, at B1.
216. Settlement Agreement, Wilkins, supra note 22.
217. Id.
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tional origin."' Considering the prestige, the resources and the power
of the Justice Department, it is no surprise that most defendants agree
to settle.219 United States v. New Jersey22 is instructive. It concerned the
same pattern of racial profiling by the New Jersey State Police that
was the subject of the Soto case and it was based to a great extent on
the same evidence as Soto. New Jersey, however, resulted in an
elaborate consent decree, including provisions for training, supervising
and disciplining troopers to prevent similar conduct in the
future, for record-keeping of the sort required by the Wilkins settle-
ment in Maryland (but, more detailed), and for a court-appointed
monitor to supervise compliance with these provisions."'
And then there is politics. In the past several years, as racial pro-
filing has become an increasingly powerful political issue, attempts to
address the problem have shifted from litigation to legislation and
administration. Two examples are particularly telling for our purposes:
On April 20, 1999 the New Jersey State Attorney
General's office - after years of defending the New
Jersey State Police in court and in public - simultane-
ously issued a report conceding that racial profiling by
the State Police was "real,"' and dropped its appeal of
the trial court decision in State v. Soto. The problem had
become so notorious that the governor and the attorney
general decided to switch to the winning side in the
court of public opinion. 2
218. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994);
see also Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on
Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815,815 (1999).
219. As of February 1, 2001, the Justice Department had filed five such pattern and
practice law suits, and was conducting fifteen additional pattern and practice investigations,
some but not all of which included claims of racial profiling. Three of the lawsuits had been
resolved through consent decrees entered by federal district courts, and in a fourth a consent
decree was awaiting court approval which has since been granted. At least two of these
consent decrees included provisions directed at racial profiling, and at least one additional
racial profiling investigation was resolved by a non-judicial settlement agreement between
the Department and the local government defendants. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of
Justice Police Misconduct Pattern or Practice Program 7-8 (document distributed by Steven
H. Rosenbaum, Chief, Special Litigation Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, at Nat'l Symp. on Racial Profiling and Traffic Stops, Northwestern University
Center for Public Safety, Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 2001) (on file with authors). As of November, 2001,
one additional consent decree had been entered, including provisions prohibiting racial pro-
filing, and an additional out-of-court settlement had been reached. SPECIAL LITIGATION
SECTION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DOCUMENTS AND PUBLICATIONS, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crtlsplit/findsettle.htm (last visited Sept. 24,2002).
220. No. 99-5970 (MLC) (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.govl
crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
221. Id.
222. VERNIERO ET AL., supra note 179, at 4.
223. See David M. Herszenhorn, Reversal Has Some Questioning Attorney General's
Motives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at B8.
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• On May 15, 2001, Maryland became the thirteenth state
to enact legislation on racial profiling, in this case a law
prohibiting the practice and requiring all police officers
to record and report, among other things, the race or
ethnicity of every driver they stop - in effect, a
broader and more permanent legislative version of the
Wilkins settlement in 1995.224 The Washington Post re-
ports that "at a bill-signing ceremony packed with jubi-
lant black lawmakers," Governor Parris N. Glendening'
said: "It is simply outrageous that African Americans
are being targeted for traffic stops. We know it does
happen. And under this bill, it is illegal and it will
stop."",
Needless to say, the politicians and administrators who have taken ac-
tion against racial profiling, from the President of the United States226
to city councils and police chiefs around the country,27 have not de-
manded the type of evidence required by the Supreme Court in
McCleskey. At the end of his opinion for the majority in McCleskey,
Justice Powell added a final reason for the Court's rejection of statisti-
cal evidence: "McCleskey's arguments are best presented to the legis-
lative bodies .... Legislatures... are better qualified to weigh and
'evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the
courts .... ,228
On the issue in McCleskey itself, Justice Powell was no prophet.
Legislative bodies have been no more willing than courts to tackle ra-
cial discrimination in capital sentencing. 9 For racial profiling,
however, his argument has force; legislative bodies and executive offi-
cers are acting to address the problem, and doing so on the basis of
224. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 25-113 (2002).
225. Lori Montgomery, Racial Profiling in Maryland Defies Definition - or Solution,
WASH. POST, May 16,2001, at Al.
226. Steven A. Holmes, Clinton Orders Investigation on Possible Racial Profiling, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 1999, at A22.
227. See, e.g., Council Names 14 Citizens to Racial Profiling Study Group, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 20,2001, at B2; Sam Skolnik, Drug Arrests Target Blacks Most
Often, Study Finds Racial Disparity; Chief Pledges to Review Issue, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 2001, at B1; TUCSON POLICE DEP'T, RACIAL PROFILING -
TPD'S RESPONSE TO COMMUNITY CONCERNS (2000), available at http://www.ci.tucson.az.
us/police/PublicInfo/RacialProfiling/body-raciaLprofiling.html (last visited Oct. 22,2002).
228. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,319 (citations omitted).
229. There have been several attempts to override McCleskey by act of Congress, all
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Racial Justice Act of 1993, H.R. 3329, 103d Cong. (1993). The only
state statute that attempts to address the issue of racial discrimination in capital sentencing is
the Kentucky Racial Justice Act,. Ky. REV, STAT. ANN. §§ 532.300-.305 (Michie 1999), which
was enacted in 1998.
December 2002]
Michigan Law Review
evidence that does not satisfy McCleskey's requirements for proof of
intentional discrimination. The difference is easy to explain. The vic-
tims of racial discrimination in capital sentencing are convicted mur-
derers - as small, isolated, despised and powerless a group as one can
imagine. The many innocent blacks and Hispanics who have been vic-
timized by racial profiling, and the countless others who fear they
might be, are a vastly more powerful political constituency.
The courts, of course, are not immune to politics. As Mr. Dooley
(satirist Finley Peter Dunne's philosopher/bartender) told us a century
ago, "th' supreme court follows th' iliction returns.""0 So far the high
court has had no opportunity to address the issue, but some lower
courts, like politicians, have been willing to act. They have been more
receptive to statistical evidence of discrimination in civil racial profil-
ing cases than in criminal prosecutions - in the typical case, they
permit the suit to proceed, and supervise the eventual settlement -
and in one major criminal case, State v. Soto, a court relied on statisti-
cal evidence of racial profiling to suppress evidence for a whole class
of criminal defendants.
We do not mean to say that the attempted reforms have been suc-
cessful. That's less clear, regardless of their source. Racial profiling
continued in New Jersey after Soto; ' the settlement in Wilkins did not
end the dispute over racial profiling on 1-95 in Maryland; and the new
Maryland statute prohibiting "race based stops" may do no better.232
Legislative reforms may prove ineffective; proof of discrimination in
criminal cases is extremely difficult; 3 civil cases are hard to mount,
and sometimes lose. Our claim here is simply that for racial profiling,
in the forums that matter - of which the most important may be
public opinion - the type of evidence we have presented is frequently
persuasive.
B. Is It Legal?
Assuming it is clear that the Maryland State Police did
intentionally use race to decide which drivers to stop and to search,
are the legal consequences equally clear? If race were used as a factor
in charging or sentencing, there would be no debate. Everybody
agrees that prosecutors, judges, and juries may not take race into
230. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901).
231. Associated Press, Report: NJ Minorities Still Profiled, July 17, 2001, 2001 WL
24713260.
232. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. 11 § 25-113 (2002). This statute is only addressed to traf-
fic stops, and includes a limiting "narrow" definition of racial profiling. See infra note 278
and accompanying text.
233. See David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271,307-08,326.
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account in deciding who to prosecute or what punishment to impose.
Criminal investigation is another matter. At that early stage of the
legal process police officers must make critical choices based on
sketchy information. Some argue that they should be allowed to con-
sider race as one factor among others in deciding what to do.
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, some commentators have
said that we should reexamine our opposition to racial profiling, at
least when physical security is at stake. Liberal columnist Nicholas
Kristoff, for example, writes that "We must... relax a taboo, racial
profiling, for one of the lessons [we have learnt] is that it sometimes
works."'  He is not alone 5 - and he is not unopposed. Others argue
that even in the face of terrorist attacks, the government must not base
criminal investigations and arrests on race or ethnicity. 3 This recent
debate, however, has focused entirely on searches for weapons or ex-
plosives at airports or other sensitive locations, and on investigations
that might help identify terrorists or uncover their plans. After
September 11, as before, very few people publicly support racial pro-
filing for drug interdiction. The most influential of this small group is
probably Heather MacDonald.' 7
MacDonald believes that it is appropriate for the police to rely on
race in deciding who to search. According to MacDonald, race should
not be a basis for a decision to stop a car on the highway because at
that point the officer has so little to go on.' Searches are another mat-
ter: "But if race does play a role in the request to search, it is a much
234. Nicholas D. Kristof, Liberal Reality Check, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,2002, at A23.
235. See, e.g., Stanley Crouch, Drawing the Line on Racial Profiling, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 4, 2001, at 41 (arguing that current Arab-American profiling differs from African-
American profiling); Michael Kinsley, When Is Racial Profiling Okay?, WASH. POST, Sept.
30, 2001, at B7 (arguing that racial profiling is sometimes appropriate, and may be
acceptable at airport security checkpoints); Editorial, Profiling Debate Resumes, DENVER
POST, Oct. 3, 2001, at B6 (suggesting that race should be taken into account in finding law
enforcement targets); Dorothy Rabinowitz, Hijacking History, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2001, at
A18 (arguing that Arab-American profiling is markedly different from past forms of racial
profiling); Stephen J. Singer, Racial Profiling Also Has a Good Side, NEWSDAY, Sept. 25,
2001, at A38 (suggesting that race, in conjunction with other factors, can signal the need for
further investigation).
236. E.g., Lisa Biank Fasig, ACLU Urges Police: Refuse to Help U.S. Government
Detain Immigrants, PROVIDENCE J. BULL., Dec. 3, 2001, at B3 (stating that ACLU charges
that program to interview Middle Eastern men is "thinly disguised racial profiling"); Chisun
Lee, Let Us Not Be Suckers for Anybody, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 1, 2002, at 52 (criticizing
post-9/11 racial profiling); Jim Schaefer & Tamara Audi, Antiterror Plan Raises Anxieties,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 16,2001, at 1B (reporting anger of Arab-American leaders and
civil rights activists); see also Gross & Livingston, supra note 9 (discussing the post-9/11
debate over racial profiling).
237. Thus, for example, nationally syndicated columnist George Will wrote: "So who is
Heather MacDonald to cast decisive doubt on the prevalence, even the existence, of racial
profiling? She is the indispensable journalist." George F. Will, Exposing the Myth of Racial
Profiling, WASH. POST, Apr. 19,2001, at A19.
238. MacDonald, supra note 13, at 16.
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diminished one compared with a car stop," since the officer has more
information after he gets a close look at the car and talks to the
driver. 9 In that context, she argues, taking race into account is
permissible because it improves the officers' ability to predict which
searches will uncover drugs.2 O Similarly, John Knowles and colleagues
conclude that Maryland State troopers were not guilty of "prejudice"
or "bias," which they define as choosing suspects on the basis of race
for no good reason. Instead, the troopers seem to have pursued what
these researchers consider to be an acceptable policy of "statistical
discrimination," using race as a predictor of criminality because it is
effective.24' As we have seen, while racial profiling by the MSP does
not increase the hit rate for highway searches, 42 it probably does
increase the number of drug traffickers who are found?4 This brings
us back to the central question: Is "statistical discrimination" accept-
able as a matter of law and policy?
Racial profiling is not a subspecies of racial bigotry. Knowles et al.
define racial profiling 'as irrational acts of discrimination that are
"biased" or "prejudiced"; MacDonald repeatedly identifies racial pro-
filing with "racism." These terms are misleading. Racial profiling
could be a perfectly logical program with no racial animus. Consider
an example discussed earlier. If African Americans are more prone
than whites to a particular disease (e.g., diabetes), then it is completely
proper - indeed, good practice - for doctors to act on the assump-
tion that some black patients have that disease, even though, other
things being equal, they would conclude the opposite for whites. No
one objects to explicit reliance on race if it makes medical decisions
more accurate. Similarly, a nonracist police officer may decide to
search blacks more readily than whites because she believes it makes
her decisions more accurate. This may be the main reason why police
officers use race to decide who to search. Nonetheless, it is racial pro-
filing to do so, and many people do object, even if it's true that blacks
are more likely than whites to be drug dealers. But is it legal to use
race for that purpose?
1. Does the Fourth Amendment Forbid Any Consideration of Race?
• The major constitutional basis for objecting to searches and sei-
zures is the Fourth Amendment. Two comparatively old Supreme
Court cases form the starting point for Fourth Amendment jurispru-
239. Id. at 24.
240. Id.
241. Knowles et al., supra note 25.
242. See supra accompanying text at notes 141-150.
243. See supra Table 21 and accompanying text.
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dence on this issue. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce the Court held
that under the Fourth Amendment, the Border Patrol needed a "rea-
sonable suspicion" to stop a car on a roving patrol to search for illegal
aliens, and that apparent Mexican ancestry alone was insufficient:
"The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien
is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but
standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to
ask if they are aliens."' " In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Court
held that the Border Patrol could stop all cars, without individual sus-
picion, at a fixed checkpoint 60 miles from the Mexican border, and
that after such a lawful stop it could refer a car to a "secondary area"
for a more detailed check based "largely" on the ethnicity of the
driver.245 The Court relied in part on its characterization of this refer-
ral as a lesser imposition than the sort of investigatory stop that
normally requires "reasonable suspicion," 2" and on evidence that in
the area where this checkpoint was located Mexican ethnicity was a
good predictor of immigration law violations.247 The context of
Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte bears little resemblance to that
of ordinary encounters between police officers and civilians. Mexican
ethnicity is uniquely important for immigration policing on the south-
ern border, and the Border Patrol has the unusual authority to detain
people without individualized suspicion at the border itself or at
checkpoints in the border area. Nonetheless, these two cases, taken
together, have generated a general view that-race may not be the sole
basis for deciding who to stop or search, but that it may constitution-
ally be considered as one factor among others.2"
A review of lower court Fourth Amendment cases reveals a legal
picture that is more complex than this shorthand description, and on
the whole less friendly to the use of race in police investigations. The
two federal circuit court cases most on point seem to be in direct
conflict. In United States v. Weaver, in 1992, the Eighth Circuit held
that under Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte the reasonable suspi-
cion required to justify the detention of the defendant's bags could be
based on several factors, including his race./ 9 Eight years later, in
United States v. Montero-Camargo, the Ninth Circuit refused to permit
road stops by the Border Patrol based on Mexican appearance among
other factors: "Hispanic appearance is, in general, of such little proba-
244. 422 U.S. 873,886-87 (1975).
245. 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976).
246. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1967).
247. Brignoni-Ponce, 22 U.S. at 886-87.
248. See infra notes 279-280 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of
the use of race as the "sole basis" for police action.
249. 966 F.2d 391,394 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992).
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tive value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor where par-
ticularized or individualized suspicion is required."' The Ninth
Circuit distinguished Martinez-Fuerte, pointing out that the Supreme
Court held that the intrusion in that case was "sufficiently minimal
that no particularized reason need exist to justify it;"25' and it distin-
guished Brignoni-Ponce on the ground that in the quarter century
since that case was decided, the population of Mexican American citi-
zens had grown enormously and the probative value of Hispanic
appearance as evidence of illegal entry into the country had
correspondingly decreased. 2 State court cases are also in conflict.
Some courts permit the use of race as a factor in determining "indi-
vidualized suspicion," 3 while others hold that "[njo rational inference
may be drawn from the race of [a person] ... that he may be engaged
in criminal activities." 4
The central question under the Fourth Amendment is whether a
search or seizure was "reasonable." One could rationally argue that it
is "unreasonable" to stop, search, or arrest a person because of her
race, whether or not there is a rational inference from race to criminal
activity, 5 but the Supreme Court said the opposite in Whren v. United
States: "[TIhe constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally dis-
criminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment." 6 Concern about discrimination seeps into some
Fourth Amendment racial profiling opinions, pre-Whren27 and post-
Whren, 58 but the courts' basic task is to decide whether the officer had
250. 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Whitefield v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 837 F.
Supp. 338, 340, 344 (D. Colo. 1993) (agreeing that the fact that officers relied on race to
some extent justifies summary judgment against them for Fourth Amendment violation).
251. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1132 n.16 (explaining United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,563 (1976)).
252. Id. at 1132-34.
253. E.g., Castaneda v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 82, 83, 86 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (not-
ing that trooper had reasonable suspicion based on drug courier profile that explained occu-
pants of cars with drugs were "frequently Hispanic or black").
254. State v. Kuhn, 517 A.2d 162,165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); see also People v.
Bower, 597 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1979).
255. See, e.g., Lowery v. Commonwealth, 388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Va. Ct. App. 1990)
("[Ulse of a person's race or national origin to justify a vehicle stop to investigate drug traf-
ficking... violates the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment of the United
States Constitution.").
256. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); see supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, CJ.,
dissenting) ("Use of race as a factor simply reinforces the kind of stereotyping that lies
behind drug-courier profiles. When public officials begin to regard large groups of citizens as
presumptively criminal, this country is in a perilous situation indeed.").
258. See, e.g., United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000)
("Stops based on race or ethnic appearance send the underlying message to all our citizens
that those who are not white are judged by the color of their skin alone.").
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enough information to justify his actions. In most cases lower courts
dispose of such claims, one way or another, on evidentiary grounds. In
Derricott v. State, for example, a Maryland State trooper admitted that
he stopped the defendant on the basis of a drug courier profile that in-
cluded race as an element, but he denied that he relied on the defen-
dant's racel 9 The Maryland Court of Appeals, taking the trooper at
his word, held that the nonracial factors he considered did not amount
to a reasonable suspicion, and suppressed the drugs he found in the
subsequent search." In United States v. Davis, on the other hand, the
Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's findings that the officer who
stopped the defendant had a reasonable suspicion, and did not stop
the defendant because of his race.26
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to draw general conclusions
about how race is treated as a Fourth Amendment factor in courts
across the United States. We will hazard only a couple of tentative
generalizations. First, comparatively few cases explicitly approve of
the use of race as a criterion for selecting targets for stops or searches.
One reason is that the issue is rarely presented clearly. In the two set-
tings in which racial profiling seems most common, the officer does
not need to rely on a profile, racial or otherwise, to approach the sus-
pect. She either pulls him over for a traffic violation on the highway,
or approaches and asks him to "voluntarily" answer questions in an
airport. Once the officer has gotten close enough to talk to the sus-
pect, she can usually get him to consent to a search,262 if the informa-
tion she has gathered doesn't already provide probable cause to search
or to arrest.263 As a result, when race is mentioned in Fourth
Amendment cases, it is typically as a side issue. For example, several
Eleventh Circuit cases from the 1980s discuss drug courier profiles
259. 611 A.2d 592, 596 (Md. 1992).
260. Id. at 597-98; see, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 130 F. Supp. 2d 560 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (suppressing evidence for lack of probable cause; defendants had argued racial profil-
ing had occurred, but court notes that this was "nothing other than a random stop."); State v,
Paul, 638 So. 2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming trial-court finding that officer
lacked reasonable suspicion, with no mention of race; dissent argues officer should have
been allowed to rely on racial drug courier profile).
261. See also United States v. Rosales, No. 93-30300, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 18897 (9th
Cir. Jul. 5, 1995); United States v. Thomas, 787 F. Supp. 663, 676 (E.D. Tex. 1992) ("If it
were proven that a stop were intentionally based on race, serious constitutional issues would
entail," but the evidence does not prove that claim).
262. E.g., United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Gonzales, 842 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Suarez, 694 F. Supp. 926 (S.D. Ga.
1988); Beguiristain v. State, 369 S.E.2d 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Lopez v. State, 360 S.E.2d
722 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
263. E.g., Bullock, 94 F.3d at 899; United States v. Wilson, 853 F.2d 869 (11th Cir. 1988).
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that included race in deciding whether a traffic stop was a pretext for a
drug investigation,26 an issue that is now immaterial under Whren.
Second, it seems that over time courts are becoming more hostile
to the use of race as a basis for police action under the Fourth
Amendment. In 1973, for example, in State v. Ruiz, the Arizona Court
of Appeals, without comment, upheld a stop on the basis of testimony
from the arresting officers "that it had been their experience in the
past that the few 'whites' or Mexicans who were in the area [where
Ruiz was stopped] were there for the purpose of purchasing narcot-
ics. '  Two years later in State v. Dean, the Arizona Supreme Court
was explicit: "While detention and investigation based on ethnic back-
ground alone would be arbitrary and capricious and therefore imper-
missible, the fact that a person is obviously out of place in a particular
neighborhood is one of several factors that may be considered by an
officer .... ,26
But in 1982, in State v. Graciano, the Arizona Supreme Court
overruled Ruiz and Dean:
[I]n the ordinary case, the mere fact that an individual is of a specific
race, nationality or ethnic background is not a reasonable ground for a
founded suspicion which will justify a stop and detention. To the extent
that State v. Ruiz might be read to the contrary, it is disapproved. 267
Similarly, in 1989, in Castaneda v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Court
of Appeals casually relied on testimony that "[a]ll of the profile
characteristics enumerated by the Department of State Police
as common to drug couriers were present in this case"2 - including,
specifically, that the suspects were "frequently Hispanic or black."269
The next year, in Lowery v. Commonwealth, the court reversed
course: "[U]se of a person's race or national origin to justify a vehicle
stop to investigate drug trafficking.., violates the reasonableness
requirement of the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution. 27 °
There is no single time line for this change in attitude. In 1990, for
example, Judge Carrigan of the District of Colorado concluded, with
strong comments on the side, that "profile stops may not be predi-
cated on unconstitutional discrimination based on race, ethnicity or
264. See, e.g., Wilson, 853 F.2d at 875; United States v. Harris, 716 F. Supp. 1470, 1472
(M.D. Ga. 1989); Suarez, 694 F. Supp. at 934-36.
265. 504 P.2d 1307,1307 (1973).
266. 543 P.2d 425, 427 (1975).
267. 653 P.2d 683, 687 n.7 (Ariz. 1982) (citation omitted).
268. 376 S.E.2d 82, 86 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
269. Id. at 83.
270. 388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
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state of residence""27 Two years later the Eight Circuit, over the
dissent of Chief Judge Arnold, upheld an airport stop based largely on
the fact that the defendant was a young black man from Los Angeles
because "facts are not to be ignored simply because they may be
unpleasant. '272 In 2000, the Ninth Circuit, en banc, held that "Hispanic
appearance... casts too wide a net to play any part in a particularized
reasonable suspicion determination,"273 and that "[s]tops based on
race or ethnic appearance send the underlying message to all our citi-
zens that those who are not white are judged by the color of their skin
alone. '274 In the process, the court explicitly overruled two earlier
Ninth Circuit cases, from 1991 and from 1994, in which profiles that
included race were considered without a blink.275 Still, there seems to
be a long-term shift. Twenty years ago race might be mentioned
casually in a Fourth Amendment opinion as a factor among others;276
in the past few years it's more likely to be the subject of judicial at-
tack.277
In short, despite apparent approval from the Supreme Court,
American judges are ambivalent and divided about the use of race as a
basis for individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.
Lower court cases go both ways, but increasingly the tone is negative.
There are comparatively few cases on point, and they will probably be
271. United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332 (D. Colo. 1990); see id. at 339 ("[The
arresting officer] carried out policies that systematically violated the constitutionally pro-
tected rights of Blacks and Hispanics to travel and be free from unreasonable seizures on an
equal basis with other persons traveling the highways of this nation."); see also United States
v. Thomas, 787 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Texas 1992) (stating in dicta that "law enforcement inten-
tionally predicated in any measure upon racial considerations is repugnant to this country's
values of individual treatment and equal justice").
272. United States v, Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992).
273. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
274. Id. at 1135.
275. Id. at 1134 n.22 (overruling United States v. Rodriguez-Sanchez, 23 F.3d 1488 (9th
Cir. 1994) and United States v. Franco-Munoz, 952 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1991)).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.
McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
277. Perhaps the more telling attacks are those made in passing, see, e.g., People v.
Anderson, No. F035357, 2001 Cal. App. LEXIS 2649, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2001)
("These conclusions are far too consistent with racial profiling to be permitted by the
Constitution.") (statement in an unpublished, uncitable opinion of the California Court of
Appeal), or in a context in which the Fourth Amendment is not directly implicated. In
United States v. Leviner, 31 F. Supp. 23, 33 (D. Mass. 1998), for example, the court refused to
consider traffic convictions in setting a black defendant's sentence under the federal sen-
tencing guidelines because "African American motorists are stopped and prosecuted for
traffic stops[ I more than any other citizens," and in United States v. Stone, the court found
that the decision to approach the defendant was "very likely.., based initially on racial
stereotyping," and pointed out that even though suppression was unavailable because the
officers had not yet effected a seizure, "[tihis does not mean that these actions are necessar-
ily free from further review, perhaps in the context of a civil action." 73 F. Supp. 2d 441, 447-
48 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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fewer yet in the future since the general message from the courts to
the police seems pretty clear: "We don't want to hear that you relied
on race,"
2. What Form of Racial Profiling Is Prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause?
Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte have led some states, local
governments, police departments and law enforcement organizations
to define racial profiling narrowly as police initiated conduct that is
based exclusively or solely on the race of the person affected.278 They
claim, along with some conservative commentators,279 that it is per-
fectly constitutional for the police to stop or search people because of
their race as long as race is one factor among several. This "narrow"
definition competes with the "broad" definition of racial profiling as
police action that is based on a suspect's race, even in combination
with other factors.2" The broad definition - which we use in this
Article"' - is endorsed by a different set of local governments, police
forces and law enforcement associations. 282
278. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. II § 25-113 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.1-2
(2000) ("For purposes of this chapter, 'racial profiling' means the detention, interdiction or
other disparate treatment of an individual solely on the basis of the racial or ethnic status of
the individual." (emphasis added)); Portland Police Bureau, Community Policing News,
Dec. 2000/Jan. 2001 (blue ribbon advisory panel to Portland Police Department defining
"racial profiling" as "[tihe use of race as the sole basis for justifying traffic stops or other po-
lice action") (emphasis added), at http://www.portlandpolicebureau.com/news1200.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2002). On April 14, 1999, the National Association of Police Organizations,
which "represents more than 220,000 sworn law enforcement officers through 4,000 police
unions and associations nationwide," issued a statement that it "is strongly opposed to any
instances of blatant racial discrimination, such as pulling over an automobile, searching per-
sonal property or detaining an individual, when based solely on the individual's race, ethnic-
ity, gender or age and not on any reasonable suspicion of danger or violations of law." Press
Release, National Association of Police Officers, National Police Group Alarmed with Bill
That Would Require the Collection of Data During Traffic Stops (Apr. 14, 1999) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.napo.org/press._alarmedapr99.htm (last visited Sept. 24,
2002).
279. John Derbyshire, In Defense of Racial Profiling, Where is our common sense?,
NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 19, 2001, available at http://www.nationalreview.com/19feb01/
derbyshire021901.shtml; MacDonald, supra note 13.
280. For a discussion of the distinction, see JANET NAPOLITANO, OFFICE OF THE ARIZ.
ATr'Y GEN., REPORT ON RACIAL PROFILING 2-4 (2001) (on file with authors).
281. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., INT'L ASS'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, SAMPLE PROFESSIONAL TRAFFIC
STOPS POLICY AND PROCEDURE 4 ("[A] person's race, ethnicity, gender or sexual orienta-
tion.., shall not be a factor in determining probable cause for an arrest or reasonable suspi-
cion for a stop.") (emphasis added), available at http://theiacp.org/documents/indexcfm?
fuseaction=document&document-type-id=l&document_id=139 (last visited Mar. 3, 2003);
JANET NAPOLITANO, supra note 280, at 2 ("[Alny reliance on race and/or ethnicity in ar-
ticulating reasonable suspicion is prohibited .... ); TUCSON POLICE DEP'T, supra note 227,
at 1 ("[A ny consideration.., of race or ethnicity.., is expressly prohibited.") (emphasis
added). In some jurisdictions, both broad and narrow definitions are used, with no attempt
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Proponents of the narrow definition of racial, profiling argue that
relying on race as one of a number of factors is an effective tactic and
that it is categorically different from the "exclusive" reliance on race
that they condemn as "racial profiling." Consider, for example, a
statement by Steve Young, National Vice President of the Fraternal
Order of Police, testifying in the United States Senate:
I also want to say a word about the police practice of criminal profiling.
This is a legitimate and effective law enforcement tool.... Race can be a
factor in a criminal profile, but it is never the only factor, nor is it the
most significant factor. It is simply one of many.
No one ought to be stopped solely on the basis of their race; this practice
is wrong and does not serve the law enforcement mission. But to contend
that the successful practice of profiling - which does not consider race
exclusively - be abandoned when it has proved to be a successful tool to
prevent crime and catch criminals is not the answer.3
Even if Mr. Young is right that profiles that include race are effective
law enforcement tools - a debatable point' - the distinction he
makes between good and bad profiling does not hold water. Nobody is
stopped or searched solely because of his race. As John Derbyshire, an
editor of the National Review, wrote in a column entitled In Defense of
Racial Profiling: "[O]f course ... [race] always is only one factor. I
have been unable to locate any statistics on the point, but I feel sure
that elderly black women are stopped by the police much less often
than are young white men."2 5 Under Young's definition, it would not
be racial profiling for the police to stop every young black male wear-
ing blue jeans and a t-shirt who walks quickly away from his car in the
parking lot at the mall, but no whites who fit all the these criteria ex-
cept race.
This sort of definition not only permits blatant discrimination, it
also makes it impossible to prove that an officer ever engaged in the
''narrow" type of racial profiling that its proponents would prohibit.
Over the years, police officers have tried to justify stops on the basis of
to reconcile them. Thus, for example, on November 6, 2000, the Seattle City Council passed
a resolution stating, among other things, that "[tihe use of race or ethnicity as a factor in de-
ciding to stop... is illegal, reprehensible, and will not be tolerated," and directing the
Seattle Police Department to have "in place a policy against racial profiling." CITY OF
SEATrLE LEG. INFO. SERV., RES. No. 30223, at 2 (emphasis added). That policy, however,
which was signed by the police chief in August 2000 - before the city council resolution -
prohibits "practices based solely on race." SEATTLE POLICE DEP'T DIRECTIVES, DIRECTIVE
DOO-66, Sept. 14,2000 (emphasis added) (on file with authors).
283. End Racial Profiling Act of 2001: Hearing on S. 989 Before the Senate Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Federalism & Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (2001) (testimony of Steve Young, Vice President, Fraternal Order of Police),
available at http:llwww.grandlodgefop.orgllegislationltestimony/profiling.html.
284. See infra notes 315-341 and accompanying text.
285. Derbyshire, supra note 279, 1 8.
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an ever changing array of "drug courier profiles." Across their entire
range, these profiles contain nearly every observable fact about the
suspect, including dozens of paired opposites: traveled alone/traveled
with a companion, acted too calm/acted too nervous, made eye contact
with the officer/avoided making eye contact with the officer, and so
forth." Apparently almost any human trait can be a basis for suspi-
cion, and nearly everybody exhibits several potentially suspicious non-
racial factors at any given time.
The main problem with the narrow definition of racial profiling,
however, is that it is inconsistent with the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause. As the Supreme Court made clear in Whren,287
while the question in a Fourth Amendment case is whether the officer
had enough information to stop or detain or search, the question in an
equal protection case is whether the officer acted for an improper rea-
son. Under the Equal Protection Clause, a government decision to
take action against a person because of her race is almost impossible
to justify. The use of race as a basis for a decision to detain or to
search or to prosecute can only be constitutional if it satisfies the re-
quirements of "strict scrutiny": it must be necessary to achieve a com-
pelling state interest, and narrowly tailored to suit that purpose.2 As-
suming that a state has a compelling interest in enforcing its drug laws,
it is hard to argue that highway drug interdiction is necessary for that
goal. And even if highway drug interdiction is accepted as a necessary
program, it is impossible to claim that the racially discriminatory prac-
tice at issue here - stopping thousands of minority motorists because
of their race, searching one in forty, and locating a drug dealer in one
search out of nine - is a necessary aspect of that program, or that it is
narrowly tailored to achieve the government's compelling interest. ..
A court might uphold a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment,
at least in some circumstances, even if the state trooper admits that the
race of the driver was one of several factors that led him to decide to
pull over the defendant's car. But, no American court would ever up-
hold a death sentence under the Equal Protection Clause if the prose-
cutor admits that she asked for the death penalty in part because of
the defendant's race, regardless of any nonracial factors that entered
into that decision. And many such nonracial factors are inevitable
components of any capital prosecution, however discriminatory: that
the defendant committed a homicide, that he did so in the course of a
robbery, that he had a substantial prior criminal record, etc.
286. DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 48-49 (1999); see also Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Pro-
file: "All Seems Infected that th' Infected Spy, as All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye," 65
N.C. L. REV. 417 (1987).
287. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
288. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
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McCleskey, however troublesome, made it difficult to prove discrimi-
nation in capital charging; it did not reach the absurd conclusion that
equal protection is satisfied as long as a black defendant is not plucked
at random from the population and executed solely because of his
race. Mr. Young, of the Fraternal Order of Police, illustrates this point
inadvertently in his Senate testimony: "When any employer is consid-
ering applicants, they have an idea of not only the skills and abilities
that the job requires, but also what kind of person would make the
best fit - a 'profile,' if you will".289 True, and under the Fourth
Amendment the analogy might have some value. But under the Equal
Protection Clause, a public employer - for example a police depart-
ment - may not use an "employment profile" that disfavors black ap-
plicants even if it happens to be true that overall black applicants are
less likely to be qualified than whites.
In practice, the value of the Equal Protection Clause as a remedy
for discrimination in criminal investigations is deeply compromised by
the near impossibility of proof. As a result, few cases are litigated, and
the legal doctrine remains undeveloped. Even the central issue of
remedy is unsettled. The Supreme Court has explicitly left the ques-
tion open,'t and few lower court opinions address the issue.
The few reported cases that are available are often muddled. In
State v. Maryland, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court de-
scribes the stop: "the police officers approached defendant only be-
cause he was one of three young black males the officers had seen at
the train station a week earlier" and explains that these facts establish
"selective law enforcement because defendant's race would then have
been the sole basis for the approach."29' Plainly, however, race was not
the sole basis but a basis for the stop, along with age, sex, number of
companions, and the fact that the officers had seen them before, to-
gether, at the same location. (Maryland and State v. Soto2" are the
only two published search and seizure cases in which criminal defen-
dants won suppression on equal protection grounds.) In Lowery v.
Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of Appeals found that the use of
289. Hearing on S. 989 Before the Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism &
Property Rights, supra note 283, at 5.
290. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461 n.2 (1996) ("We have never de-
termined whether dismissal of the indictment, or some other sanction, is the proper remedy
if a court determines that a defendant has been the victim of prosecution on the basis of his
race."); United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170, 176 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding it unnecessary to
decide whether an equal protection violation in police investigation requires suppression of
evidence); Brooks Holland, Safeguarding Equal Protection Rights: The Search for an
Exclusionary Rule under the Equal Protection Clause, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1107 (2000);
Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV.
2001 (1998).
291. 771 A.2d 1220,1229 (N.J. 2001).
292. 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996); see also supra note 214.
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race as a factor in a drug investigation violated the Equal Protection
Clause, but that suppression was not required because there was an
independent nonracial reason for the decision to detain the defen-
dant.293 In other cases courts have found that the defendants failed to
prove equal protection violations, sometimes discussing the nature of
the problem in dicta along the way. In United States v. Taylor, for
example, the Sixth Circuit says that if the police had "implemented a
general practice or pattern that primarily targeted minorities... or...
had incorporated a racial component into the drug courier profile"
that "would have given rise to due process and equal protection con-
stitutional implications cognizable by this court."'2 Some opinions,
such as Taylor, mention broad definitions of racial profiling,295 some
narrow ones,2% and some none,29 but the issue is never addressed in
any detail and does not seem to effect the outcome. State v. Soto2' is
the only criminal case to hold that a state violated the Equal
Protection Clause by racial profiling on the highway, and to do so pri-
marily on the basis of statistical evidence. There is no suggestion in
Soto that the defendants proved, or were required to prove, that they
293. 388 S.E.2d 265,267 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
294. 956 F.2d 572, 579 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
295. Id. In United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997), the Sixth Circuit says in
dicta that at the earliest stages of investigation, when choosing suspects for surveillance or
for consensual encounters, "the use of race as one factor in the pre-contact stage may not
violate equal protection principles," id. at 353, but that even at that early stage "an investiga-
tion of a citizen based solely on that citizen's race" would violate equal protection, id. at 355
(emphases added). See also United States v. Travis, 62 F.3d 170 (6th Cir. 1995). Racial pro-
filing at this stage of an investigation - before the officer exercises any compulsory author-
ity over a suspect - is related to the practices discussed in the text, but distinct. Unfortu-
nately, the court's treatment of the issue runs into the sort of trouble that may be more
common in dicta, when no immediate consequences are at stake. The Sixth Circuit reasons
that the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when "officers.. decide to interview a sus-
pect for many reasons, some of which are legitimate and some of which may be based on
race." Travis, 62 F.3d at 174 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977)). In Mt. Healthy, however, the legitimate reason was a sufficient explanation
for the governmental action - the teacher involved would have been fired anyway, even
without the allegedly unconstitutional motivation. Id. at 174. If that is what the Sixth Circuit
means - that it's constitutional to interview a suspect because he's black if you would have
interviewed him anyway - it is an uncontroversial position. No one doubts that it's constitu-
tional to interview a suspect because he was found standing over the victim's body with a
smoking gun, and because he's black. On the other hand, if the court means to extend that
rule to the case of a suspect who was interviewed for several reasons, but would not have
been interviewed if he had been white, the argument is inconsistent with Mt. Healthy, incon-
sistent with Taylor, and makes little sense.
296. United States v. Valenzuela, No. 00-CR-510-8, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7679 (D.
Colo. May 31, 2001); United States v. Ocampo, No. 85-414-W, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29408
(D. Mass. Feb. 11, 1986).
297. United States v. Arreola-Delgado, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1248 (D. Kan. 2001);
United States v. Tomas 787 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
298. 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996), State v. Maryland, 771 A.2d 1220
(N.J. 2001), dealt with a stop on a city street rather than a highway, and included no statisti-
cal evidence.
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were stopped solely because of their race, and no conceivable way
they could have done so given that it was conceded on all sides that
they were also stopped because they violated traffic laws.
The opinions in civil cases are no more helpful to the proponents
of the narrow definition of racial profiling. Some dismiss or grant
summary judgment against equal protection racial profiling claims for
unrelated defects in pleading or proof;2" others deny motions to dis-
miss or for summary judgment made on similar grounds;' none sug-
gest that a plaintiff must plead or prove that she was stopped or
searched solely because of her race. Most civil cases are resolved by
settlement rather than judgment, and the settlements that we know of
all prohibit any consideration of race. In Wilkins v. Maryland State
Police, for example, the Settlement Agreement specifies, among other
provisions, that "[t]he policy [of the Maryland State Police] shall spe-
cifically prohibit consideration of race as a factor for the development
of policies for stopping, detaining, or searching motorists;"'" and that
"it is the policy of the Maryland State Police that racial characteristics
not be considered in requesting consent to search or in utilizing a ca-
nine for drug detection purposes."' Similarly, the out-of-court set-
tlement between the Department of Justice and the Montgomery
County, Maryland, Police Department states that officers "will not, to
any degree, use the race or national or ethnic origin of drivers or pas-
sengers in deciding which vehicles to subject to a traffic stop, or a
checkpoint or roadblock stop, or in deciding upon the scope or sub-
stance of any action in connection with [such a stop]." 3 The consent
decrees in racial profiling cases filed by the Department of Justice un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 14141 all contain virtually identical language.3"
299. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001); Harris v. City of
Virginia Beach, No. 00-1704, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 10573 (4th Cir. May 22, 2001); Nat'l
Congress for Puerto Rican Rights v. City of New York, 75 F. Supp. 2d 154, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (dismissed with leave to amend to allege "through statistical evidence or other evi-
dence" that similarly situated whites were treated more favorably); Perez v. City of New
York, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21137 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16,1999).
300. Rodriguez v. California Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2000); cf
Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Maryland State Police, 72 F. Supp. 2d
560,566 (D. Md. 1999) ("It is clearly established, according to both plaintiffs and defendants,
that stopping, detaining, or searching motorists on the basis of race violates the
constitution.").
301. Settlement Agreement, Wilkins, supra note 22, 1 6 (emphasis added).
302. d. 11 (emphasis added).
303. Mem. of Agreement between the U.S. Dep't of Justice, Montgomery County, Md.,
Montgomery County Dep't of Police, and the Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery
County Lodge 35, Inc. (Jan. 24, 2000), available at http:/Iwww.usdoj.gov/crtlcor/
Pub/mcagrmt.htm (emphasis added).
304. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE POLICE MISCONDUCT
PATTERN OR PRACTICE PROGRAM, supra note 219.
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To summarize, it is plainly unconstitutional to use race as a crite-
rion for choosing who to stop or search. Most opinions on the issue,
not surprisingly, are under the Fourth Amendment where the remedy
is clear - suppression - but the legal standard is fuzzy. Two Supreme
Court cases, Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte, say that Mexican
appearance may be considered by the Border Patrol as one factor
among others in deciding who to stop for possible immigration law
violations. Despite the special setting of these decisions, some lower
courts have followed Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte and permit-
ted the use of evidence found in ordinary drug searches that were
based in part on a suspect's race. Other lower courts, however, have
excluded evidence under the Fourth Amendment if race played any
role in the decision to stop or search the suspect, even in conjunction
with other factors, and there are indications that the tide may be run-
ning in that direction. The use of race as a factor in decisions to stop,
search, or arrest is clearly prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause,
but the remedy is unclear and proof is very difficult. As a result, few
cases have been litigated under that provision, and the law on the issue
remains sparse and undeveloped.
C. Is It Worth It?
The argument for racial profiling is not just that it is legal, but that
it's a good idea because it produces considerable value at low cost.
Heather MacDonald, for example, argues that racial profiling in the
decision to conduct a search "is both legitimate and not overly bur-
densome on law-abiding minorities." 5 No one denies that racial pro-
filing imposes costs on minorities: more innocent blacks and Hispanics
than whites are stopped, detained, questioned and searched. Professor
Randall Kennedy calls this a racial tax,' which suggests three practi-
cal questions: How many people pay that tax? How steep is it? And
what benefits does it buy?
(1) How widespread is the burden of racial profiling? MacDonald
focuses on searches. We know that on 1-95 in Maryland, drug-free
African Americans and Hispanics are five to ten times as likely as
drug-free whites to be searched, 7 but that's only a small fraction of
the problem. The Maryland State Police search two or three hundred
minority motorists a year in the 1-95 corridor out of the millions who
305. MacDonald, supra note 13, at 9; see supra text at notes 237-243; see also William
Tucker, The Tragedy of Racial Profiling; It's Unjust - and It Works, WKLY STANDARD,
May 21, 2001, at 23 ("[R]acial profiling is an effective law enforcement tool, though it unde-
niably visits indignity on the innocent.").
306. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 159 (1998).
307, See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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travel that highway,3" but behind these hundreds who are searched
there are thousands of minority motorists who are questioned, or-
dered out of their cars or frisked because of their race, and tens of
thousands who are stopped. Across police forces, over the years, the
cumulative impact is enormous. On a national poll in 2001, 52% of
African-American men said that they had been victims of racial pro-
filing at some point in their lives."° Some, no doubt, were mistaken,
but the number would be shocking even if it were only half that size.
(2) How high is the cost to those who are affected?a"' Law abiding
minorities, like all citizens, are willing to put up with inconvenience in
return for greater security. We all happily line up at security check-
points at airports, walk through metal detectors and submit to baggage
and body searches if requested. Since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, some passengers get mad if they are not checked care-
fully enough."' Racial profiling on the highway is different. The bur-
den on those who are merely pulled over and ticketed is comparatively
light, but only comparatively. Most of us have been through this expe-
rience; it can be a passing item of bad news, or it can ruin a day. But
it's a lot worse than being told to open your bags three times between
the taxi and the plane, and that's the low end of the spectrum.
As the level of the police officer's interest increases, the cost to the
innocent citizen escalates rapidly. It's one thing to get a speeding
ticket and an annoying lecture from a state trooper; it's quite another
to be told to step out of the car and to be questioned: Where are you
coming from? Where did you sleep last night? Where are you going
to? Who do you plan to see? What is their address? What is your
business? How long have you known your passengers? And so on. The
questions may seem intrusive and out of line, but you can hardly
refuse to answer an armed cop. At some point you realize that you are
not just another law-abiding citizen who's being checked out for the
sake of general security, like everybody else. You've been targeted.
The trooper is not going through a routine so, he can let you go on
your way and move on to his next task; he wants to find drugs on you.
308. See supra Table 22.
309. Richard Morin & Michael H. Cottman, Discrimination's Lingering Sting, WASH.
POST, June 22,2001, at Al.
310. For extended discussions of our claim that the extent of the harm from racial pro-
filing depends on the nature of the treatment of those targeted by the police because of their
race, see Gross & Livingston, supra note 9, at 1413; William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After
the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137,2194 (2002).
311. See generally John Reid Blackwell, Flights Mostly On Schedule: Screening Steps
Largely Invisible, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 2002, at Al (illustrating the posi-
tive reaction of passengers subjected to increased airport security measures); All Things
Considered, Analysis: Increased Security for U.S. Airlines (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 18,
2002), available at 2002 WL 3494730 (reporting positive reactions of passengers subjected to
increased airport security measures).
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He hopes and believes that he will, or he wouldn't have gone this far.
He will be disappointed if you turn out to be clean; he might get mad.
He wants to prove that you are a criminal, preferably a big criminal.
Robert Wilkins, whose family's ordeal triggered the litigation in
Wilkins v. Maryland, described the experience in testimony in the
United States Senate:
So there we were. Standing outside the car in the rain, lined up along the
road, with police lights flashing, officers standing guard, and a German
Shepard jumping on top of, underneath, and sniffing every inch of our
vehicle. We were criminal suspects; yet we were just trying to use the in-
terstate highway to travel from our homes to a funeral. It is hard to de-
scribe the frustration and pain you feel when people presume you to be
guilty for no good reason and you know that you are innocent.312
Those of us who have not been through this sort of experience
probably underestimate its impact. To be treated as a criminal is a
basic insult to a person's self-image and to his position in society. It
cannot easily be shrugged off. Of course, many victims of racial pro-
filing are not surprised by this sort of treatment. They know why they
were chosen - which makes it worse. It's bad enough to have the ac-
cidental misfortune to be mistaken for a bad guy; it's worse to feel that
you are assumed to be a criminal because of your race. Robert Wilkins
again:
I particularly remember a car driving past with two young white children
in the back seat, noses pressed against the window. They were looking at
the policemen, the flashing lights, the German Shepard, and us .... They
saw some black people standing along the road who certainly must have
been bad people who had done something wrong, for why else would the
police have them there?3 13
Stop and consider: If you had been driving by that night and saw the
roadside scene that Wilkins describes - what would you have thought
of the black people standing in the rain with state troopers around
them?314
Effective law enforcement depends on the cooperation and trust of
the citizens. Treating law abiding blacks and Hispanic like criminals is
312. The Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1999: Hearings on S. 821 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism and & Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Robert L. Wilkins, Esq.), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/330200rw.htm.
313. Id.
314. John Derbyshire, columnist and contributing editor for the National Review, has a
different view of the costs of racial profiling. He recognizes that innocent people will get
caught in the net, but considers it a small problem. We must, he writes, "shed the idea that
deference to sensitivities of racial minorities - however overwrought those sensitivities may
be, however over-stimulated by unscrupulous mountebanks, however disconnected from
reality - trumps every other consideration...." Derbyshire, supra note 279. We can only
attribute this diatribe to an acute failure of imagination.
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counterproductive, to say the least. If you've been stopped, searched,
and perhaps humiliated because of your race, you don't forget it; the
next time a cop stops or questions you, whatever the true reason,
you'll probably assume that once again, it's your race. To the extent
that this is known to be a general problem, its impact spreads from
those who are affected directly to their relatives, friends and neigh-
bors. Large segments of minority communities learn to see the police
as a threat, to avoid rather than to help them;3" 5 some of those who are
most often picked on - young black and Hispanic men - may come
to identify with criminals even though they are not criminals them-
selves. This is a heavy price to pay, above and beyond the immediate
consequences that are visited directly on the innocent victims of racial
profiling.
(3) Are the gains from racial profiling worth these coStS? 316 In other
settings, away from the highway, away from drug interdiction, this may
be a difficult question. A couple of examples will suffice. Starting in
1994, the New York City Police Department conducted an aggressive
stop-and-frisk campaign with the explicit purpose of removing guns
from the streets and discouraging New Yorkers from carrying them.a1 7
The Police Department claims that this campaign was a major cause of
the steep decline in homicide and other violent crime in New York
City in the mid-and late-1990s 8 Others dispute that claim,3" 9 but let's
assume for the moment that it's true. The New York City Police
Department has also been accused of racial profiling in conducting
315. See James Forman, Jr., Arrested Development, The Conservative Case Against
Racial Profiling, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 10, 2001, at 25-26.
316. For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see Gross & Livingston, supra note 9,
at 1429.
317. The NYPD's strategic plan was articulated in a public document issued by the
Department. New York Police Dep't, Police Strategy No. 1, Getting Guns Off the Streets of
New York (1994). In 1999, New York's Attorney General issued a report in response to
public concern about the impact of the use of aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics upon minority
communities in New York City. This report analyzed some 175,000 "UF-250s" - forms that
NYPD officers were required to complete after many "stop" encounters - for the period of
January 1, 1998 through March 31, 1999. This report concluded that about 51% of all per-
sons "stopped" during the period were black and 33% were Hispanic. OAG REPORT, supra
note 21; see also Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry,
Race and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457,470-71 (2000); Skolnick &
Caplovitz, supra note 8, at 413-15.
318. See Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two
Trends, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1313-18 (1998) (concluding that policing may
have caused or helped cause drop in gun related homicides); see also David Garland,
Criminology, Crime Control, and "The American Difference," 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1137,
1150 (1998) (arguing that street stops and searches discourage casual gun possession and
thus reduce the potential violence of unplanned street incidents).
319. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998); Fox Butterfield, Cities Reduce Crime
and Conflict Without New York-Style Hardball, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,2000, at Al.
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this operation320 and has been sued on that account.32 The
Department denies the charge,322 but lets assume that it too is true
(and in any event, the widespread perception of racial profiling is a
serious problem in itself). Given those assumptions, did the benefits of
the anti-gun campaign outweigh its costs? This is not an easy question.
On the one hand, hundreds of homicides and thousands of violent
crimes prevented is a major gain. On the other hand, many thousands
of unarmed black and Hispanic men were stopped and searched, com-
plaints of police misconduct multiplied, and relations between the
New York City Police Department and minority communities deterio-
rated to the point of crisis.323 In this messy context (and ignoring, for
the moment, strictly legal considerations) we are driven to ask ques-
tions that are not easily answered: Would a less controversial policy
have been equally effective?324 To what extent are we willing to
tolerate discrimination for the sake of security?
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many people have said that
racial or ethnic profiling may be justified in order to prevent further
attacks." In this climate, the likely targets are men who seem to be
from the Middle East, or of Middle Eastern descent, or Muslim. Few
would question a policy of searching the bags or the bodies of every
Middle Eastern air passenger if we knew that doing so would prevent
an airline hijacking that would otherwise occur - but that's a big if.
Most of us would probably also be willing to tolerate such a policy if it
merely minimizes the risk of hijacking. But if extensive searching is
necessary, can we justify limiting it to those who look like the
September 11 hijackers? A program of searching everybody would be
more expensive than an ethnically selective program, but no less effec-
tive, and it would avoid the nasty stigmatizing effects of racial profil-
ing. In fact, searching everybody would be more effective. If we con-
centrate on particular ethnic groups, we risk making terrible mistakes
320. OAG REPORT, supra note 21; UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE
PRACTICES AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN NEW YORK CITY 6 (Aug. 2000) (on file with authors);
Fagan & Davies, supra note 317.
321. Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (class action certi-
fied).
322. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T, NYPD RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT OF
THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS - POLICE PRACTICES AND CIVIL
RIGHTS IN NEW YORK CITY 3 (2001) (on file with authors).
323. Fagan & Davies, supra note 317, at 462; Skolnick & Caplovitz, supra note 8, at 415-
17.
324. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Police Are Split on Questioning Mideast Men, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at Al.
325. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Racial Profiling May Get Wider Approval by Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A16; Kinsley, supra note 235; Henry Weinstein et al., Racial
Profiling Gains Support as Search Tactic, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at Al.
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by fighting the last war. The deadliest terrorist attack on American
soil before September 11 was by Timothy McVeigh, a clean-cut, white,
army veteran. Now that the potential to wreak havoc has become so
well known, the next terrorist may be another all-American guy, or a
Cuban refugee, or a Basque separatist. Still, organized Muslim terror-
ist cells probably pose the greatest threat of mass terror, so if we can't
search everybody - if we must do our best to identify those who pres-
ent the highest risk - shouldn't we consider ethnicity, and even re-
ligion, together with other factors, to decide who to single out? Maybe
- but notice how qualified and conditional the answer becomes when
the stakes are truly high, and how we immediately focus on the costs
and benefits. We don't want to alienate Arab. Americans - we need
their help. We don't want to question every foreign student from
Turkey while a salesman from Springfield drops twenty anthrax
loaded letters into a mailbox. And, most important, we have a long
and depressing history of racism - in law enforcement and elsewhere
- and should be extremely reluctant to take action against people
because of their race or ethnicity. 26 Not surprisingly, in the wake of
September 11 several police departments around the country have
refused to participate in a Department of Justice program to interro-
gate thousands of Middle Eastern men. They say it sounds too much
like racial profiling."
Do these digressions tell us anything about racial profiling on 1-95
from the Baltimore city line to the Delaware border? We think they
do, by contrast.
First, racial profiling on the highway. is comparatively easy to spot.
The New York City Police Department claims that blacks and
Hispanics were disproportionately stopped and frisked on the streets
of New York because the Department deployed its officers dispropor-
tionately in high-crime neighborhoods- which are mostly minority
dominated - and not because of racial profiling. All motorists on 1-95
drive in the same six or eight lanes. Street stops are free form; they can
occur in many ways and may be based on a legion of factors. Highway
stops are stylized; the officer chooses his target based on the few facts
he can see from a distance, one of which is race.
Second, profiling on the highway is heavy handed. The conse-
quences for all of those who are targeted are significant; for many they
are severe, much worse than a second search at a security checkpoint,
on a par, perhaps, with being frisked on the sidewalk in front of your
apartment building.
326. See Gross & Livingston, supra note 9, at 1414-15.
327. See, e.g., Butterfield, supra note 324; see also Gross & Livingston, supra note 9, at
1414. Local police departments might be concerned that once again, as with Operation
Pipeline, the Department of Justice will lead the way in a racially oriented policing program,
and then leave them holding the bag. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Finally, and most important, the benefits of racial profiling on 1-95
are negligible. This is a strong conclusion, but it is not in doubt even
under the most generous assumptions.
An actual evaluation of the benefits of drug profiling in the 1-95
corridor would require answers to several difficult questions. What
proportion of the drugs seized and of the dealers arrested were found as
a result of confidential intelligence?" It wouldn't take many successful
tips to have a big impact; recall that half the cocaine seized in the 1-95
corridor was found in five searches.329 If confidential intelligence
played a big role in drug interdiction by the MSP, the possible benefits
of racial profiling would be correspondingly reduced. In the absence of
information on that issue, we'll proceed as though prior intelligence
played no role at all in this program. How successful might the MSP
have been if they had not considered race? Other police agencies have
succeeded in curtailing racial profiling without reducing their effi-
ciency,"a but we'll assume that the Maryland State Police could not
have cut their reliance on race without substantially decreasing the
volume of drugs seized. Is drug interdiction a plausible strategy for re-
ducing the use of illegal drugs? This is a debatable point, to say the
least. The centerpiece of the War on Drugs - the attempt to limit the
supply of contraband drugs in the United States - has been a con-
spicuous failure.33 To cite just one finding, according to government
estimates, annual cocaine consumption in the United States was virtu-
ally unchanged from 1990 through 1998, while the price declined
slightly.332 Nonetheless, we'll assume for the moment that drug inter-
diction is a worthy goal.
328. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
329. See supra Table 13.
330. For example, in March 2000, a General Accounting Office report found, among
other things, that black, female, U.S. citizen airline passengers were nine times more likely
than white, female, U.S. citizens to be subjected to x-ray searches by the Customs Service,
but less than half as likely to be found carrying contraband. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., BETTER TARGETING OF AIRLINE PASSENGERS FOR
PERSONAL SEARCHES COULD PRODUCE BETTER RESULTS 2 (Mar. 2000). In response to
this and other charges of racial profiling, the customs service instituted changes in policies
that resulted, among other things, in a decrease of nearly 80% in the number of personal (as
opposed to baggage) searches conducted by the Service, but no decrease in the level of drug
seizures. End Racial Profiling Act of 2001: Hearing on S. 989 Before the Senate Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (2001) (testimony of Raymond W. Kelly), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
oldsite/te080101sc-kelly.htm. See Skolnick & Caplovitz, supra note 8, at 432-35 (describing
Customs Service shift from searches based on "profile" factors, to behavioral factors, to re-
duce reliance on race and improve efficiency).
331. See, e.g., STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR
203-07 (1993); SAMUEL WALKER, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME AND DRUGS 262
(3d ed. 1994); Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, in THE CRISIS IN DRUG
PROHIBITION 13,21 (David Boaz ed., 1990).
332. RHODES ET AL., supra note 152, at 15-18.
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Even with these forgiving assumptions, drug interdiction on 1-95
has no value to speak of. Stopping and searching cars on interstate
highways without prior intelligence is a hopeless strategy for eradi-
cating drug trafficking. Identifying drug dealers on the highway is inef-
ficient for the same reason that racial profiling is easy to spot: because
the officer has so little information to go on. Taking the Maryland
State Police data at face value, the troopers conducted about one
search for every seventy stops in the 1-95 corridor,333 and found a
dealer about once in 600 stops.3 ' In the process they must have missed
some of the dealers they pulled over - maybe even most - but we'll
assume nonetheless that the troopers found all of the drugs that were
in the cars they stopped. Even so, highway drug interdiction is doomed
to fail.
Consider: How likely are you to be stopped by an officer in the
course of a single car trip from New York City (the source of drugs in
this pipeline) to Baltimore (the destination)? The chance of being
stopped in the 1-95 corridor in Maryland is about one in 1250; 35 since
you're traveling south the risk may be up to about one in 1100;11 if
you're a black driver headed toward Baltimore, the risk of a stop in
Maryland may be one in 650,137 or perhaps one in 180 for the entire
200 mile trip. In other words, even with racial profiling, 99.4% of
minority drug traffickers driving from New York to Baltimore are
never stopped at all - and that's without considering the possibility
that they take even simple steps to reduce the risk even further, such
as hitting every possible rush hour along the way. A trooper may be
taking his best shot at finding a drug dealer on the interstate by stop-
ping a black driver, but it's a very long shot, and ten other drivers,
identical in every respect that he could observe, will have sped by
before he asks for license and registration.
This is not speculation. From January 1995 through June 2000 the
Maryland State Police seized about 182 kilograms of powder cocaine
and crack in the 1-95 corridor,338 an average of about 33 kilograms a
year. In that same period, the government estimates that Americans
consumed 1606 metric tons of cocaine.339 The Baltimore-Washington,
333. See supra Table 5.
334. See supra Table 12 and accompanying text (reporting that about 11% of searches in
1-95 corridor found drug dealers).
335. See supra note 41.
336. See supra text following Table 16.
337. See supra Table 4.
33A See supra text accompanying notes 153-154 (combining powder cocaine and crack).
A small proportion of the cocaine seized on 1-95 was northbound, see supra Table 16, but we
will assume (conservatively) that it was all headed toward the Baltimore-Washington D.C.
metropolitan area.
339. RHODES ET AL., supra note 152, at 17, tbl.7.
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D.C., metropolitan area has about 2.7% of the national population;3"
if they used cocaine at the average rate for the country, the amount
seized by Maryland State Police on the major drug pipeline into the
region amounted to about 0.4% of the cocaine consumed. A similar
estimate for heroin is even lower, just over 0.2%. 3"' These are rough
estimates, of course, and even if 1-95 is the major drug pipeline to the
area a significant proportion of the cocaine and heroin sold in
Baltimore and Washington probably arrives by other routes. Maybe
we have underestimated (or overestimated) the impact of this effort
by a factor of two or three. Maybe, with luck and effort, the troopers
could do better; in 1996, the most successful year for which we have
data, they seized about three times the average amount of crack and
cocaine, and more than twice the average amount of heroin. It doesn't
matter. Even multiplied five-fold, these amounts are trivial. The entire
1-95 drug interdiction program in Maryland could end tomorrow, ra-
cial profiling and all, without raising a ripple on the surface of local
drug markets one way or the other.342
On reflection, why would anybody ever think that the state police
could choke off the supply of illegal drugs by stopping one car in 1000
on the highway? Surely the impetus for this practice is not that it is ef-
fective but that it is easily done. The most important duties of state
police troopers on interstate highways are infrequent events: re-
sponding to periodic emergencies and policing extreme violations of
traffic regulations. In between times they may deter routine traffic
violations to some extent by occasional enforcement of the official
rules, but their most important jobs are to be available and to be visi-
ble. As long as all they need to do is be there and give out some tick-
ets, why not troll for drugs along the way? After all, the troopers have
virtually unlimited discretion in choosing who to stop, and are at least
as visible as otherwise when they question a suspect by the side of the
road or conduct a search. Of course, once such a program takes hold,
it's self-perpetuating. A big drug bust, unlike a traffic ticket, is a catch
- $10,000 worth of cocaine seized, two bad guys put away. It's a satis-
fying, career-building success, even if a hundred similar fish swim by
340. According to the 2000 Census, the national population was 281.4 million,
http://factfinder.census.gov/bf/.lang=en vt_name=DEC_2000_SF_U_DPl._geo..id--O1000U
S.html, and the population of the Baltimore-Washington D.C. Consolidated Metropolitan
Area was 7.6 million, http://factfinder.census.gov/servletlDTrable?_ts =42817970970.
341. See RHODES ET AL., supra note 152, at 17, tbl.7, for the estimate of heroin con-
sumption. The total seized by the MSP in the 1-95 corridor in the study period was about 4.5
kilograms. See supra text accompanying notes 153-154.
342. According to the Superintendent of the MSP, in 1997, "an agency of the Drug En-
forcement Administration recognized the Maryland State Police for recovering more crack
cocaine during traffic stops than any other police department in the country." Mitchell,
supra note 30. If that is any indication of the comparative success of other high way drug in-
terdiction programs generally, it is a pretty dismal signal.
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undisturbed. Unfortunately, the circumstance that makes this method
possible - the discretion to stop, question, and search any one of
thousands of drivers - also means that the troopers must make their
initial choices based on very limited information, and that they rarely
find what they are looking for. Not surprisingly, the troopers use any
clue that might improve their odds, and race is a clue that is always
available. The defining features of highway drug interdiction -
unchecked police discretion, low information, low probability of suc-
cess, and high rewards for the rare big hit - combine to make racial
profiling a temptation that is hard to resist.
V. CONCLUSION
The data on drug interdiction by the Maryland State Police are the
best available, but they are limited. We have done our best to describe
a complex process with the information at our disposal. Fortunately,
the basic outlines are not hard to see. The first step is both the clearest
and the most important: The Maryland State Police transparently do
use race and ethnicity to decide who to stop and to search. There is no
other credible explanation for the patterns of stops, searches, and sei-
zures. We cannot observe the process by which these racial prefer-
ences are put into effect, but a plausible story emerges from our data
together with other information on highway drug interdiction:
Maryland State troopers seem to discriminate against black and
Hispanic motorists at every stage of their encounters, from initial stop
to final search, including especially the large number of "pre-search"
interrogations and investigations that precede the comparatively small
number of full-dress searches. The purpose of this discrimination is
plain, to maximize the number of drug traffickers arrested, and the
quantities of contraband drugs seized. Whether it works is less clear.
The great majority of the drugs seized on 1-95 in Maryland are found
in cars with black and Hispanic drivers, but that fact is hard to evalu-
ate; we know that proportion is exaggerated by the racial disparities in
the MSP's intelligence and interdiction practices, but we don't know to
what extent.
The legal status of racial profiling may be the murkiest issue we
consider, but only at the margins: How does the Equal Protection
Clause apply in an area that traditionally has been governed by the
Fourth Amendment? What remedies are available? And so forth.
These questions are less important than they might appear, since all
significant audiences - including especially political actors - seem to
agree that racial profiling on the highway is illegal and should be
stopped. That consensus should be no surprise. Racial profiling on in-
terstate highways inflicts heavy costs on thousands of innocent minor-
ity motorists in an attempt to find a few dozen drug dealers, and it
achieves nothing in return. The impulse that fuels the practice - to
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increase the haul of illegal drugs - also provides a measure of its suc-
cess, and by that measure it is an unqualified failure. At their best, the
Maryland State Police seize less than one percent of the illegal drugs
that flow around them.
